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Abstract 
The importance of developing effective disaster management strategies has 
significantly grown as the world continues to be confronted with unprecedented 
disastrous events. A number of factors seem to have created conducive 
conditions for these events; factors such as climate instability, recent 
urbanization, and rapid population growth in many cities around the globe have 
unwittingly exacerbated the risks of potential disasters, leaving a large number 
of people and infrastructure exposed to new forms of threats from natural 
disasters such as flooding, cyclones, and earthquakes and the like.  
With disasters on the rise, effective recovery planning of the built 
environment is becoming imperative as it is closely related to the well-being and 
essential functioning of society. In the built environment context, post-disaster 
recovery focuses essentially on the repair and rehabilitation of large critical 
infrastructure systems. Such recovery efforts are generally performed in the form 
of collaborative partnerships that involve multiple organisations, enabling the 
restoration of interdependencies that exist between infrastructure systems such 
as energy, water (including wastewater), transport, and telecommunication 
systems. These interdependencies are major determinants of vulnerabilities and 
risks encountered by critical infrastructures and therefore have significant 
implications for post-disaster recovery. When disrupted by natural disasters, 
such interdependencies have the potential to promote the propagation of failures 
between critical infrastructures at various levels, and can have dire consequences 
on reconstruction activities.  
A holistic examination of the concept of interdependency in recent 
literatures revealed that interdependencies can be categorized according to six 
dimensional characteristics. These characteristics include the types and the 
degrees of interdependencies, the actual infrastructure characteristics and its 
environment, as well as the types of failures and the states of operation of 
infrastructures. However, to date, no adequate modelling or simulation 
techniques have been able to provide an integrated network analysis that can 
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evaluate the influence of these elements of interdependency on post-disaster 
recovery. The restoration of interdependent network systems following a 
disaster remains an immense challenge to most organisations as there is no 
unifying theory that can serve as a common standard for rehabilitating 
interdependent systems after disasters. 
This research proposes a framework that supports and guides the inclusion 
of various elements of infrastructures interdependencies when developing a 
post-disaster recovery strategy. The aim of this research was to investigate how 
various elements of infrastructure interdependencies affect the post-disaster 
recovery effort. The resulting framework sought to answer the following 
research questions: 
1. What are the various elements of infrastructure interdependency, 
which affect the post-disaster recovery effort? 
2. How do elements of infrastructure interdependency impede post-
disaster recovery effort? 
3. How can the disruptive effects of the key elements of infrastructure 
interdependency be reduced or minimized during recovery period? 
An exploratory pilot study was conducted to obtain a first-hand 
understanding on which key elements of interdependency have the potential to 
impede the post-disaster recovery. The study was followed by a multiple case 
studies approach, which was used as a tool in investigating the multifaceted 
problems related to how infrastructure interdependencies affect the post-
disaster recovery effort. Using theoretical sampling, four case studies were 
selected to investigate the implementation process of recovery strategies after 
flood-related disasters. The four case studies were principally large city councils 
and regional councils, from the most affected regions of the 2011 Queensland 
floods, in Australia.  
The case study method was concerned with looking into how these 
organisations deal or cope with recovering critical infrastructures after disasters 
despite the influence of their strong interdependencies. A range of analytical tools 
including QSR International NVivo 10 software, pattern matching logic and 
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explanation building analysis were used to analyse data. Emerging propositions 
from the cross-case analysis were further compared with the extant literatures in 
order to generate new insights on how infrastructure interdependencies 
influence the post-disaster recovery effort.  
The conceptual framework derived from the literature review indicated 
that infrastructure characteristics and environment have relatively low 
significance in revealing the influence of infrastructure interdependencies on 
post-disaster recovery. Elements of interdependencies such as (1) the types of 
interdependencies including physical, cyber and geographical, and (2) the 
degrees of interdependencies whether tight or loose, as well as (3) the types of 
failures including cascading and escalating, and (4) the states of operation of 
infrastructures after a disaster can directly affect the recovery effort. 
The exploratory pilot study confirmed that the types and degrees of 
interdependencies have the potential to impede the post-disaster recovery effort. 
The study revealed that the types of interdependencies have the potential to 
induce physical and cyber disruptions due to the lack of infrastructure 
availability and reliability, as well as resources transferability. The degrees of 
interdependencies can affect the recovery effort by the ways infrastructures 
interact (types of interactions), how often these interactions take place 
(frequency of interactions), and with which infrastructures interactions occur the 
most (relationship with the critical enabling infrastructures).  
The within-case and cross-case analyses indicated that physical and cyber 
interdependencies tend to generate cascading and escalating failures. The 
propagation of failures across infrastructures depends to a large extent on the 
degrees at which infrastructures are interdependent. Failures tend to propagate 
slowly across infrastructures that are loosely interdependent, whereas failures 
propagate rapidly for tight or strong interdependencies. Cascading and escalating 
failures induce the different states of operations of infrastructures, which will 
determine the recovery approach that need be adopted. 
 
Keywords: Post-disaster recovery, critical infrastructure, infrastructure 
interdependency, disaster resilience. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
Post-disaster recovery is a complex undertaking as it is not only closely 
linked to the well-being and essential functioning of society, but also requires a 
large financial commitment (World Bank, 2011; Davidson, Johnson, Lizarralde, 
Dikmen, & Sliwinski, 2007; UNISDR, 2005). Management of critical infrastructure 
during post-disaster recovery needs to be underpinned by a holistic recognition 
that the recovery of each individual infrastructure system (such as energy, water, 
transport and information and communication technology) can be affected by the 
interdependencies that exist between these different systems. A fundamental 
characteristic of these interdependencies is that often the failure of a critical 
infrastructure can result in the failure of other interdependent infrastructures, 
either because of their close proximity to one another, or because the 
interruption of a provided service (such as electricity) can cause the knock-on 
failures of other infrastructures (Buldyrev, Parshani, Paul, Stanley, & Havlin, 
2010; Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 2009). This can in turn lead to a cascade of 
failures, which can impede post-disaster recovery and delay reconstruction 
processes (Buldyrev, et al., 2010; Santella, Steinberg, & Parks, 2009; O'Rourke, 
2007; US Department of Homeland Security, 2006). 
This research proposes a framework that will support and guide the 
inclusion of various elements of infrastructure interdependency when 
developing a post-disaster recovery strategy. The first chapter of this thesis 
outlines the background (section 1.1) and problem (section 1.2) that led to the 
undertaking of this research project. The aim and objective of the research are 
depicted in section 1.3 of this chapter. The research contributions to the existing 
body of knowledge found in the literatures and in the disaster management field 
are also described in section 1.4. The final section of this chapter (section 1.5) 
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1.1 BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH CONTEXT  
The world continues to be confronted with unprecedented disastrous 
events, both man-made and those generated by nature (Alagona, 2006). 
Specifically related to the latter, the financial and emotional burden of natural 
disasters is expected to increase in the coming years (World Bank, 2011; UNISDR, 
2005, 2009). Factors such as urbanization, change in technological and socio-
economic conditions, as well as environmental degradation and climate 
instability are major contributors to the severity and the rate at which natural 
disasters occur (UNESCAP, 2013 2014 2015; UN Regional Commission, 2011; 
UNISDR, 2005, 2009; US Department of Homeland Security, 2006). Additionally, 
the development of infrastructures within high-risk zones, along with rapid 
population growth, have also significantly exacerbated the risks and impacts of 
natural disasters, challenged recovery efforts and raised concerns regarding their 
effectiveness (Arendt & Alesch, 2014; Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
Authority, 2012; Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011; Baird, 2010; Cameron, 2009; 
Comfort, 2007).  
Despite all of the mitigation and preparedness measures taken in advance, 
and which have partially succeeded in few cases, the occurrence of natural 
disasters and their consequences on the built environment are almost inevitable. 
Between 1970 and 2014, the world has experienced over US$2.8 trillion of 
economic losses as a result of natural disasters. The Asia-Pacific region in 
particular has been subject to approximately 50% of the world’s major natural 
disasters, affecting more than 6 billion people, causing more than 2 million 
fatalities and resulting in approximately US$1.15 trillion of economic losses 
(UNESCAP, 2013 2014 2015; ADB, 2013; World Bank, 2011UNISDR, 2009). 
Countries such as the Philippines for instance experienced the deadly Typhoon 
Haiyan in 2013, which killed more than 2 million people and resulted in 
approximately $14 billion of devastation cost (NDRRMC, 2014). In 2011, the 
Great East Japan Earthquake killed approximately 20,000 people and resulted in 
more than $235 billion of devastation cost (UNISDR, 2005, 2009). The city of 
Christchurch in New Zealand experienced the 6.3 magnitude Canterbury 
earthquake, causing 185 deaths and resulting in more than $10 billion of 
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extensive damage to infrastructures and buildings (Australian Government, 2012 
; New Zealand Government, 2012; UNISDR, 2009).  
Although earthquakes and landslides have caused extensive damage, 
hydro-meteorological natural disasters such as floods and storms have 
represented two of the highest increases in occurrence, resulting in higher 
economic losses in the region (Queensland Government, 2011, 2012; UNESCAP, 
2014 2015; UNISDR, 2005, 2009). More than 64% of the total number of natural 
disasters reported between 1970 and 2014 were essentially floods, storms and 
cyclones. This was followed by 12% from earthquakes and 6.9% from landslides 
(UNESCAP, 2013 2014 2015; UNISDR, 2005, 2009). Australia is one of those 
countries that have been affected by relentless series of floods, which has 
undeniably caused enormous impacts on many lives and destroyed numerous 
properties and infrastructures (Australian Government, 2012 2013 ; Carbone & 
Hanson, 2012; Bureau of Transport Economic, 2001). For instance, the 
subsequent 2011 Queensland floods alone caused approximately $2.8 billion of 
the $6.9 billion devastation cost registered in 2011. The floods resulted in 
damages to approximately 9,100 km of state road network and 4,700 km of the 
rail network, including power disruptions to more than 480,000 homes and 
businesses (Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2014; Emergency Architects 
Australia, 2011). This posed tremendous challenges to the response and recovery 
mechanisms that had been implemented at a state and national level (Queensland 
Reconstruction Authority, 2014). 
With disasters on the rise, effective recovery planning of the built 
environment is becoming imperative as it is not only closely related to the well-
being and essential functioning of society, but it also requires significant financial 
commitment. In the built environment context, post-disaster recovery focuses 
essentially on the repair and reconstruction of physical infrastructures 
(Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011). Major disasters require substantial efforts to 
rebuild physical infrastructures and recover from personal losses (Amaratunga 
& Haigh, 2011). The impact of natural disasters can have long-lasting implications 
for the national development of a country as they can impinge development 
efforts and drain economic resources. This is primarily due to the disabled 
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functioning of critical infrastructures (CIs), which are essential enablers to 
economic and societal living conditions (FEMA, 2010; De Bruijne & Van Eeten, 
2007; Helbing, Ammoser, & Kühnert, 2006; Moteff & Parfomak, 2004; Geipel, 
1991; Haas, Kates, & Bowden, 1977).  
All developed societies, to a large extent, rely on the constant operation of 
CI systems such as energy, transport, water (including sanitation), as well as 
information and communication technologies (Buldyrev, et al., 2010; Dueñas-
Osorio & Vemuru, 2009; Pistrika & Jonkman, 2009; De Bruijne & Van Eeten, 2007; 
O'Rourke, 2007; Alesch, 2005; Moteff & Parfomak, 2004). The incapacitation or 
destruction of such infrastructure systems would have a debilitating impact on 
national security, economic security, and the public health and safety of 
communities (FEMA, 2010; De Bruijne & Van Eeten, 2007; Helbing, et al., 2006; 
Moteff & Parfomak, 2004; Geipel, 1991; Haas, et al., 1977). Disabled critical 
infrastructures can exacerbate poverty, disrupt large industry as well as small 
businesses activities, and quite often suppress vital lifelines responsible for 
economic activity and service delivery (IPCC, 2012b; Hyogo framework, 2005). 
Given these realities, it becomes indispensable to develop a comprehensive 
approach for the effective reconstruction of critical infrastructures. 
Analysts and decision makers have recently started to recognize that 
critical infrastructure systems have become highly interconnected and mutually 
dependent on each other’s uninterrupted availability, both physically and 
through a host of information and communication technologies (ICTs) ( 
Brummitt, D’Souza, & Leicht, 2012; Eusgeld, Nan, & Dietz, 2011; Wang & Mark, 
2010; Buldyrev, et al., 2010; Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 2009; Parfomak, 2008; De 
Bruijne & Van Eeten, 2007; Dudenhoeffer et al., 2007; O'Rourke, 2007; Alesch, 
2005; Yao, Xie, & Huo, 2004). Although the nature of these interdependencies, 
especially those generated through ICTs have improved efficiencies and speed in 
control of most critical infrastructure systems, they also have added elements of 
vulnerability generated across them (De Bruijne & Van Eeten, 2007). When 
disrupted by natural disasters, such interdependencies have the potential to 
promote the propagation of failures between critical infrastructures at various 
levels, having dire consequences on reconstruction activities (Brummitt, et al., 
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2012; Eusgeld, et al., 2011; Chiaradonna, Di Giandomenico, & Lollini, 2011; 
Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 2009; Klein et al., 2009; Laprie, Kanoun, & Kaâniche, 
2007; Ouyang, Hong, Mao, Yu, & Qi, 2009; Santella, et al., 2009; Theoharidou, 
Kotzanikolaou, & Gritzalis, 2009).  
As previously mentioned, major disruption to critical infrastructure’s 
physical and cyber interdependencies can lead to cascading or escalating failures, 
which can delay the recovery effort (Brummitt, et al., 2012; Buldyrev, et al., 2010; 
Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 2009). This could subsequently lead to the occurrence 
of a ‘disaster of disaster’ scenario during the recovery period. For instance, in 
most cases, without energy system, a variety of other critical services will also fail 
during the post-disaster recovery period. Energy systems provide power for 
switches and to operate ICT networks. Similarly, ICT systems provide network 
services (including information and telecommunication services) necessary for 
the operation and supervision of electrical networks and other infrastructure 
systems. Water and sanitation systems are dependent on electricity to run pumps 
and control systems, as well as to generate petroleum fuels for transportation. 
Energy system on the other hand, requires water system for cooling and to reduce 
emissions. Additionally, transport infrastructure systems provide accessibility to 
other infrastructure operators, recovery crews and the logistics chain during the 
post-disaster recovery period, and are in turn dependent upon electrical and ICT 
systems as well as drainage systems during recovery. Thus, any unplanned 
disruption in the operation of these infrastructures may lead to undesirable 
outcomes when implementing major recovery and reconstruction projects.  
When taking these factors into consideration, it appears evident that 
securing a unique infrastructure, isolated from all other interdependent 
infrastructures has become increasingly inefficient during post-disaster 
recovery. Therefore, there is a critical need for developing an effective strategy 
that will assess the impact of critical infrastructures’ failures due to their 
interdependencies on post-disaster recovery, in order to rebuild more resilient 
infrastructure systems.  
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1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND RATIONALE 
It is indisputable that infrastructure interdependencies have always been 
acknowledged by many industries (Agneessens & Skvoretz, 2012; Brummitt, et 
al., 2012; Eusgeld, et al., 2011; Buldyrev, et al., 2010; Oliva, Panzieri, & Setola, 
2010; Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 2009; Kröger, 2008; De Bruijne & Van Eeten, 
2007; Laprie, et al., 2007; Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001; Alesch, 2005; 
Zhang, Peeta, & Friesz, 2005). This is primarily due to the fact that 
interdependency as an overall concept is intangible (existing only in connection 
with something else) and has received a plethora of descriptive expertise across 
various disciplines, ranging from statistical physics to complex systems studies. 
Most of these studies have used modelling and simulation techniques such as the 
Inoperability Input-output Model (IIM), the Agent Based Model (ABM), and 
System of System (SoS) modelling approach to analyse and assess the 
performance of interdependent network systems (Johansson & Hassel, 2010; 
Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2007; Rinaldi, 2004). However, to date the restoration of 
interdependent network systems following a disaster remains an immense 
challenge to most organisations. This is due to the fact that there is no unifying 
theory that can serve as a common standard for rehabilitating interdependent 
systems during post-disaster recovery. Accordingly, no widely accepted 
comprehensive standards have been formally recognized as suitable to guide the 
recovery process of interdependent networks. As a result, post-disaster recovery 
practices continue to remain unclear, uncoordinated and often contradictory. 
Further concern relates to the sheer enormity of infrastructure systems, 
especially when it comes to dealing with the complexity of their sub-systems or 
components. At a micro-level of each individual system are found large numbers 
of dependent and interdependent components, of which inherent behaviour are 
difficult to anticipate and understand (Johansson & Hassel, 2010). Additionally, 
in many instances critical infrastructures are linked in interdependent 
relationships with other major infrastructure systems. Post-reconstructions are 
often driven hastily, failing in most cases to repair these interdependencies. In 
conjunction with this, many organisations fear that re-establishing all those 
interdependencies, particularly at a micro-level during post-disaster recovery 
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would require a significant amount of resources and could eventually delay the 
recovery process as a whole (Queensland Government, 2012; FEMA, 2010; 
Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2014). In this regards, most of them have 
limited themselves to recognizing the level of (inter-) dependability of their 
infrastructures based on the amount of services required by the local community, 
and also based on the amount of resources necessary for the recovery of other 
dependent infrastructures. Reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts as such are 
generally performed in the form of collaborative partnerships that involve 
multiple organisations, thus enabling the restoration of interdependencies 
between infrastructures. 
The real challenge during recovery has been to incorporate and implement 
these interdependencies into existing recovery strategies, guidelines or 
standards. Interdependencies are major determinants of vulnerabilities and risks 
encountered by critical infrastructures and therefore have significant 
implications for post-disaster reconstruction (Parfomak, 2008; O'Rourke, 2007). 
In order to develop robust infrastructure protection strategies after disasters, it 
is important to identify and understand the overall behaviour as well as the 
inherent vulnerabilities of interdependent systems during recovery period. The 
main issue resides not only in assessing the performance of interdependent large 
network systems during recovery, but also in finding ways to prevent existing 
damage from escalating and resulting in additional damage, which could hinder 
the recovery effort. Thus, establishing a theoretical framework that can provide 
standardized knowledge and awareness of existing elements of infrastructure 
interdependency is essential to prioritise recovery processes of interdependent 
infrastructure. 
The current research contributes towards an understanding of the risks 
that interdependencies pose to the post-disaster recovery of large critical 
infrastructure systems. The research examines and investigates the fundamental 
roles that key elements of interdependency including the types and degrees of 
interdependencies, as well as the types of failures and state of operation of 
infrastructure due to interdependency play in impeding the post-disaster 
recovery effort. Finally, the research explains how the disruptive effects of these 
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key elements of interdependencies can be reduced or minimized during post-
disaster recovery.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVE 
In view of the research problems and rationales, the aim of this research 
was to investigate how various elements of infrastructure interdependencies 
affect the post-disaster recovery effort. The investigation was performed with the 
objective of developing a framework that will support and guide the inclusion of 
various elements of infrastructure interdependencies in a post-disaster strategy 
development. With the development of the framework, this research sought to: 
1. Determine the various elements of infrastructure interdependency 
which affect post-disaster recovery effort 
2.  Describe how these elements impede the post-disaster recovery, 
particularly during the short-term recovery period 
3. Recommend how the disruptive effects of the key elements of 
infrastructure interdependency can be reduced or minimized during 
recovery period 
Considering the three objectives that emanate from this study, a qualitative 
approach was considered to be the most appropriate strategy for this research. 
With the intent to provide a theoretical underpinning for investigating 
interdependency during post-disaster recovery, the conceptual design of the 
framework started by refining existing theories and concepts to specify which 
key dimensions of interdependency influence the recovery process. Using an 
exploratory study, the conceptual framework then described how and under 
what circumstances these key variables impede the post-disaster recovery effort. 
Ultimately, four main case studies were investigated to determine how the 
disruptive effects of these various elements of interdependency can be reduced 
or minimized during recovery period.  
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1.4 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION AND SCOPE 
The lack of theoretical framework that supports and guides the inclusion of 
key elements of infrastructure interdependency when developing a post-disaster 
reconstruction strategy remains an existing problem within the large repertoire 
of research studies on disaster management. The proposed theoretical 
framework provides an explicit understanding of the influence exerted by 
infrastructure interdependencies on post-disaster recovery effort. The 
exploratory aspect of this research provides a better understanding on key 
elements of infrastructure interdependencies, which have the potential to 
impede the recovery processes of critical infrastructures. The predictive aspect 
of the theoretical framework provides a clear depiction on how these elements 
including the types and degrees of interdependencies can escalate to a disaster of 
a disaster scenario and affect the states of operation of infrastructures. The 
research also suggests which measures can be adopted to minimize the risk of 
cascading and escalating failures across interdependent infrastructures.  
Investigating the types of failures engendered by interdependency provides 
an indication of the level of criticality of each infrastructure located within the 
interdependent network which encompasses them. As much as all damaged 
infrastructures are considered to be critical during post-disaster recovery, some 
are more critical than others, either because failures due to interdependency 
have minimal impact on them, or because failure of one infrastructure does not 
preclude their functioning. Generally, damaged infrastructures that are 
considered most critical represent the trigger elements, from which failures due 
to disaster can propagate to the rest of infrastructure systems. When it comes to 
recovery, identifying those infrastructures and recognising their level of 
interdependency could potentially dictate prioritization of the recovery 
processes of CIs. 
Nonetheless, the knowledge and understanding gained from the adoption 
and extended use of the developed theoretical framework will provide guidance 
to stakeholders in implementing comprehensive strategic guidelines during post-
disaster recovery. The theoretical framework will allow policy makers and 
disaster recovery managers to take informed actions that could result in positive 
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recovery scenarios for disaster prone regions such as the state of Queensland in 
Australia. The results will contribute to development of better reconstruction and 
rehabilitation processes and will provide a balance of theory-based and practical 
guidelines for policymakers and practitioners in order to implement effective 
post-disaster recovery planning for interdependent infrastructures in the future. 
The research is limited to hydro-meteorological natural disasters such as 
floods and cyclones, which are considered to be the costliest natural disasters in 
Australia. Floods have been estimated to contribute to 29% of the average annual 
natural hazard damage in Australia, costing around $314 million each year 
(Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2014; Queensland Government, 2012; 
FEMA, 2010). Critical infrastructure systems mentioned in this research 
encompass organisational systems such as energy (including thermoelectricity), 
transport (including roads and rails systems), and water supply (including 
sanitation), and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) systems 
(Partnership, 2006). According to Hague (2010), these critical infrastructures 
form the resource pillars on which the global security and prosperity of a country 
such as Australia stand.  
Although limited to Australia, this study provides lessons for other 
countries where similar natural disaster and post-disaster recovery issues occur 
and where addressing the impacts of infrastructure interdependencies are of 
great necessity. Additionally, there is potential for the development of new 
research along similar lines in a wide variety of flood situations and post-disaster 
recovery practices in different countries.  
 
1.5 THESIS OUTLINE 
This research investigated the influence of infrastructure 
interdependencies from a post-disaster recovery perspective. It was concluded 
that in the same ways that interdependencies between critical infrastructures 
have the potential to affect the functioning of individual infrastructure, it has also 
the capacity to impede the recovery process of an entire interdependent network 
of critical infrastructures. Thus it becomes equally important not only to secure 
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infrastructures from the consequences of natural disasters, but also to prevent 
their interdependencies to escalate to additional disasters. In order to reach that 
conclusion, a series of milestones were performed in the course of this research;  
In Chapter 2 and 3, an integrative literature review was conducted to 
provide a comprehensive depiction of the research topic and demonstrate the 
reasoning underlying the general research questions. The discussed topics 
included factors that contribute to effective post-disaster recovery of critical 
infrastructures as well as infrastructure interdependencies. It was necessary to 
unveil the concept of interdependency from its original etymology as well as from 
other research study areas, to be able to investigate how the concept of 
interdependency could be contemplated within the post-disaster recovery 
context. To unveil the research problem, knowing the kind of interdependence 
that exists between critical infrastructures was not sufficient, it was also 
necessary to question what sort of impacts these interdependencies can have on 
the post-disaster recovery. This is why the purpose of the review performed in 
chapter 3 was to determine various elements of interdependency that can affect 
the functioning of interdependent infrastructures. Among these, determining 
which key elements of interdependencies that have the potential to impede the 
post-disaster recovery effort was of a great importance. In the mix of these 
activities, the knowledge gaps within the empirical context of post-disaster 
recovery was determined and theoretical concepts derived from 
interdependency that needed further investigation became much more apparent. 
This led to the refining of the scope of the research and of the development of a 
conceptual framework that needed further testing throughout the course of this 
research.  
Chapter 4 of this research described the study approach and the 
methodology used to uncover how infrastructure interdependencies influence 
post-disaster recovery processes. The chapter synthetised the research gaps and 
expanded on the conceptual framework that was introduced in chapter 3. It also 
provided the rationale in using methods such an exploratory study and an 
inductive theory building approach for multiple case studies to answer the 
research questions. This section of the research investigated the pros and cons of 
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adopting each of these methods and most importantly the reasons why the 
methods were found to be suitable in answering the research questions. The 
exploratory study served as a pilot study to verify that the key concepts of 
interdependency discovered from the literature review were positively 
associated with existing post-disaster recovery strategies. It also provided a 
platform for deriving further qualitative measurement items, which after being 
tested, were then included in the theoretical framework. Multiple case studies 
were selected to provide the possibility of comparing data from a number of post-
disaster related cases and generate more compelling results. The processes that 
have been selected in collecting and analysing data for both the exploratory study 
and case studies are also depicted in this chapter.  
Chapter 5 reported the results of the exploratory pilot study and provided 
an overall response to the first research question on what are the key elements 
of infrastructure interdependency that have the potential to impede the post-
disaster recovery effort. The chapter described the process involved in 
conducting the exploratory study including the interview process, the selection 
of participants, as well as the data analysis process.  
Chapter 6 and 7 reported the results of the case studies investigations and 
provided the answer to the second and third research questions on how elements 
of infrastructure interdependencies have the potential to impede the post-
disaster recovery effort and how can the disruptive effect of infrastructure 
interdependencies can be reduced or minimized during post-disaster recovery. 
In Chapter 6, the results of the within-case analysis of the four selected cases were 
reported. The aim of this chapter was to become familiar with each case 
individually before undertaking the cross-case analysis required for this 
research. Chapter 7 provided the results of the cross-case analysis, which served 
to compare the cases. The comparison was performed to discover similarities and 
differences between the cases in order to produce more robust and strong results 
as well as to produce more reliable research propositions.  
Chapter 8 provides a general response to the overall research question in 
relation to the influence of infrastructures interdependencies on post-disaster 
recovery. The chapter reviews the results from the analysis conducted in Chapter 
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5, 6 and 7. It reiterates the emergent concepts derived from the literature review 
performed in Chapter 2 and 3, compare this to the results found in Chapter 5, 6 
and 7 to provide a more succinct implication of the research results.  
The last chapter of this research, Chapter 9, completes the thesis. It provides 
a conclusion of the overall research including a summary of the main findings, as 
well as the theoretical and practical contributions of the research. It emphasises 
the limitations of the research and provides general recommendations and 
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Chapter 2: POST-DISASTER 
RECOVERY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
“Solum certum nihil esse certi- The only certainty is uncertainty” 
Pliny and Rackham (1952) 
 
Phillips and Pugh (2010, p. 5) described the whole process of undertaking 
a research study as reorienting one’s thinking in a way that allows to constantly 
question what is believed to be known, in order to acquire knowledge and 
understanding of what is unknown (Phillips & Pugh, 2010, p. 5). In fact, the word 
“re”- “search” implies searching again what has been previously searched in 
order to find the knowledge gaps and propose solutions to fill these gaps.  
The literature review performed in this research provided the opportunity 
to investigate the existing body of knowledge related to the research topic, 
allowing an understanding of what is known about infrastructures 
interdependencies on one hand, and about post-disaster recovery on the other 
hand, and also to discover the gaps across these two fields of studies. The purpose 
of this literature review was to develop plausible arguments that cover the extant 
literature on the research topic and eventually to raise pertinent questions that 
will lead to the conclusions of the research. The integrative literature review 
began in Chapter 2 (sections 2.2 and 2.3) by investigating contributing and 
challenging factors to the recovery of infrastructures after a disaster. Factors such 
as effective coordination of recovery activities, building high resiliency of 
infrastructures after a disaster, as well as maintaining efficient collaborative 
governance have been examined. These factors have provided a comprehensive 
depiction of what is considered to be crucial in implementing effective disaster 
recovery. To explore the link between infrastructures interdependencies and the 
post-disaster recovery effort, a literature review on infrastructure 
interdependencies is performed in Chapter 3. In sections 3.2 and 3.3, the inherent 
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures due to their interdependencies, as well 
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as elements of interdependency that could potentially impede the recovery 
processes, are examined. The review proves to be essential in finding the gaps 
related to the influence that infrastructure interdependencies have on the post-
disaster recovery of critical infrastructures.  
 
2.2 CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO SUCCESSFUL RECOVERY OF 
INFRASTRUCTURE  
2.2.1 Understanding the Context  
Recent urbanization and rapid population growth in many cities around the 
world have unwittingly exacerbated the risks of potential disasters, leaving a 
large number of people and infrastructure exposed to new forms of threats from 
natural disasters such as flooding, cyclones, earthquakes and so on (ADB, 2013; 
Miller & Rivera, 2010; UNISDR, 2005, 2009). Natural disasters in a global context 
relate to sudden catastrophic events induced by natural phenomena that are 
experienced collectively in a society, which have the potential to cause great 
material damage and loss of lives over a certain period of time (UNESCAP, 2015; 
Arendt & Alesch, 2014; UN Regional Commission, 2011; Norris, Stevens, 
Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008; Alagona, 2006; Wisner, Blaikie, 
Cannon, & Davis, 2004). Major disasters require substantial effort to rebuild 
physical infrastructure and recover from personal losses (Kapucu & Liou, 2014; 
Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011). The financial and emotional burden of natural 
disasters is expected to increase in the coming years (World Bank, 2011). 
According to World Bank (2011), factors such as urbanization and environmental 
degradation, as well as climate change, have since the 1980s, increased by more 
than 400 percent the severity of disasters and the rate at which they occur (IPCC, 
2012b; Warren, 2010; Pelling, 2003; Freeman & Warner, 2001;). With disasters 
on the rise, effective recovery planning is becoming imperative in order to 
minimize the negative impacts and effects of catastrophic events in the coming 
years (Warren, 2010; Freeman & Warner, 2001; Pelling, 2003).  
Although many successful practices and lessons learned around disaster 
recovery have been applied in many countries over the last few years, Amaratunga 
and Haigh (2011) have denounced the lack of knowledge and proper points of 
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reference to guide the recovery processes. According to these authors (ibid 2011), 
past recoveries have failed to add any great value to current recovery practices due 
to the fact that most recovery plans have always been approached as “guessing 
games” (Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011, p. 212). Additionally, expertise and knowledge 
from disaster practitioners has tended to remain essentially within its own 
individual realm, and even when experts remain in the same organisation for a 
certain period of time, the knowledge and experiences that they possess are usually 
not codified and tend to be lost when they have left the organisation (Graebner, 
Martin, & Roundy, 2012; Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011; Moe & Pathranarakul, 2006). 
Generally this tends to result in delaying information to be shared with the other 
infrastructure providers until disruption occurs. Therefore, getting the right 
information, at the right time, from reliable sources, remains an immense challenge 
in implementing effective recovery effort (Alexander, 2002; Amaratunga & Haigh, 
2011, p. 213).  
Arendt and Alesch (2014) mentioned the need for good theory to guide 
recovery efforts in order to rebuild more resilient infrastructures and a stronger 
community. A starting point in building such theory would be in defining 
recovery as an individual concept within the disaster management field. The 
concept of recovery derives its original etymology from the Latin word 
“recuperāre”, which means the act of returning something to its normal state 
after being disturbed (recover, n.d). The notion of normalcy that emerges from 
recovery conveys the idea that the object (which in this case is the infrastructure) 
that is being recovered needs to regain its former ‘usual self’ or original condition 
after being restored (Petak, 1985). According to Petak (1985), it is during 
recovery that vital life support systems, as well as the social and economical living 
conditions of affected communities, are rehabilitated to their functioning states. 
Thus, the state of ‘usual self’ of an infrastructure is generally measured in function 
of how well infrastructures fulfil their intended purposes for the community 
(Kepaptsoglou, Konstantinidou, Karlaftis, & Stathopoulos, 2014; Petak, 1985). 
Recovery is generally conceptualized as one of the emergency management 
phases along with mitigation, preparedness, and response phases (Arendt & Alesch, 
2014; Emergency Architects Australia, 2011). Lindell (2013) used expressions 
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such as hazard mitigation, disaster preparedness, emergency response, and 
disaster recovery to differentiate the four emergency management phases. Some 
studies, however, have used terms such as ‘protection’ and ‘prevention’ to refer 
to ‘mitigation’ and ‘preparedness’ respectively (O'Brien, O'Keefe, Rose, & Wisner, 
2006; Weichselgartner, 2001), while others have used the four Rs; Reduction, 
Readiness, Response, and Recovery to refer to the four phases of emergency 
management (McEntire & Myers, 2004; Ritchie, 2008; Haigh, Amaratunga, & 
Keraminiyage, 2006).  
Several organisations such as Queensland Reconstruction Authority (2014) 
have started to recognize that emergency management is a cyclical disaster 
management process, where response and recovery phases succeed the prevention 
and preparedness phases and vice versa. This is due to the fact that most activities 
performed in each of these phases are interrelated and overlap each other 
(UNESCAP, 2015; Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2014). Mitigation and 
preparedness generally take place concurrently in the pre-impact period of a 
disaster, whereas response and recovery take place in the post-impact period of a 
disaster, during which future mitigation and preparedness plans are contemplated 
(Konstantinidou, et al., 2015; Kepaptsoglou, et al., 2014; Amaratunga & Haigh, 
2011; Berke, Kartez, & Wenger, 1993). Figure 2.1 illustrates the cyclical process 
involved in managing disasters. 
 
Figure 2.1: Disaster Management Cycle (Adapted from (Amaratunga & Haigh, 
2011; Warren, 2010) 
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Mitigation is described as the decision phase, during which organisations 
agree to take different measures to eliminate or reduce potential risks from 
natural disasters to society (Konstantinidou, et al., 2015; Kepaptsoglou, et al., 
2014; Baird, 2010; Labadie, 2008). Preparedness on the other hand, is the phase 
during which those previously mentioned measures start to be implemented 
(Ritchie, 2008; Haigh, et al., 2006; McEntire & Myers, 2004). According to Petak 
(1985), it is during preparedness that plans are developed and resources are 
accumulated to save lives and minimize damage from natural disaster. 
Amaratunga and Haigh (2011) described the response phase as the phase during 
which emergency assistance such as search and rescue, emergency shelter, 
medical care, mass feeding, etc., are provided to the community to prevent the 
occurrence of secondary damage. 
Recovery is the last of the four phases of emergency management, which 
reflects on what has happened in the previous phases and involves the 
rehabilitation or reconstruction of physical assets and services intended to return 
the community to normalcy (Arendt & Alesch, 2014; Benjamin, Bassily‐Marcus, 
Babu, Silver, & Martin, 2011). According to Anderson, Holcombe, Flory, and 
Renaud (2008), recovery goes beyond simply being an essential part of 
emergency management, it is a very complex process that involves assessment, 
planning, coordination, and evaluation activities, all of which are implemented 
throughout different phases of post-disaster recovery (Anderson, et al., 2008; 
Queensland Government, 2011; Smith & Flatt, 2011). To the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency FEMA (2010), it is during post-disaster recovery that the 
basic facilities or infrastructures, as well as the social and economical living 
conditions of affected communities, are rehabilitated to their functioning state 
(FEMA, 2010; OED, 2007; UNESCAP, 2013 ; UNISDR, 2005).  
 
2.2.2 Using Community-based Approaches in Infrastructure 
Rehabilitation 
Arendt and Alesch (2014) argued that the simple restoration of the built 
environment is insufficient to ensure community recovery (Levine, Esnard, & 
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Sapat, 2007). According to Arendt and Alesch (2014), following a significant 
disaster, neither the individual affected nor the community ever returns to what 
they were before that event. Every significant natural disaster affects not only the 
lives of the community, but also the community itself (Arendt & Alesch, 2014; 
Levine, et al., 2007). The United Nations Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN-
ISDR) (2009) report explains that an event is only considered to be a disaster 
when it results in serious consequences to a community or a society (Amaratunga 
& Haigh, 2011; Arendt & Alesch, 2014; Sullivan, 2003). Thus, the primary goal of 
recovery should be to benefit the community (Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011; 
Labadie, 2008; Sullivan, 2003). Labadie (2008) mentioned that recovery should 
go beyond the restoring of basic life support infrastructures; it should offer the 
possibility to rebuild better quality of living conditions for the community, 
sometimes referred to as ‘build back better’ (Mannakkara and Wilkinson, 2014). 
Such improved living conditions are what Labadie (2008, p. 4) referred to as the 
"the new normal", during which the community do not necessarily return to what 
they were before, but they become a more resilient or physically survivable 
community. Clinton (1996, p. 1) added that “building back better means making 
sure that, as you rebuild, you leave communities safer than they were before disaster 
struck”. Therefore, to build back better, recovery needs to be underpinned and 
driven by the safety and well-being of the community.  
Levine, Esnard and Sapat (2007) recommended the adoption of a 
community approach at an early stage of recovery to promote the return to 
normalcy of the community after a disaster. Infrastructures are generally built to 
promote the well-being and operation of a society. This is why recovery after a 
disaster in most cases, is essentially driven by the objective of reaching the 
optimal stage where infrastructures are restored to their functioning states and 
the community has reached its self-help capacity (Arendt & Alesch, 2014; 
Labadie, 2008; Levine, et al., 2007; Sullivan, 2003). Sullivan (2003) described this 
stage as being the phase during which the community is able to sustain itself 
without further external intervention due to the fact that its basic facilities and 
infrastructures have regained their original conditions. According to Lindell 
(2013), this is achieved by restoring the normal activities of a community to what 
they were before being disrupted by natural disasters (Arendt & Alesch, 2014; 
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Labadie, 2008; Levine, et al., 2007; Sullivan, 2003). Such activities, when 
disrupted, can also affect a community’s values, minds and feelings (Arendt & 
Alesch, 2014; Labadie, 2008; Levine, et al., 2007; Sullivan, 2003).  
Levine, Esnard and Sapat (2007) indicated that how the community aspect 
of recovery operations is dealt with could prevent the return to normalcy of the 
community. While most organisations attempt to keep the well-being of the 
community at the centre of recovery activities (Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011; 
Labadie, 2008; Sullivan, 2003), they in fact continuously experience numerous 
challenges and difficulties in dealing with disaster impacts and rebuilding 
infrastructures to their rehabilitated levels after disasters. As previously 
mentioned, re-establishing normal activities of communities is closely linked to 
the restoration of critical infrastructures and physical assets to a rehabilitated 
level as they are usually part of the community’s daily lives. Some infrastructures 
will have been in excellent condition before the disaster; while others may have 
been at a deteriorated level after experiencing the effects of wear and tear, or any 
other time-related issues. Nonetheless, the rehabilitated level referred to in this 
context does not necessarily imply that infrastructures have to regain their pre-
disaster conditions; normalcy is attained as long as infrastructures recover their 
functioning states. 
2.2.3 Ensuring Effective Coordination of Recovery Activities 
The reconstruction of damaged infrastructure systems needs to be carefully 
planned in order to alleviate the impact of natural disasters on local communities. 
However, defining post-disaster recovery as a sequence of activities is still a 
problematic undertaking as disaster recovery planning in most cases is 
considered to be a reactive approach (Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2014; 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, 2012; HMCRP, 2012). For most 
organisations, the real cause of natural disasters is perceived to be beyond 
organisational control and as such, recovery plans including budget plans, 
measures, and special recovery programs are usually developed in the aftermath 
of disasters (Hwang, Park, Lee, Lee, & Kim, 2014). Organisations tend to face 
many uncertainties as well as pressures to fast-track the recovery and develop 
and implement recovery plans and policies when a disaster has struck. Hence, 
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most organisations prefer to adopt a reactive rather than a proactive approach 
(Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, 2012; HMCRP, 2012; Queensland 
Reconstruction Authority, 2014).  
Several attempts have been made to provide simplistic distinctions between 
the different stages involved in post-disaster recovery. However, defining recovery 
as a sequence of stages remains a challenge. This is because as mentioned earlier, the 
descriptions of recovery stages vary depending on countries and organisations 
involved in disaster management. Very few organisations including the US 
Department of Homeland Security DHS (2008), have divided post-disaster recovery 
into two stages; short-term recovery and long-term recovery. According to DHS 
(2008), short-term recovery refers to the immediate phase of recovery that overlaps 
with any response activities. It involves the restoration of essential services such as 
power, ICT, water and wastewater systems, as well as transportation systems (DHS, 
2008). Long-term recovery on the other hand, is described as the phase which 
completes the actions undertook during the short-term recovery until all other 
reconstruction activities are fully completed (DHS, 2008; Queensland Government, 
2011; Smith & Flatt, 2011; TEMA, 2006).  
A substantial number of publications have divided the post-disaster recovery 
into three phases including the immediate aftermath, the short and the long-term 
recovery on one hand, as well as the short-term, the intermediate and the long-term 
recovery phases on the other hand (Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2014; 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, 2012; HMCRP, 2012). To most 
organisations in Queensland, Australia, post-disaster recovery varies from the 
immediate aftermath stage (first stage), to the short-term recovery phase (second 
stage), and extends to the long-term recovery phase (third stage) (Queensland 
Reconstruction Authority, 2014; UNESCAP, 2014; Queensland Government, 2011, 
2012). For Queensland Reconstruction Authority (2014), the immediate aftermath 
phase corresponds to the emergency relief effort phase, while the short-term 
recovery phase is considered as the transition phase from the emergency stage to a 
full-scale reconstruction program. It is during this phase of recovery that critical 
infrastructures are restored to a minimum operating level. Thus, the short-term 
recovery is considered to be the most critical phase of recovery during which 
immediate actions are taken to rebuild and rehabilitate critical infrastructures ( 
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Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2014; UNESCAP, 2014; Queensland 
Government, 2011, 2012). The full restoration and reconstruction of critical 
infrastructures occurs during the long-term recovery phase (Queensland 
Government, 2011, 2012; Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2014).  
Researchers such as Kates (2006) and Alexander (2002) have described 
post-disaster recovery as a set of overlapping recovery activities which span over 
four different stages. To Alexander (2002) these phases include (1) the relief phase, 
(2) the rehabilitation or restoration phase, (3) the reconstruction phase, as well as 
the (4) the post-disaster development phase. The relief and rehabilitation phases 
constitute the emergency management phase, during which immediate problems 
such as food provision, shelters, etc., are provided to the community (Alexander, 
2002). This phase of recovery constitutes the phase during which temporary 
measures are implemented to meet the basic necessities and ensure the safety of the 
community (Alexander, 2002). It extends until all the basic facilities and critical 
services are restored during the rehabilitation and restoration phase (which in turn 
extends to the reconstruction phase) (Alexander, 2002). Similar to Alexander 
(2002)’s classification, Kates (2006) recovery timeline model includes an emergency 
phase along with a restoration, as well as reconstruction I and II phases. Activities 
involved in these phases are presented in Figure 2.2. Although these two models 
provide well informed and descriptive classifications of the disaster recovery 
phases, the present study has adopted a much more simplistic and clearer 
representation of recovery phases that is used by most organisations in Queensland, 
Australia (as shown in Figure 2.3). This research focuses on the influence of 
infrastructure interdependencies on post-disaster recovery and thus a clear 
description of the recovery phases will allow a better recognition of exactly where 
and when infrastructure interdependencies impact on the recovery process. 
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Figure 2.3: Classification of post-disaster recovery (Adapted from (Queensland 
Reconstruction Authority, 2014)) 
 
Alexander (2002) recommended that although it may be impossible to 
predict the need for recovery, or what sort of recovery activities will be 
implemented, for future disasters, the procedures should be studied and some 
preparations made before the next disaster occurs in order to improve the efficiency 
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Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2014; UNESCAP, 2014). Emergency 
Management Australia (EMA) (2004) described the recovery process as a series of 
actions that involve restoring and maintaining infrastructure assets (Shaw & Sinha, 
2003). According to Bryson et al. (2002), recovery processes should aim at 
minimizing existing damage to infrastructures by identifying, prioritizing and 
safeguarding those critical infrastructures that are more vulnerable than others 
within the interdependent network. Several countries, including Australia, have 
been able to develop disaster recovery plans to meet the challenges of recovery from 
catastrophic natural disasters. However most of these recovery plans have focused 
on meeting organisational goals and business objectives such as social and economic 
recovery, rather than promoting recovery of critical infrastructures while reducing 
the impacts of their interdependencies during recovery (Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Authority, 2012; Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2014). As a result, 
these disaster recovery plans have been implemented merely on the basis of 
previous experiences rather than in line with a set of strategic guidelines to 
coordinate recovery activities (DHS, 2008; Odile, 2008).  
Post-disaster recovery processes vary temporally and spatially according 
to the types, magnitude and extent of damages, of disasters, the prevailing pre-
disaster trends, as well as the availability of resources, and qualities such as 
leadership and effective organisational planning during recovery (Alexander, 
2002; Arendt & Alesch, 2014; Smith, 2012). Spatially, different recovery 
processes can be implemented in various locations for the same disaster. For 
instance, recovery and reconstruction activities such as debris removal and 
infrastructure rehabilitation can take place at the same time in two different 
locations. This depends on the resources available and the different levels of 
impacts that a disaster can have in these locations (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 
2013; Rubin, 2009; Anderson, et al., 2008;). Viewed from the same perspective, 
the time of recovery is also directly related to the types of disasters as well as the 
magnitude and extent of damages of these disasters (Baird, 2010). Exceptional 
performances in major recovery activities can substantially reduce the time required 
to complete the recovery of those activities (Baird, 2010). However, similar to most 
natural disasters, the performance of recovery activities also cannot be predicted. 
Therefore, most organisations and researchers of post-disaster recovery have the 
Chapter 2-Post-Disaster Recovery 
Erica Mulowayi 26 
tendency to estimate the recovery period based on historical experiences from 
which they have deducted “Lessons Learned” (Queensland Reconstruction 
Authority, 2014; Queensland Government, 2011; Kates, et al., 2006). 
Kates et al. (1977; 2006) determined a recovery period based on previous 
historical studies of earthquakes and floods conducted in countries such as Italy, 
Nicaragua and the United States. In the model provided in Figure 2.4, the recovery 
was described as four periods embedded with overlapping activities that were 
essentially derived from experiences that began during and after major disasters 
(Smith, 2012; Geipel, 1991; Haas, et al., 1977). The hypothetical model developed by 
Kates et al. (1977; 2006) determined the recovery period based on the principle that 
the short-term recovery (referred to as the restoration period) and the long term 
recovery period (referred to as reconstruction I and II phases) should be 
approximately 10 times the interval of the emergency period, even when 
considering that recovery phases overlap each other (Geipel, 1991; Haas, et al., 1977; 
Kates, et al., 2006; Smith, 2012). The proposed model took into consideration the fact 
that post-disaster recovery is influenced by disaster driven activities (also referred 
to as coping activities) such as capital stock or the built environment, as well as 
“normal activities “or the daily actions of the community (Haas, et al., 1977). In the 
model displayed in Figure 2.4, the short-term recovery time was identified as 
approximately 20 weeks (approximately 5 months), 10 times higher than the 
emergency phase, although the short-term recovery overlaps the previous phase 
with activities such as clearing rubble from main arteries. Additionally, curves in the 
model display a normal distribution. This indicates that within each interval, the 
distribution of coping activities is approximately normal (Smith, 2012; Kates, et al., 
2006; Geipel, 1991; Haas, et al., 1977). 
A large number of researches have criticized this model as being overly 
simplistic, providing a broad conceptual understanding of the temporal aspect of the 
post-disaster recovery processes (Baird, 2010). Additionally, the model took into 
consideration the population’s behaviour, which is quite unpredictable considering 
that it varies from country to country, depending on the types of disasters and extent 
of damages.  
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Figure 2.4: Disaster recovery timeline (Adapted from (IPCC, 2012a)). 
 
Norris et al. (2008) noted that some disasters, although familiar in nature, are 
unpredictable as to where or when they will happen (the “known unknown” 
scenario), but other disasters are new and will not be known until they happen (the 
“unknown unknown” scenario). According to Wildavsky (1988), anticipatory 
strategies produce better results with known issues, whereas resilience strategies 
produce better results when unknown issues occur. Thus, it is safe to say that 
anticipating the risk of damage works best when previously experienced disasters 
(with expected consequences) arise; whereas resilience strategies, particularly 
during post-disaster recovery, produce better results when disasters with new 
and/or unknown consequences occur (Allenby & Fink, 2005). Nevertheless, 
experience has demonstrated that the past is not necessarily a predictor of the 
future. There are interesting examples of reconstruction projects that have broken 
the trends of their pre-disaster trajectories (Longstaff, 2005). For example, the 
2010/2011 Queensland floods in Australia were nowhere near what Queensland 
had experienced in previous years. Experts from various organisational 
backgrounds in Australia based their judgements on the 1974 Queensland flood’s 
recovery experience, implementing recovery measures based on the “Lessons 
Learnt” approach (UNESCAP, 2014 2015; Queensland Government, 2011, 2012; 
UNISDR, 2005, 2009). These experts underestimated the damage and were 
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unprepared for the scale of tragedy that followed (Queensland Reconstruction 
Authority, 2014). The 2011 floods were nowhere near what Queensland 
experienced in previous years. Damage reached $2.38 billion, exceeding the 1974 
cost of damage, which was estimated at $68 million (Emergency Architects Australia, 
2011; Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry, 2012; Carbone et al., 2013). 
Therefore the recovery processes were more ambiguous than expected, needing 
new reforms and different approaches (Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 
2014; Emergency Architects Australia, 2011;).Thus, relying essentially on disaster 
anticipatory strategies could potentially reduce the ability of an organisation to 
adapt to unexpected changes and increase the vulnerability of its infrastructure. In 
conjunction with this, anticipating a disaster and its impact may vainly monopolize 
investments against dangers that could never take place.  
Spatial and temporal dimensions of recovery are not necessarily the only 
indicators of the commencement and ending of a recovery process. In the model 
mentioned earlier that Alexander (2002) developed, the successful completion of 
recovery was associated to the costs of recovery activities and assumptions made in 
that model stipulated that funding is the key to recovery from disasters. According 
to Alexander (2002), funding provides the ability to people and organisations to 
choose appropriate solutions to their problems. With sufficient funding, relief and 
rehabilitation activities would not exceed the first three months (1 month for relief 
and 2 months for rehabilitation activities), while the reconstruction and post-
disaster development would take approximately 10 years and above (Alexander, 
2002). However, other models such as the one developed by the Tennessee 
Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) (2006) in the United States, mentioned 
that the level of activities such as restoring critical infrastructures to their normal 
functional state or optimal design state can serve as indicators of the end of a 
recovery process (Santella, et al., 2009). TEMA (2006) used a recovery timeline 
model which investigated the level of activities of the immediate aftermath phase of 
recovery, the restoration and the reconstruction phases over a certain period of time 
to determine the overall duration of each recovery phase. According to Baird (2010), 
the total level of activities and efforts (characterized by the area under the curves) 
was easier to predict for the immediate aftermath phase, which displays a normal 
distribution curve compared to the restoration and reconstruction phases. This is 
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essentially due to the fact that, in order to determine the start and the end of 
activities involved in the recovery process in the short-term and long-term period, 
experts judgment based on engineering knowledge, as well as certain number of 
assessments and tests such as structural assessment by deflection of the pavement 
condition, based on engineering standards are necessary.  
 
2.2.4 Research Gap 
The real difficulty in guiding recovery activities resides essentially in 
understanding exactly what is needed, in order to develop appropriate plans that 
will lead to the implementation of the overall recovery process of infrastructures. 
As previously mentioned, many studies have urged the need for substantial 
knowledge and understanding to guide the recovery process while others have 
encouraged following a community approach to lead to better recovery. Despite 
the current levels of knowledge and understanding, many practitioners and 
organisations involved in disaster management remain misinformed about the 
issues related to, and impacts that infrastructure interdependencies could have 
on, the recovery process. Although numerous guidelines and recovery plans 
previously put in place by many organisations have proved to be successful in 
effectively restoring infrastructures, most of them have neglected to incorporate 
and implement infrastructure interdependencies into existing recovery 
strategies, guidelines or standards. Some studies of Information System (IS) 
disruptions, have attempted to investigate and define the particular post-disaster 
recovery activities of ICT. However, although useful, these studies did not 
consider the interdependencies of ICT with other infrastructures.  
Many of the models developed, provided a very narrow, function-based 
theoretical approach to post-disaster recovery that is difficult to expand to the 
recovery of real time disastrous events (Elliott, Swartz, & Herbane, 2010). For 
instance, Cremer and Tirole (2000) investigated issues relating to the recovery of the 
internet, including issues of connectivity, multi-technology data networks and 
degradation of service of its own components without providing any suggested 
succinct recovery process which actually considers and incorporates the impact due 
to interdependencies of ICT networks with other external critical infrastructures 
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during recovery. Klincewicz (1998) investigated how the integrated design of 
computer networks affected their recovery without considering their reliance on 
electric power when that infrastructure is disrupted. Additionally, the Electric Power 
Research Institute (EPRI) and the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) both instigated 
the Complex Interactive Networks/Systems Initiative (CIN/SI) to develop new tools 
and techniques that would enable large national infrastructures to self-heal in 
response to threats of, or actual, or natural disasters (Amin, 2002). However CIN/SI 
did not consider interdependencies between critical infrastructures (Amin, 2002). 
Studies such as these, have unfortunately limited the capacity of organisations to 
develop effective recovery management guidelines that can improve the recovery 
process of interdependent infrastructure systems. Furthermore, in the absence of an 
already established recovery plan, developing and implementing a new plan after a 
disaster strikes would seriously delay any recovery process. 
 
2.3 CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTATING EFFECTIVE RECOVERY PROCESS 
2.3.1 Building a High Degree of Resilience after a disaster 
The concept of resilience derives its original etymology from the Latin word 
‘resili (ēns)’ meaning ‘bouncing back’, and is generally used to describe the ability of 
an object to resist physical stress and return to its original shape after being bent, 
compressed or stretched (Holling, 1973, p. 3). Across various disciplines such as 
social science and biological researches, resilience refers to the capacity to 
successfully tolerate disturbance and adapt to change without collapsing (Norris, et 
al., 2008; Layne, Warren, Watson, & Shalev, 2007). In a post-disaster recovery 
context, a resilient infrastructure is an infrastructure that has the capability to regain 
the same basic structure and ways of functioning after being damaged, and 
demonstrates the ability to recover to normality once the disaster has passed 
(Australian Government, 2012; Wildavsky, 1988). The UN Regional Commission 
(2011) referred to resilience as the ability of an infrastructure system to recover 
from the impacts of disasters in a timely and efficient manner through restoration of 
its basic essential functions. Holling (1973) highlighted two key concepts that shape 
a resilient infrastructure, namely the capacity to withstand or absorb external 
disturbance such as natural disasters and the speed of recovery after the disaster. In 
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this case, infrastructure systems do not necessarily need to demonstrate the ability 
to anticipate the risk of potential damage in order to minimize the consequences of 
disaster, but rather need to demonstrate their capability to recover rapidly from 
natural disasters (Hollnagel, 2014; Westrum, 2006; Woods, 2006). Thus, resilience 
is best conceptualized as an ability or a process, rather than purely as an outcome 
and it is also better perceived as adaptability than as stability (Norris, et al., 2008).  
Hollnagel (2011, p. 6) mentioned that resilience is clearly perceived through 
“the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust performance prior to something 
happening”. This ability of an infrastructure to adjust its behaviour can also be 
displayed once a disaster has occurred to anticipate for future disasters (Hollnagel, 
2014). In fact, Lettieri, Masella, and Radaelli (2009) highlighted that resilience is an 
after-disaster attribute (recovery from harm), not to be confused with resistance, 
which is needed before a disaster occur (immunity from harm). According to 
Hollnagel (2011, p. 6), during post-disaster recovery, a resilient infrastructure shows 
the ability to: 
 Know how to respond to unpredictable disturbances or disruptions by 
implementing a set of recovery processes that address these 
disturbances.  
 Know how to monitor or look for potential critical issues that 
could be a treat for the well-functioning of a system.  
 Know how to learn from previous experience and lessons derived 
from these experiences.  
 Know what to expect or anticipate future treats/ disturbances/ 
disruptions  
(Bodin & Wiman, 2004; Hollnagel, 2011, 2014).  
This implies that building a degree of resilience is not merely a reactive 
approach; it involves a series of proactive steps that do not simply aim at the survival 
of the infrastructure but also at protecting infrastructure from potential risks of 
future disasters (Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011; Longstaff, 2005). A precautious 
approach in building such degree of resilience after a disaster will involve both an 
anticipatory approach (learning from the past), but also taking efficient recovery 
actions to be able to survive the next disaster. According to Bruneau et al. (2003), 
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maintaining infrastructure resilience during post-disaster recovery also implies 
reducing the restoration period during which a specific system, or set of systems, 
returns to a normal level of functional performance. Therefore, resilience is revealed 
with the capacity of damaged infrastructures to efficiently and effectively cope with 
the impacts of disasters during the rebuilding stage. O’Rourke (2007) and Bruneau 
et al. (2003) added that resilience can be achieved by displaying adaptive qualities 
such as:  
 Robustness – showing the ability to withstand stress without suffering 
degradation. 
 Redundancy – duplicating or replacing elements within an infrastructure 
that are damaged in the event of disruption or degradation. For example 
power grids within energy system have extensive redundancy built into 
them. 
 Resourcefulness - the capacity to identify the damage and mobilize needed 
resources and services when conditions threaten the system. 
 Rapidity - the capacity to recover in a timely manner in order to contain 
losses and avoid disruption  
(Bruneau & Reinhorn, 2007; O'Rourke, 2007). 
In Figure 2.5, O’Rourke (2007) explained that prior to any natural 
disasters, the robustness of an infrastructure is considered to be at 100 percent 
as the infrastructure is viewed to be fully resilient. However, when a disaster 
strikes the infrastructure is no longer at its full resilience capacity (O'Rourke, 
2007). Therefore its robustness could decrease significantly to less than 100 
percent and eventually reach 0 percent (O'Rourke, 2007). Norris et al. (2008) 
mentioned that resilience is also directly related to resources and can fail when 
resources are lacking. Resourcefulness in itself is a problematic attribute as 
resources are not static and depend on robustness, redundancy, and the recovery 
rapidity attributes of the infrastructure to which they are allocated (Norris, et al., 
2008). Therefore, because of extensive interdependencies between critical 
infrastructures, resilience depends not only on the resource capacities of each 
individual infrastructure, but also the resource capacities that they share 
between each other (Rose & Liao, 2005; Rose, 2004). Furthermore, to maintain 
resilience of an interdependent infrastructure network, it is necessary to ensure 
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that each critical infrastructure operates normally within the interdependent 
system. Put another way, the resilience of interdependent infrastructure 
networks generally depends upon one component of the system being able to 
change or adapt in response to changes in other components, meaning the 
system would fail to function if that component remained stable (Rose & Liao, 
2005; Rose, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Measure of seismic resilience (Adapted from (Bruneau, et al., 2003; 
O'Rourke, 2007)) 
 
Several authors have recognized the need of implementing resilience at 
organisational level since the recovery of infrastructure depends to a large extend 
on organisations behind the functioning of these infrastructures. For instance 
organisations are responsible to identify and overcome design flaws and functional 
issues related to their infrastructures (Hollnagel, 2011, 2014; Bodin & Wiman, 
2004). They know the actual demands and can adjust infrastructures performance 
accordingly. Organisations also can interpret and apply procedures to detect when 
something goes wrong, or is about to go wrong etc. (Hollnagel, 2011, 2014; Bodin & 
Wiman, 2004). Thus, Whitman (2013) suggested the need to build infrastructures 
resilience within their respective organisation. In this context, looking at resilience 
at an organisational level alludes to improving organisational resilience to be able to 
improve infrastructure resilience. Authors have sporadically emphasized the need 
to consider resilience primarily within a single organisation in order to increase the 
organisation’s ability to understand its current issues and situations and thus 
formulate appropriate responses that reflect these understandings (Lengnick-Hall, 
Beck, & Lengnick-Hall, 2011; Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005;). The concept of 
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organisational resilience was initially viewed as a unique blend of cognitive 
properties of an organisation that will allow successful responding and recovering 
from a disaster (Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005). Furthermore, it is easier for 
organisations to solve design and technical issues that are specific to the units and 
sub-units of their infrastructures as these issues tend to require a high level of 
involvement and also a high degree of autonomy from the organisation to act and 
react (Normandin, Therrien, & Tanguay, 2009; Telford & Cosgrave, 2007).  
According to Longstaff (2005), surprises from natural disasters are nearly 
impossible to predict or prepare for, and thus require broad resilience strategies 
from organisations. Hollnagel (2011, p. 6) discussed that it is easier and more 
effective to manage risks from future disasters by improving the number of things 
that ‘go right’, rather than by reducing the number of things that ‘go wrong’ with an 
infrastructure. Traditionally, post-disaster reconstruction consisted of simply 
repairing the physical damage that has been induced by a disaster. However, 
authors such as Kennedy, Ashmore, Babister, and Kelman (2008) pointed out that 
rebuilding infrastructures exactly as they were prior to a disaster often re-creates 
the same vulnerabilities that existed earlier. Additionally, if restored to pre-
disaster conditions, affected infrastructures would face the same damages that 
they did when exposed to another disaster (Lyons, 2009). This is why Queensland 
Reconstruction Authority (2014) suggested the integration of the ‘build back better’ 
principle into Queensland infrastructure recovery plans in order to achieve long 
term infrastructure resilience after a disaster. This notion of betterment conveys the 
idea of rebuilding infrastructures to a more disaster resilient standards than their 
pre-disaster building standards. 
 
2.3.2 Maintaining Efficient Inter-organisational Collaboration 
Building a degree of resilience to counter a wide range of potential disasters 
is a complex task requiring a holistic approach, often in the form of partnerships, 
which involve multiple organisational sectors such as energy, water (including 
wastewater), transport, and information and communication systems (Kajitani & 
Sagai, 2009; Kröger, 2008; McDaniels, Chang, Peterson, Mikawoz, & Reed, 2007). The 
high degree of interdependency that exists between critical infrastructures requires 
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that entire interconnected networks be considered when assessing the impacts of 
disastrous events or when evaluating restoration methods (Little, 2002, 2004). 
Inter-organisational resilience can be associated with the concept of infrastructure 
interdependency as most organisations that are responsible for critical 
infrastructures tend to collaborate during the post-disaster recovery phase, 
especially when their infrastructures are exposed to cascading and escalating 
failures due to interdependency with other infrastructures (Brummitt, et al., 2012; 
Buldyrev, et al., 2010; Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 2009; Alesch, 2005).  
Inter-organisational collaborations possess different connotations 
depending on the context and circumstances surrounding the events which bring 
organisations together. Across the world, inter-organisational relationships are 
present to varying degrees in governance, administration, mutuality, norms and 
organisational autonomy (Iverson, 2013). Terms such as ‘strategic alliance’, ‘joint 
venture’, ‘public-private partnership’, ‘coordinated service delivery’, and 
‘community development’, have been used in everyday managerial vocabulary to 
describe inter-organisational relationships. According to Van de Ven, Delbecq, and 
Koenig Jr (1976), this type of relationship occurs when two or more organisations 
exchange resources in order to attain collective and self-interested goals. Iverson 
(2013) mentioned that such collaboration is not to be confused with either 
cooperation (which is quite an informal type of relationship) or coordination (which 
is a very formal type of inter-organisational relationship). The extent of the 
relationship within collaborative organisations is higher than cooperative and 
coordinated organisations (Iverson, 2013; Van de Ven, et al., 1976). Gray (2000, p. 7) 
further explained that inter-organisational relationships are more than simple 
collaboration between organisations; they are “processes through which parties 
who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences 
and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible”. 
Viewed from this perspective, for the purpose of this study, inter-organisational 
relationships will be examined as essential resilience attributes needed to cope with 
complex recovery issues that escalate beyond the capacity and capabilities of 
individual organisations. 
According to LaPorte (2007), organisations work better alone for relatively 
well-understood and regular sources of disruption, such as storms or severe 
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weather, as well as for relatively predictable budget requirements, standardized 
emergency preparedness, response and recovery procedures, and similar issues. For 
more complex dealings that could generate high risks and treats from natural 
disasters such as extreme floods, and earthquakes as well as bushfires, this require 
organisations to be more flexible in seeking external collaboration and engagement 
with outsiders (Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002; Queensland Government, 2011, 
2012; Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2014). Furthermore, Turner (1976) 
argued that large scale organisational failures generally result from ignoring outside 
complaints, difficulties handling multiple sources of information, falling back on 
habit or ritual, and the tendency to minimize danger. In situations where disasters 
occur; these elements incubate until they become part of the organisational culture, 
setting the stage for a serious problem to be triggered by an event that in other 
circumstances might be easily dealt with (Turner, 1976; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). 
Some organisations attempt to deal with uncertainty by identifying goals and 
developing plans to achieve them, but in contingent and complex situations, they 
have a hard time knowing whether they have done enough (Frederickson & LaPorte, 
2002; Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2014). 
Although inter-organisational collaboration could restrain autonomy of 
individual organisations to perform freely during recovery, Kapucu (2008) 
mentioned numerous advantages in working in a collaborative environment, 
including understanding the threat between infrastructure systems and their 
members, sufficient trust among leaders, organisations and the community to 
overcome disaster recovery uncertainties and enable members to accept direction 
(Kapucu, 2005, 2006, 2008; Kapucu & Liou, 2014; Comfort & Kapucu, 2006). Such 
collaboration also provides the ability to gain sufficient resources to sustain 
collective action under varying circumstances (Kapucu & Liou, 2014; Kapucu, 2005, 
2006, 2008; Comfort & Kapucu, 2006). Contemplating infrastructure resilience in 
an inter-organisational context also provides advantages such as the transfer of 
knowledge, technology and expertise from both private and public organisations, 
together with the sharing of information on disaster risk and impacts, as well as 
research findings and best practices (Hyogo framework, 2005).  
Researchers such as Kapucu and Liou (2014), Kapucu (2005, 2006, 2008) 
and Comfort and Kapucu (2006) have argued that infrastructure resilience cannot 
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possibly be achieved by a single organisation. Building disaster resilience is the 
result of collaborative efforts between several parties involved in inter-
organisational relationships. These authors have described inter-organisational 
relationships as inherent attributes of resilience, which are generally established in 
function of the context (or environment) to which the collaboration take place, the 
dependability or reliance of resources between organisations involved, the 
economic impact generated by the transactions, as well as the contingency or 
eventually of not having any transaction taking place, and the institutional 
paradigms that could eventually impact the collaboration between organisations 
(Comfort & Kapucu, 2006; Kapucu, 2005, 2006, 2008; Kapucu & Liou, 2014).  
According to Normandin, et al. (2009), inter-organisational relationships do 
not happen out of nowhere, they generally take place in political, economic, or socio-
cultural contexts, as well as depending on the challenges involved. In a political and 
economic context, the collaboration between organisations is shaped by laws and 
rules that not only control the exchanges between organisations, but also protect 
each party involved (Normandin, et al., 2009). This generally creates a level of trust 
as well as an extensive bond or proximity between organisations since they all have 
to comply with the same rules and regulations, especially for their own economic 
benefits. In a socio-cultural context on the other hand, collaboration between 
organisations is based on beliefs, values and standards that the organisations share 
(Normandin, et al., 2009). In this case, organisations are obliged to remain in a 
relationship to comply with those beliefs, values and standards. Hence, when facing 
challenges such those related to the post-disaster recovery, in most cases the 
complexity of issues encountered by a single organisation becomes part of the 
overall complexity of tasks required to be accomplished by all organisations 
(Normandin, et al., 2009; Van de Ven, et al., 1976). As such, this tends to lead to the 
development of obliged relationships between organisations.  
The broader context from which inter-organisational relationships happen 
as well as the differences between parties involved play a significant role in enabling 
those relationships. Comfort (2007) mentioned that rebuilding infrastructure to a 
most reliable state after a disaster requires concerted efforts to improve 
governmental response and recovery to natural disasters, as well as increasing 
infrastructure resilience, and reducing future threats. This can be achieved by: 
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a) Investigating past failures, with particular attention to communication 
and coordination problems in multi-jurisdictional settings, in order to improve 
complex inter-organisational system performance.  
b) Recognizing that emergency operations do not follow a set of traditional 
and linear methods. They are inherently non-linear and dynamic, and as such 
require creative and effective operations to face unpredictable natural disasters. 
c) Continuously learning and making organisational reforms to take 
advantage of new capabilities (Kapucu & Liou, 2014; Kapucu, 2005, 2006, 2008; 
Comfort & Kapucu, 2006).  
 
2.3.3 Research Gap 
Several organisations have recognised the necessity to improve recovery 
processes in order to avoid re-creating the pre-disaster conditions that led to 
infrastructure failures. Among the challenges in reaching such goals, building 
infrastructures with a high level of resilience, as well as maintaining effective 
collaboration among organisations, remain difficult to achieve for most 
organisations. Although many of these areas of interest have begun to attract the 
attention of several researchers in recent years, most studies still focus on the 
rebuilding of infrastructure as a reactive approach rather than taking a proactive 
perspective of the issues. Thus very few studies on infrastructure resilience have 
emphasized the necessity of rebuilding resilient infrastructures using a proactive 
approach. These studies have omitted to take into consideration infrastructure 
interdependencies, which have the potential to not only impede the recovery of 
infrastructures, but also to delay the rebuilding of resilient systems after a 
disaster. 
Infrastructure resilience needs to be improved as a function of these 
interdependencies, particularly during the recovery period to avoid the 
occurrence of a ‘disaster of disaster’ scenario. Viewed from that perspective, a 
number of research studies have also recognized that ideally the complexity of 
recovery process requires a holistic approach that involves partnerships across 
multiple organisational sectors. However, the real drive for such collaboration is 
evidently due to interdependencies that exist across large infrastructure systems. 
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Infrastructure interdependencies are one the main challenges in implementing 
effective recovery process as they continue to have significant impacts on the 
restoration of critical infrastructures. To date, only limited studies have 
attempted to reconcile inter-organisational collaboration to infrastructure 
interdependencies. 
 
2.4 SUMMARY  
Ensuring a smooth transition from response to full recovery and 
reconstruction largely depends on the coordinated efforts of multiple 
organisational sectors varying from infrastructure owners to local, state, and 
federal government agencies. During post-disaster recovery there are too many 
uncertainties and concerns that exercise pressure on these organisations to 
rebuild back to what is perceive as normalcy. Usually some of these uncertainties 
emerge due to the need to decide on whether to rebuild back to the pre-disaster 
conditions that existed before, or introduce changes and reconstruct to new 
improved standards, taking into consideration future risks of potential disasters. 
Other concerns involve establishing priorities and deciding on the sequence of 
activities starting from the highest to the lowest priority activities, such as the 
types and sections of infrastructure to be rebuilt first, and which are the most 
important human services that need to be provided after disasters.  
With the large amount of uncertainty that surrounds the recovery of 
infrastructure after disasters; recent studies have demonstrated that three major 
contributing factors can result in efficient post-disaster recovery effort. 
Management of disaster recovery is best approached by possession of good 
theory and knowledge of previous recoveries. This can serve as a proper point of 
reference to guide the next recovery efforts. Recovery of infrastructures is also 
considered to be successful when it is implemented from a community 
development perspective and when it follows a set of well-coordinated recovery 
activities. This is generally achieved when recovery is conducted through an 
inter-organisational collaboration between public and private sectors. The lack 
of effective coordination and collaboration not only compounds the impacts of 
natural disasters, but also affects the rebuilding of resilient infrastructures during 
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post-disaster recovery. Additionally, interdependencies across infrastructures 
demand that the rebuilding of resiliency after disaster takes into account the 
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Chapter 3-Infrastructures Interdependencies 




‘Interdependency’ as an overall concept has received a plethora of 
commentary and description across various disciplines, ranging from statistical 
physics to complex systems studies (Johansson & Hassel, 2010; Dudenhoeffer, et 
al., 2007; Rinaldi, 2004). However, examination of the influence of infrastructure 
interdependencies on post-disaster recovery efforts remains poorly investigated, 
particularly in those disciplines in the fields of disaster management, project 
management, and construction management. 
The previous chapter outlined the challenging and successful contributors 
to effective disaster recovery. Although useful suggestions were elaborated, most 
publications have omitted to consider the challenges related to infrastructure 
interdependencies during recovery and to provide recommendations on how to 
cope with their impacts on the recovery processes. With little assumptions on 
how infrastructure interdependencies influence recovery after disaster, this 
section begins with investigating elements of infrastructure interdependencies 
which could potentially impede the recovery effort. Elements such as the types 
and degrees of interdependency including infrastructure behavioural 
characteristics and environment, as well the types of failures and the state of 
operation of infrastructure due to interdependency are described in section 3.2. 
From implications drawn from these literatures, section 3.3 outlined the 
conceptual framework proposed for this study including the major hypothesis 
and theoretical propositions which could potentially unveil research questions.  
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3.2 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCIES 
3.2.1 Background 
Modern society, to a large extent, relies on a set of vital infrastructure systems 
that are essential to enable economic growth and societal living conditions (Ouyang, 
2014). These critical infrastructures (CIs) provide services such as electricity, road 
and rail transportation services, telecommunication and information services as 
well as water supply and sanitation (Pitilakis & Kakderi, 2011; Santella, et al., 2009; 
Zhang, et al., 2005; Yao, et al., 2004; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). Critical infrastructures have 
become highly interconnected and mutually dependent in the past few years, both 
physically and through a host of information and communication technologies (De 
Bruijne & Van Eeten, 2007). For instance, energy system provides power for 
switches and operating ICT network and ICT system provides network services 
(including information and telecommunication services) necessary for the 
operation and supervision of electrical networks.  
To a large extent, the functionality of one critical infrastructure is largely 
dependent on the functionality of other infrastructure systems. Thus, in order to 
develop robust infrastructure protection strategies, it is important to identify and 
understand the overall behaviour and the inherent vulnerabilities of these 
interdependent systems, particularly when facing consequences of natural disasters. 
Interdependencies are major determinants of vulnerabilities and risks 
encountered by critical infrastructures and can have significant implications for 
post-disaster recovery. When disrupted by natural disasters, such 
interdependencies have the potential to promote the propagation of failures 
between critical infrastructures at various levels, and can have dire consequences 
on reconstruction activities (Ouyang, 2014; Loschel, Moslener, & Rubbelke, 2010; 
Santella, et al., 2009). Interdependencies become peculiarly apparent when 
critical infrastructures are subject to disruptions. Disruptions generally fall into 
two categories: physical disruptions (which correspond to shortage of 
supply/consumption/production of an asset) and cyber disruptions (which 
correspond to electronic, radio-frequency, or computer-based attacks, to name a 
few) (Eusgeld, et al., 2011; Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 2009).  
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3.2.2 Propensity of Critical Infrastructures to Fail  
Parfomak (2008) mentioned that the intrinsic interdependencies that exist 
between large infrastructure systems make them more vulnerable and exposed 
to natural disasters (Setola, Bologna, Casalicchio, & Masucci, 2009; Parfomak, 
2008; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). Targeting infrastructure interdependencies during 
post-disaster recovery requires an understanding of the dynamics and 
characteristics that underline not only the individual functioning of critical 
infrastructures, but also the linkage between them. Understanding and 
preventing the propagation of failure due to interdependency remains an 
immense challenge for the construction industry. This is primarily due to the fact 
that critical infrastructures are large complex systems, which are very often 
composed of large collections of interacting parts and entities (Dueñas-Osorio & 
Vemuru, 2009; Alesch, 2005). Conscious of their criticality, several organisations 
around the world have been seeking to manage infrastructures and reduce the 
impact of their failures on the ultimate well-being of society (Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Authority, 2012; Hyogo framework, 2005). Infrastructure 
providers have started to recognise the need for clear identification of their asset 
criticality, in order to know exactly which assets to protect before disasters occur, 
as well as knowing which ones to rehabilitate and prioritize during post-disaster 
recovery. 
The list of critical infrastructures varies across countries and changes over 
time. For instance the 1996 Executive Order (E.O.) signed by US President Clinton 
listed and classified critical infrastructures according to their national 
importance (Clinton, 1996) as follows:  
 Telecommunications; 
  Electrical power systems; 
 Gas and oil storage and transportation; 
 Banking and finance; 
 Water supply systems; 
  Emergency services (including medical, police, fire, and rescue),  
 Continuity of government.  
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Additionally, in 2004 the United States Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIPD) provided a much broader list 
containing approximately 1,700 infrastructures considered to be critical (Moteff 
& Parfomak, 2004). Several infrastructures that were identified were not listed 
in previous reports. Nuclear power plants, for instance, have only recently been 
considered to be a critical infrastructure in some countries; while they are still 
non-existent in others (Partnership, 2006; Moteff & Parfomak, 2004). In Japan for 
instance, the nuclear accident that occurred with the Fukushima-Daishi power 
plant resulted in long-lasting economic impacts to the Japanese industry, which 
subsequently led several countries to change their nuclear energy policies, such 
as cancelling investments in new nuclear power plants (Germany), or closing 
most of the existing nuclear plants (Japan) (Jonkman & Dawson, 2012).  
The variation in the number of critical infrastructures over time is mainly 
due to the ever evolving influence that technological, economical and geo-
political factors have on public safety (Australian Government, 2012 ). The scope 
of this research is limited to critical infrastructures that predominantly form the 
resource pillars on which the global security and prosperity of a country such as 
Australia stands (Hague, 2010). As noted earlier, these critical infrastructures 
vary in numbers but are essentially limited to energy (including electric power), 
transport (including roads and rail transportation systems), water supply 
(including sanitation), as well as Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) (Australian Government, 2012 ; Bureau of Transport Economic, 2001).  
As much as all of these infrastructures are to a degree considered to be 
critical, some are more critical than others during recovery, either because 
failures due to interdependency have minimal impact on them, or because the 
failure of one infrastructure does not preclude the other to function (Rinaldi, et 
al., 2001). Energy and ICT systems for example, are considered as high priority 
systems during recovery as they provide services directly to most 
infrastructures, unlike water systems from which other infrastructures could 
possibly abstain, depending on the circumstances. However, this does not 
exclude the fact that both potable water and wastewater evacuation and 
treatment are fundamental to the well-being of the community. In many ways, 
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water is essential to minimise the risk of untreated effluents from contaminating 
water systems with which humans come into contact, especially after floods and 
cyclones.  
The criticality of infrastructures during recovery depends to a large extent 
on the amount of services needed not only by the local community but also by 
other dependent infrastructures in order to recover quickly from natural 
disasters. For instance, the 2007 floods in the UK affected several power stations 
and water infrastructures, which resulted in 350,000 people losing water supply 
for approximately 17 days, 42,000 people losing electricity supply for over 24 
hours and over 10,000 people being stuck on a motorway (Jonkman & Dawson, 
2012). Some systems, such as telecommunications and electric power, operate in 
real-time, meaning that there is no possibility of stockpiling or scheduling 
demand: the whole system, from end to end, is "on" all the time (Auerswald, 
Branscomb, La Porte, & Michel-Kerjan, 2005). Other systems are less subject to 
the requirements of real-time operations, however even short or unexpected 
interruptions, for example in local road traffic, can cause major economic and 
social disruption. Hence, Rinaldi, et al. (2001) referred to these infrastructures as 
complex adaptive systems. In the US Patriot Act mentioned by Sullivant (2007, p. 
538), critical infrastructures are described as physical or virtual assets, so vital 
that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating impact on 
national and economic security, as well as public health or safety of the 
community (Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011; Haas, et al., 1977).  
Given the complexity, breadth and depth of critical infrastructures, one can 
readily observe characteristics that make the issue of protecting and recovering 
these critical infrastructures practically intractable (Buldyrev, et al., 2010; 
Alesch, 2005). For instance, electric power systems are complex, semi-redundant 
networks of power generation, transmission, and distribution facilities relying 
essentially on technologies that may have been installed several years before 
(Kröger, 2008; Dudenhoeffer, Permann, & Manic, 2006; Alesch, 2005; Freeman & 
Warner, 2001). Furthermore, many of these critical infrastructures were 
designed and constructed over several decades with few, if any, security 
considerations in mind. As a result, each of these critical infrastructures faces a 
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clear and present danger of failure by design or due to potential natural disasters. 
Adding to these challenges are the numerous dangers that arise from the inherent 
interdependencies that exist among critical infrastructures. For instance, electric 
power systems depend upon transportation networks to deliver fuel to 
generation facilities and to provide accessibility to infrastructure operators, 
recovery crews and the logistics chain during the post-disaster recovery. These 
same electrical generators often depend upon water systems for cooling 
purposes. In addition, electric power systems depend heavily upon 
telecommunication networks to support the Supervisory, Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems that manage power transmission and distribution 
(Rinaldi, et al., 2001). Thus, any unplanned disruption in the operation of these 
infrastructure systems resulting from natural disasters, may lead to undesirable 
outcomes when implementing major post-disaster recovery and reconstruction 
projects. A pertinent recent example was the blackout induced by Cyclone 
Oswald, which occurred in January 2013 in Queensland, Australia. The cyclone 
led to a loss of power of several businesses and homes across the Bundaberg 
region and several other regions of Queensland. The tight couplings within and 
across infrastructures and the brittleness that can result from were clearly 
evident in the length of time it took to restore power to the affected regions 
(Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2014). 
Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003) have argued that the propensity of critical 
infrastructures to fail during post-disaster recovery is not always due to their 
interdependencies. According to Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003), these 
infrastructure systems are bound to experience failures or accidents due to the 
fact that they have a highly centralized decision-making structure within their 
own individual organisations. In other words, most of the decisions made within 
such organisations concentrate or focus primarily on issues related to their own 
infrastructures, instead of decentralising or externalising them to other 
interdependent infrastructure in order to address the complex issues that may 
result from their interdependencies. For example, the decision to close a road 
infrastructure system following a natural disaster could possibly affect rail 
transportation and electric systems as well. This type of decision could 
necessitate an increase in traffic on a parallel railway due to larger numbers of 
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individuals and goods travelling by railway instead of using personal vehicles, 
bus or truck. The resultant increase in rail traffic volume would require more 
electric power to sustain the traffic flow, which in turn could possibly generate 
an overload usage of the electrical network and possibly lead to a failure of the 
latter. Thus, due to interdependency, the decisions made by one organisation can 
also affect other infrastructures and hinder their recovery and reconstruction 
efforts. This is why LaPorte (2007) emphasised the need to promote 
interrelationships among organisations during post-disaster recovery, in order 
to contribute to the fast and efficient re-building of resilient infrastructures. 
 
3.2.3 Crisis Theories 
Normal Accident Theory 
Many researchers in the social science arena have started to recognize that 
the consequences resulting from critical infrastructures’ damage cannot be 
predicted accurately (Boin & McConnell, 2007; Perrow, 1999). According to Boin 
and McConnell (2007), some infrastructure failures happen in isolated contexts 
and as such can be rapidly rehabilitated, whereas others induce cascading effects 
and can subsequently result in unprecedented damage (Rijpma, 1997). In this 
regard, Normal Accident Theory (NAT) was initially developed by Perrow (1984) 
with the intention to provide a better understanding of the cause and origin of 
cascading failures within extremely complex systems such as nuclear power 
plants (Hopkins, 1999; Perrow, 1984; Tamuz & Harrison, 2006). Such systems 
are those that form complex interactions with one or more systems (or 
components of systems) outside of their normal operating sequence (Perrow, 
1999, 2011; Perrow, 1984).  
According to Rijpma (1997), complex interactions tend to take place within 
systems that are embedded with multiple components close to each other, having 
multiple functions including control parameters and inferential information. 
Perrow (1999) referred to them as being tightly coupled and having complex 
unexpected interactions. Tight-coupled systems are those which are invariants 
and follow a time-dependent production process where their functioning cannot 
be halted under any circumstances and the production of materials cannot be 
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easily suspended (Whitney, 2003; Rijpma, 1997; Rasmussen, Nixon, & Warner, 
1990). Rijpma (1997) mentioned chemical plants as being one example of such 
systems, within which production is almost instantaneous and cannot be delayed 
or extended due to any previous production breakdowns. NAT affirms that to a 
large extent, these systems are beyond human comprehension (since no one 
really is able to understand and track all of their interactions) and they tend to 
experience stochastic escalation (any small or random incident has the potential 
to escalate and create cascading failures) (Boin & McConnell, 2007; Whitney, 
2003; Perrow, 1999, 2011; Rijpma, 1997). Contrary to these kind of systems are 
those that are considered loosely coupled and not constrained by any of the above 
mentioned conditions and where the sequence of production can be redesigned 
if a disturbance occurs (Perrow, 1999).  
Perrow’s (2011) theory stipulated that no matter what organisations do, 
unexpected accidents are inevitable in extremely complex systems and should 
eventually be considered as normal or ordinary to most of them (Perrow, 2011; 
Whitney, 2003; Rijpma, 1997). Further remarks from Perrow (1999) indicate 
that most system failures are not necessarily technical but rather directly related 
to the organisation itself. This is generally observed in most cases when members 
of an organisation fail to anticipate or comprehend the unexpected interactions 
between failures, and thus do not know how to react or respond to them (Rijpma, 
1997). As trivial as they may seem, human errors are more likely to induce 
cascading failures of complex systems than technical factors can (Tamuz & 
Harrison, 2006). Rasmussen (1990, p. 4) mentioned that latent weaknesses that 
already exist within most organisations could potentially trigger “accidents 
waiting to happen”. Therefore organisations should focus on ensuring internal 
safety within their own boundaries so as to minimise the consequences of 
cascading damage (Tamuz & Harrison, 2006).  
With NAT, both Perrow and Clark (1993) aimed at increasing sensitivity to 
the probabilities and possibilities of human harm to social disruptions related to 
major events, but also the need to focus on safety protection after disasters rather 
than only focusing on preventive pre-disaster planning. However, some have 
argued that NAT is only limited to complex, tightly coupled systems and does not 
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offer any suggestions on how to deal with loose systems, which are found in many 
organisations. Additionally, successful results have been experienced in 
organisations that have developed high reliability through building effective 
organisational strategies rather than by solely dealing with human input to 
disasters.  
 
High Reliability Theory 
High Reliability Theory (HRT) recognises that despite the propensity of 
complex systems to fail, if certain processes or procedures are followed 
effectively, organisations are likely to reduce risks of cascading failures and 
maintain a high level of reliability to meet production demands (Shrivastava, 
Sonpar, & Pazzaglia, 2009; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008). The theory 
essentially refers to highly reliable organisations (HROs) such as aircrafts or 
other interdependent systems, which have the capacity to attain high level of 
safety with minimal errors when exposed to various types of disturbances in an 
environment where normal accidents may be expected (Shrivastava, et al., 2009; 
Weick, et al., 2008; Whitney, 2003). HRT encourages organisations that operate 
in similar high risk environments to benchmark against those HROs externally 
and identify what can be learned from them. Such organisations are preoccupied 
with reliability and have spent more time and effort to follow a failure-free 
performance, and thus avoiding disproportional catastrophic impacts from 
occurring (Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002; Rijpma, 1997).  
Rather than adhering to NAT, which tends to view systems failures as being 
normal and irreversible, HROs have adopted a number of strategies in order to 
achieve error-free performance and maintain high reliability of their 
organisations (Boin & McConnell, 2007; Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002; La Porte, 
1996). These strategies are largely implemented in relation to decision making; 
where greater flexibility in changing authority pattern from either hierarchical to 
collegial or informal to formal is adopted (Boin & McConnell, 2007; Frederickson 
& LaPorte, 2002; Rijpma, 1997; La Porte, 1996). Strategies such as organisational 
redundancy, decentralized decision-making, prioritization of safety, careful 
attention to design and procedures, as well as a limited degree of trial-and-error 
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learning etc. are mentioned in HRT (Shrivastava, et al., 2009; Weick, et al., 2008; 
La Porte, 1996; Rijpma, 1997).  
Redundancy implies that if one component of a system fails, HROs ensure 
that another component is available as a backup to replace it. Similarly if one 
operator fails to perform a particular task, another operator is kept ready to take 
over the position (Weick, et al., 2008; La Porte, 1996). This creates a high degree 
of mindfulness within the organisation, enabling employees to acquire key 
knowledge and expertise after rotating on different roles (Rijpma, 1997). 
Although redundancy provides the guarantee that reliable processes are 
maintained, researchers such as Rijpma (1997) have argued that it tends to 
increase a system’s complexity. Gathering redundant information from several 
employees simultaneously may create a large number of conflicting perceptions 
and information in an organisation (Cooke & Rohleder, 2006; Rijpma, 1997). 
Additionally, with the interdependencies that exist among complex systems, the 
need for a large amount of backups could potentially lead to having some failures 
going unnoticed for a long period of time with the risk of having series of backup 
failures that could eventually exhaust all the resources (Rijpma, 1997; Sagan, 
1993).  
Furthermore, effective HROs adopt a decentralized decision-making 
approach to provide opportunities to low-level operators that are directly 
involved with certain tasks to be able to solve problems as soon as they emerge 
(Weick, et al., 2008; Cooke & Rohleder, 2006; Weick, 2004; Rijpma, 1997; Sagan, 
1993). Usually members of organisations receive intensive training and clear 
decisions framework that enable them to have a certain level of autonomy when 
it comes to responding to complex interactions (Cooke & Rohleder, 2006; Rijpma, 
1997). This ensures that failures are restrained within one location and the 
spreading of failures through tightly coupled systems is limited (Rijpma, 1997). 
HROs have recognised that it is only after acquiring greater knowledge of the 
technology and production processes that this goal can be achieved.  
Sagan (1993) mentioned that it is impossible for members of an 
organisation, whether they are low or high in their functions, to be able to 
anticipate every possible contingency that might arise from complex systems. 
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Unexpected situations will eventually emerge in complex systems, whether 
decisions are centralized or decentralized (La Porte, 1996; Sagan, 1993). In this 
regard, La Porte (2007) suggested the need for extending HRT to highly efficient 
organisations, which are considered to be those that use simple low-hazard 
technologies, governed by single rather than multilayered authority systems. 
Such organisations are not preoccupied with perfection; their operations are 
carried out at one level of intensity even when they experience few nasty 
surprises, and they can rely on computation or judgment as decision strategies. 
LaPorte (2007) concluded that HRT is insufficient to understand organisations 
where major technical operation failures are associated largely to consequences 
and costs that have not been previously experienced by other organisations and 
from which there are almost no clear lessons to be derived. 
 
Disaster Incubation Theory  
In his Disaster Incubation Theory (DIT), Turner (1997) argued that the 
majority of accidents or disasters do not just happen, they are the result of 
unforeseen risks, and more importantly from ‘non-causal’ human and 
organisational reasons (Dekker & Pruchnicki, 2014; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997, p. 
1). There is an incubation period, which precedes a disaster during which risks 
gradually increase without being recognized until they lead to collective failures 
(Dekker & Pruchnicki, 2014; Dekker, Cilliers, & Hofmeyr, 2011).The theory 
argues that there are not such beliefs that risks can be engineered out of any 
system, neither that disasters are normal reactions to the inherent vulnerabilities 
of complex systems (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Both 
human and organisational systems play an important role in incubating and 
inducing cascading disasters across complex systems (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000).  
Based on such perspective, Turner advised that organisations should 
simply identify and manage threats as they develop, since none of them has the 
predictive ability to recognize well in advance threats and factors that lead to 
failure (Dekker & Pruchnicki, 2014; Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000; Turner & Pidgeon, 
1997). Thus, good disaster management requires good general management 
(Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000). Although most DIT characteristics are based on 
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common sense, especially when it comes to identifying the incubation period, 
many practitioners have argued that the theory is unspecific and generally leads 
to unsatisfactory results (Dekker & Pruchnicki, 2014; Dekker, et al., 2011; 
Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Practitioners have 
complained about the lack of effective guidance and the large amount of 
inadequacy and specificity in the theory (Dekker & Pruchnicki, 2014; Pidgeon & 
O'Leary, 2000; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997).  
 
3.2.4 Modelling and Simulations Techniques  
Different meanings have been attributed to the word interdependency in 
various studies (Gao, Buldyrev, Stanley, & Havlin, 2012; Johansson & Hassel, 2010; 
Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 2009; Amin, 2002). However, in a global context, 
interdependency is viewed as a reciprocal relationship or influence between two or 
more infrastructures, through which the condition of one infrastructure affects the 
condition of the other infrastructure (Pitilakis & Kakderi, 2011; Lee, Mitchell, & 
Wallace, 2007; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). Significant numbers of modelling and simulation 
techniques such as the Inoperability Input-output Model (IIM), the Agent Based 
Model (ABM), the System of System (SoS) modelling approach, as well as Network 
Analysis theory, have analysed and assessed the performance of interdependent 
large systems after being disrupted (Johansson & Hassel, 2010; Dudenhoeffer, et al., 
2006; Rinaldi, 2004). Ouyang (2014, p. 4) classified these techniques in terms of 
empirical, agent based, system dynamics based, network based approaches.  
 
Empirical study approaches  
Empirical studies are those which have analysed previous historical studies on 
interdependency to determine not only the performance and behaviours of 
interdependent infrastructures, but also recognise significant failure patterns 
related to them (Kajitani & Sagai, 2009; Krimgold, Bigger, Willingham, & Lamine, 
2006; Laefer, Koss, & Pradhan, 2006;). For instance, Haimes et al. (2005) 
investigated the inoperability input–output model (IIM) that was originally 
developed by Leontief in 1973 (Santos, 2006; Leontief, 1973). The model established 
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a relationship between economic sectors of interconnected infrastructures and the 
physical linkages that exist between these large infrastructures (Setola, et al., 2009; 
Rose, 2007; Santos, 2006). According to the IIM, two infrastructures that have a large 
amount of physical interdependence, will eventually have substantial economic 
interaction (Hallegatte, 2008; Santos, 2006; Haimes, et al., 2005). Thus, the 
inoperability of one infrastructure will affect both the physical and economical 
operability of other interdependent infrastructures (Setola, et al., 2009; Santos, 
2006).  
Setola et al. (2009) indicated that the parameters used in the IIM are typically 
estimated using statistical financial data, which are essentially based on the 
assumption that the influence of one sector on another sector is proportional to the 
financial exchange that exist between them (Hallegatte, 2008; Rose, 2007). Although 
the model provides a better way to manage cost-effectively the economic risks 
encountered by critical infrastructures due to their interdependencies, financial data 
are only one of the many dimensions required to analyse interdependency during 
post-disaster recovery. Additionally, the model assumes that each industry produces 
a single commodity at a time, which is an unrealistic assumption since 
interdependencies between critical infrastructures are most apparent when there 
are mutual exchanges (of production and consumption) through multiple services 
shared by critical infrastructures. Therefore, the reliability of the results of the IIM is 
questionable if it were to be adopted in this research.  
 
Agent based approaches and Critical Infrastructure Modelling System (CIMS) 
Agent based approaches focus on investigating the inherent complexity of CIs 
(Hassan & Radman, 2010; Amin, 2003; Amin, 2002). In the model, CIs are classified 
as complex adaptive systems (CASs) that are made of a collection of individual 
elements or agents, interacting with each other to ensure the effective functioning of 
the entire system (Hassan & Radman, 2010; Kaegi, Mock, & Kröger, 2009; Amin, 
2003; Amin, 2002; North, 2001). Pitilakis (2011) and Cardellini et al. (2007) used the 
Agent Based Model (ABM) to capture interdependencies of complex infrastructure 
systems by decomposing each system into a set of collaborative agents. The ABM 
was concerned with assessing not only interdependencies between large systems, 
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but also looking into the multi-scale interdependencies that exist between sub-
systems in order to understand the impacts of these interconnections on the overall 
system (Casalicchio, et al., 2010; Nan & Eusgeld, 2011; Pitilakis & Kakderi, 2011; 
Cardellini, et al., 2007). This is referred to as a bottom-up approach (Ouyang, 2014).  
The concept behind the modelling or simulation of micro-level 
interdependencies, originates from the notion that a simple behaviour can produce 
more complex behaviours (Nan & Eusgeld, 2011; Pitilakis & Kakderi, 2011). It is 
impossible to predict how interdependent infrastructures will behave if behaviours 
of elements within those infrastructures are unknown (Perrow, 1999, 2011). Thus, 
observing how interdependent agents within an infrastructure system react to 
external disturbances can predict how the overall system would react. This is what 
most researchers have described as emergent behaviours of complex systems ( 
Perrow, 1999, 2011; Perrow, 1984). Although useful, especially in grasping the 
understanding of complex interactions, difficulties in ABM reside in the lack of 
validation, reproducibility and scalability of the model, as well as the extensibility to 
diverse and unforeseen scenarios, to name a few (Casalicchio, et al., 2010, p. 10). 
Whenever ABM was used, the model was applied in different fields including biology, 
business, economics, as well as technology and network theory, thus lacking a 
consistent single way of applying it ( Gao, et al., 2012; Batty, 2007; Grimm et al., 2006; 
Bonabeau, 2002; Parunak, Savit, & Riolo, 1998). Additionally, in ABM the behaviours 
of agents tend to be those essentially assumed by the researcher, which in most cases 
are not clearly explained and justified (Ouyang, 2014). For these reasons, ABM could 
not be adapted to a post-disaster recovery context, which offers a rather practical 
and factual framework of investigating infrastructure interdependencies. 
 
System dynamics based approaches 
Unlike ABM which is a bottom up approach, the System of System (SoS) based 
approach examine infrastructure interdependencies from a top-down perspective, 
looking at interdependencies between large infrastructure systems to predict what 
would happen to interactions between sub-systems located within these large 
systems (Johansson & Hassel, 2010; Gao, et al., 2012). Johansson and Hassel (2010) 
used such approach to assess interdependencies between elements of the same 
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system, and interdependencies between elements of one system with elements of 
another system. The model assumed that the combination of failed components 
within large infrastructure system is not restricted to that infrastructure only, but 
rather expands simultaneously to other components from different infrastructures, 
leading to unforeseen consequences (Francis & Bekera, 2014; Gao, et al., 2012; 
Eusgeld, et al., 2011; Johansson & Hassel, 2010).  
In conjunction with this, according to the SoS model, all infrastructures would 
react in the same fundamental way if the nodes were to be removed from the system 
(Francis & Bekera, 2014; Gao, et al., 2012; Eusgeld, et al., 2011; Johansson & Hassel, 
2010). This suggests that every component within each critical infrastructure needs 
to be modelled in the same way. (Johansson & Hassel, 2010). However some 
disturbances, particularly those generated by natural disasters do not affect 
infrastructures and their components in the same way. In fact, in an electrical 
distribution system, severe storms are much more likely to affect overhead power 
lines than underground cables. Furthermore, the SoS model tends to use a 
quantitative approach where most parameters need calibration, which is generally 
performed with a large amount of data (Ouyang, 2014). Due to security concerns, 
most organisations including government lead agencies are usually reluctant in 
providing large amount of data after disasters. Besides, the SoS model tends to create 
significant uncertainties during analysis, especially when it comes to dealing with 
series of differential equations in order to explain the behaviours of CIs at sub-
systems level. For these reasons, this approach was found unsuitable for informing 
this research.  
 
Network Analysis theory  
Similar to the System of System (SoS) model, Network Analysis Theory (NAT) 
considers critical infrastructures to be interdependent networks made of 
interrelated components or nodes (Wallace & Jensen, 2004; Newman, 2003; 
Wallace, 2001; Ahuja, 1993). Interdependencies are assessed from the patterns of 
failures observed from the nodes located within a system (Ouyang, 2014). Failures 
from these nodes are modelled and then simulated across the entire system to 
effectively capture the effects of cascading failures (Wallace & Jensen, 2004; 
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Newman, 2003; Wallace, 2001). According to Ouyang (2009), despite being useful, 
this method tends to analyse randomly constructed networks of various sizes, 
assuming that all the nodes or components of a system will fail in exactly the same 
ways. However, CIs have different operating mechanisms and cannot be 
characterized under a uniform modelling technique. Additionally, due to spatial 
constraints, Network Theory Analysis (NAT) is incapable of analysing large 
infrastructure networks which have the tendency to fail due to natural disasters 
(Ouyang, 2014). A summary of principal approaches used to assess the performance 
of infrastructure interdependencies is provided in Figure 3.1.   
 
 
Figure 3.1: Previous modelling approaches used to assess infrastructure 
interdependencies 
 
3.2.5 Research Gap 
Overall, there are no adequate modelling or simulation techniques that have 
been previously utilised that could provide an integrated network analysis to 
evaluate the impacts of infrastructure interdependencies on post-disaster recovery. 
Most of the outcomes from previous studies have been used as important knowledge 
tools for addressing interdependency related to specific issues, and pre-planning for 
future disaster events (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2007; Lee, et al., 2007; Zhang, et al., 
2005). Therefore, as this research is intended to improve and refine the concept of 
infrastructure interdependencies in a post-disaster recovery context, the 
classification of interdependency introduced by Rinaldi et al. (2001) will be used. 
This self-contained classification is the only framework which describes different 
Chapter 3-Infrastructures Interdependencies 
Erica Mulowayi 58 
forms of interdependencies and clearly differentiates the circumstances during 
which each of those interdependencies can be observed. The classification (ibid 
2001) provides a global theoretical perspective of how to approach different aspects 
of interdependency for which there is relatively little practical application. Rinaldi’s 
original classification is based on six dimensional characteristics used to investigate 
infrastructure interdependencies. These characteristics include Types of 
Interdependencies; Coupling and Response Behaviour; Infrastructure 
Characteristics; Infrastructure Environment; State of Operation; and, Types of 
Failures of the infrastructure (Rinaldi, et al., 2001).  
 
3.3 ELEMENTS OF INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCY 
3.3.1 Overview 
Society demands that infrastructures operate constantly in an ‘always-on’ 
mode. However, interdependencies that exist between critical infrastructures 
make them more vulnerable and exposed to natural disasters. Such vulnerability 
induces greater challenges to post-disaster recovery, particularly when faced 
with failures that extend simultaneously across multiple infrastructures during 
the recovery period. As previously mentioned, the restoration of interdependent 
network systems following a disaster remains an immense challenge to most 
organisations. This is due to the fact that there is no unifying theory that can serve 
as a common standard for rehabilitating interdependent systems during post-
disaster recovery. Accordingly, no adequate modelling or simulation techniques 
have been previously utilised to provide an integrated network analysis that can 
evaluate the impacts of infrastructure interdependencies on post-disaster 
recovery processes. A conceptual framework was derived from the six 
dimensional characteristics of interdependency depicted by Rinaldi et al. (2001). 
These dimensions, which are presented in Figure 3.2 include: 
1. The types of interdependencies 
2. The coupling and response behaviour of infrastructures  
3. Infrastructure characteristics  
4. Infrastructure environment 
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5. The state of operation of infrastructures; and  
6. The types of failures 
(Johansson & Hassel, 2010; Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 2009; Rinaldi, et al., 
2001).  
 
Figure 3.2: Interdependency dimensions depicted by Rinaldi et al. (2001) 
 
Examination of the six dimensions provides understanding of elements of 
infrastructure interdependencies in a global context. The primary objective of 
section 3.3 is to synthetise literatures related to these dimensions, and to propose a 
framework that will guide and scope the research investigation. The conceptual 
framework was developed by questioning how each element of interdependency 
can individually affect the recovery process of large critical infrastructures. The 
wider context of this theoretical framework is to establish links between 
infrastructure interdependency and post-disaster recovery. 
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3.3.2 Types of Interdependencies  
Post-disaster recovery is inherently complex, requiring a large amount of 
time and resources. As such, the challenge during recovery is to reduce, with limited 
resources, the impact of failures of interdependent infrastructures on the recovery 
processes. An efficient allocation of limited resources requires understanding of the 
types of bi-directional relationships that exist between critical infrastructures 
(Rinaldi, et al., 2001). This section examines the various types of interdependencies 
that could potentially impede the post-disaster recovery effort.  
The types of interdependencies are generally described according to the 
nature and sort of interactions that exist between critical infrastructures. Rinaldi 
et al. (2001) classified the types of interdependency as being physical, cyber, 
geographical and logical. Viewed from the same perspective, Dudenhoeffer et 
al.(2006) proposed a slightly different connotation, using terms such as 
geospatial, policy and informational interdependencies rather than geographical, 
logical, and cyber interdependencies. Zimmerman (2001) on the other hand, used 
terms such as functional and spatial interdependencies to emphasize the need for 
interdependent infrastructures to be operational and at close proximity to one 
another. To highlight the importance of economic parameter in enhancing strong 
interdependencies among critical infrastructures, Zhang and Peeta (2005) added 
budgetary, market and economic interdependencies to functional and physical 
interdependencies. Furthermore, Wallace (2001) and Lee et al.(2007) classified 
the types of interdependencies in terms of how activities that are shared between 
infrastructures including how components of infrastructures are co-located near 
one another. Terms such as input, mutual, shared and exclusive activities were 
used to describe the types of interdependencies (Wallace & Jensen, 2004). A 
summary of these classifications including their definitions is provided in Table 
3.1. 
Most of these classifications found their roots in the original framework of 
Rinaldi et al. (2001). However, for a more comprehensive depiction of the types 
of interdependencies that exist between CIs such as energy, transport, water 
(including sanitation), and ICT systems, these concepts have been grouped into 
four major types of interdependencies. Descriptions of the types of 
interdependencies are provided as follows:  
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a) Physical interdependency 
Two or more critical infrastructures are physically interdependent when 
services and commodities are shared among one another (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 
2006; Pitilakis & Kakderi, 2011; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). This sort of reciprocal 
relationship, according to Dudenhoeffer (2007), is apparent when the supporting 
infrastructure (the provider) and the supported infrastructure (the receiver) are 
mutually dependent on the inputs and outputs from each other (Amaratunga & 
Haigh, 2011; Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). For example, energy 
requires water for cooling and to reduce emissions, and water systems are 
dependent on electricity to run pumps and control systems. Although the 
exchange of services between critical infrastructures is commutative, the roles of 
supported and supporting infrastructure depend on the order in which the 
services are provided or received.  
b) Cyber interdependency  
Cyber interdependency is created through the sharing of virtual 
information (Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011; Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; Pitilakis & 
Kakderi, 2011; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). Generally, the state of an infrastructure 
system is dependent on information transmitted through ICTs via electronic links 
shared among them (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; Pitilakis & Kakderi, 2011; 
Rinaldi, et al., 2001). For example energy systems provide power for switches and 
operation of ICT networks, and ICT systems provide network services (including 
information and telecommunication services) necessary for the operation and 
supervision of electrical networks. A representation of physical and cyber 
interdependencies that can be observed between water, transport, energy and 
ICT has been provided in Figure 3.3. 
c) Geographical interdependency 
Geographical interdependency is formed due to adjacent environmental 
location (Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011; Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; Pitilakis & Kakderi, 
2011; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). This type of interdependency generally results from the 
impacts that a natural disaster such as flood, can have on infrastructures located at 
close spatial proximity to one another (Pitilakis & Kakderi, 2011; Dudenhoeffer, et 
al., 2006; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). According to Parfomak (2008), geographically 
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concentrated infrastructures tend to experience natural disasters of the same scale. 
Usually, natural disasters tend to create simultaneous disturbances, or modifications 
in the state of interdependent infrastructures, located at close proximity to each 
other. For instance, an electrical line and a fibre–optic communication cable located 
under a bridge are geographically connected to transport infrastructure. However, 
geographical interdependency of these systems is purely related to their close 
proximity to one another, not on the services or commodities that they share 
(Rinaldi, et al., 2001). In the event of a cyclone for instance, disturbances will 
affect these systems simultaneously.  
d) Logical interdependency 
Logical interdependency involves any types of interdependencies induced 
by human behaviour or decisions without any direct physical, cyber, or 
geographic connections to it (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; Bush, 2005; Rinaldi, et 
al., 2001). Generally, this type of interdependency involves policy, procedural and 
societal interdependency, meaning that dependencies are created through the 
influence of society or public opinion. Therefore, to a large extent logical 
interdependency influences any types of interdependencies that link critical 
infrastructures to one another (Kahneman, 2003; Dörner, 1996). Dörner (1996) 
mentioned that human decisions have proven to be subject to many errors in 
various circumstances, and therefore their reliance essentially on decisions to 
maintain infrastructure interdependencies may prove to be insufficient. 
Nevertheless, logical interdependency remains one of the main influencers in 
inducing other types of interdependencies. For a clear understanding of the 
actual nexus that exists between CIs such as energy, transport, water (including 
sanitation), taxonomy of the types of interdependencies including key concepts 
are provided in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.1: Classifications and definitions of the Types of Interdependencies synthetised by the author 
Authors Types of Interdependencies Definitions 
 
 
Rinaldi et al. (2001) 
Physical 
 
The state of one infrastructure is dependent on physical outputs from the other infrastructure 
Cyber  The state of one infrastructure is dependent on information transfer between infrastructures 
Geographical  Interdependence between infrastructures created due to close proximity  




Physical The direct linkage that exist between infrastructures from supply/consumption/production  
relationships 
Informational  The reliance on information that flows between infrastructures 
Geospatial  The co-location of infrastructure components within the same area 
Policy The relationship of infrastructure components due to policy or high level decisions 
 
Zimmerman (2001) 
Functional The functioning of one infrastructure system is necessary for the operation of another 
infrastructure system 
Spatial  Interdependency induced due to proximity between infrastructure systems 
Wallace (2001) and 
Lee et al.(2007) 
Input An infrastructure requires one or more inputs from another infrastructure in order to provide 
services 
Mutual Infrastructures are mutually dependent upon each of the other activities 
Shared Physical activities from one infrastructure are shared with other infrastructures to provide services 
Exclusive  Restricted amount of services can be provided by an infrastructure  
Co-located  Components of two or more systems are located within the same geographical region 
Zhang and Peeta 
(2005) 
Functional The functioning of one infrastructure required inputs from another infrastructure  
Physical Infrastructures are interdependent through shared of some physical attributes  
Budgetary Interdependencies between infrastructures involve some level of public financing under centrally 
controlled economies or during disaster recovery 
Market and Economic Infrastructures interact with each other within the same economic system 
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Figure 3.3: Services provided through Physical and Cyber interdependencies 
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Table 3.2: Description and taxonomy of the Types of Interdependency synthetised by the author 





Multidirectional interdependencies Multiple interrelationships among infrastructure through which 
the state of each infrastructure is correlated to the state of the 
other infrastructure.  
 
Rinaldi, et al. (2001) 
Johansson and Hassel 
(2010) 
Pitilakis and Kakderi 
(2011) 
Supporting Infrastructure Infrastructure that is providing outputs (or services) to benefit 
the functioning of the dependent infrastructure 
Supported infrastructure  Infrastructure that receives the services from the supporting 
infrastructure in order to facilitate its functioning.  
Geographical Spatial proximity  Infrastructures that are dependent due to the close spatial 
proximity or nearness that they have with one another  
Rinaldi, et al. (2001) 
Cyber  Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) 
SCADA systems are computer controlled systems that monitor 
and control industrial processes that exist in the physical world. 
Cyber dependencies include the reliance on telecommunications 
and computers for supervisory control and data acquisition. 
Pitilakis and Kakderi 
(2011) 
Logical  Policy/Procedural Interdependency An interdependency that exists due to policy or procedure that 
relates an event change in one infrastructure sector component 
to affect another infrastructure. 
Zhang and Peeta (2005) 
Johansson and Hassel 
(2010) 
Pitilakis and Kakderi 
(2011) 
Societal Interdependency The interdependencies or influences that societal factors as 
public opinion may have on infrastructures.  
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3.3.3 Degrees of Interdependencies  
Infrastructure coupling and response behaviours are referred to as degrees 
of interdependencies in this research. The degree of interdependency denotes the 
extent (or intensity, strength, amplitude), to which interdependencies between 
critical infrastructures exist and are manifest (Ventura, García, & Martí, 2010). 
Rinaldi et al. (2001) and several other researchers such as Zhang et al. (2005) and 
Santella et al. (2009) referred to the degree of interdependency as the coupling 
and response behaviour of critical infrastructures. According to Ventura et al. 
(2010), the degree to which critical infrastructures are coupled, or linked, strongly 
affects their operational characteristics and varies considerably. Some couplings or 
interdependencies are loose and thus relatively flexible, whereas others are tight, 
leaving little or no flexibility for the system to respond to changing conditions or 
failures due to natural disasters (Ventura, et al., 2010; Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 
2009; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). Loose interdependency implies that infrastructures are 
relatively interdependent upon each other at a certain level, and thus the state of one 
infrastructure is weakly correlated to the state of the other infrastructure (Ventura, 
et al., 2010). Tight interdependency on the other hand, means that infrastructures 
are highly dependent on one another at every level (Ventura, et al., 2010; Rinaldi, et 
al., 2001). As previously mentioned in section 3.2.3, tight- coupled systems are those 
which are invariants and for which their functioning cannot be halted under any 
circumstances and the production of services cannot be suspended (Whitney, 2003; 
Rasmussen, et al., 1990; Rijpma, 1997). 
Thus, as emphasised by Glassman (1973) and Dubois et al. (2002), the 
degree of interdependency is measured in function of the services shared by 
interdependent systems. The more activities are shared between two systems, 
the tighter their interdependencies. If two units share very few activities in 
common, then they are relatively independent of each other (Dubois & Gadde, 
2002; Glassman, 1973). Such systems tend to adapt and cope easily with wide 
spread disturbances from other interdependent systems. Glassman (1973) 
mentioned that in loosely coupled systems, influences tend to spread slowly 
while disturbances tend to propagate rapidly both through and across tightly 
coupled infrastructures. According to Rijpma (1997) and Weick et al. (2008), 
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tight interdependencies are likely to be found within infrastructure systems that 
rely mostly on the use of unifiable, invariant, and time-dependant processes 
(Weick, et al., 2008; Weick, 2004; Rijpma, 1997). These processes must be 
performed in a set of sequences to avoid halting the exchange of services at one 
stage and restart again (Weick, et al., 2008; Weick, 2004; Rijpma, 1997). Rijpma 
(1997) further explains that such orderly systems increase both the likelihood 
that tasks will be accomplished and that disturbances could easily escalate and 
be diffused more widely to the rest of the interdependent systems. On the 
contrary, in a loose coupled system, the production sequence can be easily 
redesigned, particularly when disturbances occur (Weick, et al., 2008; Weick, 
2004; Rijpma, 1997). Therefore, tightly coupled systems tend to cause greater 
concern for the reconstruction and repair of critical infrastructures. Hence, it is 
essential to determine the extent to which critical infrastructures are 
interrelated, and in most instances, determine whether or not their degrees of 
interdependencies could have an impact on their recoveries. A summary of 
various other concepts of the degrees of interdependencies is provided in Table 
3.3.  
 
Figure 3.4: Degrees of interdependencies 
 
3.3.4 Infrastructure Characteristics 
Targeting interdependencies of critical infrastructures during post-disaster 
recovery requires an understanding of infrastructure dynamics and 
characteristics. Infrastructure characteristics serve to distinguish and provide an 
understanding of how critical infrastructure functions individually in order to 
determine how interdependencies are created among those infrastructures. As 
Chapter 3-Infrastructures Interdependencies 
Erica Mulowayi 68 
per the classification proposed by Rinaldi et al. (2001), infrastructure 
characteristics include organisational, operational, as well as spatial and 
temporal characteristics (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2007; O'Rourke, 2007; Rinaldi, et al., 
2001). Infrastructure operational characteristics influence the way an 
infrastructure react to a disruption. This is more related to the conditions and 
states in which the infrastructure operated before a disaster occur and as result, 
little consideration is given to operational characteristics in this study. 
Organisational characteristics overlap aspects related to logical 
interdependency, where human behaviours or decisions affect the functioning of 
infrastructures. Although useful, these important aspects will be considered in a 
broader context in this research, where not only stakeholders or infrastructure 
providers influence decisions related to their own infrastructures (which may 
subsequently affect other infrastructures), but rather in a context where human 
decisions would affect the entire recovery process. In fact, during recovery, 
decisions made at higher level (from State and Local government) prevail on 
those that come from infrastructure providers.  
In conjunction with operational characteristics, spatial characteristics refer 
to the various hierarchical levels within an infrastructure’s organisational system 
(Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2007; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). This generally varies from the 
smallest individual component (referred to as unit) to the largest structure 
(which is the infrastructure system) (FERRARI, 2010; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). Spatial 
characteristics are generally subdivided into infrastructure systems, subsystems, 
structures and units in most organisations (FEMA, 2010). As infrastructure 
systems include energy, transport, water and ICT, these systems are generally 
formed by a set of interacting components used to provide services such as 
electricity, roads and rails transportation, communication and information networks 
as well as water supply and sanitation (DHS, 2008; Queensland Government, 2011; 
Smith & Flatt, 2011; TEMA, 2006). Subsystems represent autonomous system such 
as treatment plants or data control centres that are part of a system (FEMA, 2010). 
Structures on the other hand, are assets such as local and arterial roads as well as 
communication equipment, that are used daily, and which contribute to the enabling 
of societal living conditions. Units are the smallest functional constituent of 
infrastructures such as electricity grids, road infrastructure signalisation and so on 
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(TMR, 2014; Origin, 2013). As previously mentioned, the scope of this research is 
limited to interdependencies that occur at macro-level among systems and sub-
systems, which tend to directly impede the recovery effort.  
Besides spatial characteristics, temporal characteristics are one of the most 
important dimensions that could potentially influence interdependencies across 
infrastructure systems (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2007; O'Rourke, 2007; Rinaldi, et al., 
2001). In a broad context, temporal characteristics refer to the time scales, which 
vary from seconds to hours to months or even years, that it takes for infrastructures 
to be made functional after being disrupted (Rinaldi, et al., 2001). This generally 
depends on the types of disasters and the extent of overall damage to the 
infrastructure. This study does not deeply investigate the details of how long it takes 
for infrastructures to become functional after being damaged. However, the research 
focuses on the effects of infrastructure interdependencies on post-disaster recovery. 
As such, the research focuses on prioritization activities as a major indicator of time 
taken to restore infrastructures that are damaged due to their interdependencies. 
The overall research considers some specific aspects of infrastructure organisational 
characteristics, such as the role of human decisions at organisational level that affect 
the recovery effort. Thus organisational characteristics are not investigated as 
elements of interdependencies, but rather as influential factors of the post-disaster 
recovery effort.  
 
3.3.5 Infrastructure Environment 
Infrastructures operate in an environment described by their individual 
inputs, outputs, characteristics and states (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2007; O'Rourke, 
2007; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). The term ‘infrastructure environment’ was initially 
introduced to describe various aspects that play a major role in shaping 
infrastructure operational characteristics and behaviours (Queensland Government, 
2011; Smith & Flatt, 2011; DHS, 2008; TEMA, 2006). Such factors include economic 
factors, public policy and government investment decisions, legal and regulatory 
concerns, technical and security issues, and social and political concerns, and are the 
driving forces behind the operability of critical infrastructures (ADB, 2013; 
Emergency Architects Australia, 2011; Emergency Management Australia, 2004). 
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Thus, to a large extent, infrastructure environment is the framework in which the 
infrastructure providers establish the goals and objectives, construct value systems 
for defining and viewing their businesses, model and analyse their operations, and 
make decisions that affect infrastructure architectures and operations (ADB, 2013; 
Emergency Architects Australia, 2011; Emergency Management Australia, 2004). 
Knowing and understanding the infrastructure environment, and being able to audit 
it, allows organisations to prepare for unexpected changes before they actually 
occur. However, this has a broader influence on the impacts of infrastructure 
interdependencies on post-disaster recovery. The sole examination of infrastructure 
environment would constitute in itself a unique blend of several other studies that 
could potentially focus one aspect of infrastructure environment and its influence on 
the post-disaster recovery of interdependent infrastructures.  
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Table 3.3: Examples of spatial characteristics related to the four CIs 
Spatial Characteristics Energy                                           
(Thermoelectricity from Coal 
and Natural gas) 
Water                                       
(Sanitation) 
Transport                          
(Roads and Rails) 
Information and 
Communication 




A set of interacting 
components that 





Water system        Sanitation 
 






system that is part 
of a larger system 
Fossil fuel power 
(Thermoelectricity) 
Treatment plants  
 
Roads and Rails 
centralised control 
sites 





The assets that are 
essentials to the 
enabling of societal 
living conditions. 
Coal-fired and natural gas-
fired generation plants, 
distribution including 
transmission networks 
       Pipes,                           Pipes,   
pumps lifting              pumps 
 
Electrified railways,  






Unit A single structure 
regarded as an 
elementary 
functional 
constituent of a 
whole. 
Electricity grids, transmission 
lines, electrical power lines 
and transformers, pole 
transformers, underground 
and overhead feeders. 
Major irrigation systems, 
potable drinking water 
supply, wastewater systems 





fixed lines and cables, 
fibre networks, radio 
and mobile  
(Adapted from Origin Energy (2013) and Department of Transport and Main Roads (TMR) (2014) 
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3.3.6 Types of Failures due to Interdependency 
Ensuring the functionality and the continuity of exchange of services among 
critical infrastructures during post-disaster recovery has become a real challenge 
due to the interdependent nature of these infrastructures. The types of failures that 
occur within an interdependent network usually vary from common cause, to 
cascading and escalating failures (Kajitani & Sagai, 2009; Laprie, et al., 2007; Boin & 
Hart, 2003; Bonabeau, 2002; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). A common cause failure occurs 
when two or more infrastructures are disrupted simultaneously due to some 
common cause, which could be a natural disaster (Rinaldi, et al., 2001). Common 
cause failures can be induced by geographical interdependency (due to 
infrastructure being located at close proximity), and eventually be the root cause of 
widespread disasters of multiple infrastructures (Johansson & Hassel, 2010; 
Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; Rinaldi, 2004). However, these failures tend to take place 
independently of factors related to infrastructure interdependencies, and in most 
cases do not necessarily generate interdependency issues during post-disaster 
recovery. In fact, most common cause failures could affect infrastructure that are not 
interdependent and be the result of man-made disasters such as explosions.  
Cascading failure on the other hand, occurs when a disruption in one 
infrastructure causes the failure of another infrastructure, and subsequently 
propagates throughout on the rest of the infrastructures (Johansson & Hassel, 2010; 
Boin & McConnell, 2007; Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; Boin & Hart, 2003). For example 
a large-scale power outage can affect simultaneously all the interdependent 
infrastructures. An escalating failure occurs when the disruption in one 
infrastructure increases in severity and then generates the disruption of a second 
infrastructure, delaying the time for recovery or restoration of the second failure 
(Johansson & Hassel, 2010; Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; Rinaldi, 2004). In most cases 
cascading and common cause failures can lead to an escalating failure during the 
recovery period. However, unlike cascading failures, common cause failures are 
considered to be invariant factors that are not directly related to the impacts that 
infrastructure interdependencies could have on a post-disaster recovery effort.  
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The impacts of external disturbances such as those generated by natural 
disasters vary considerably according to the types of failures and the degree to 
which infrastructures are interdependent (Perrow, 2011; Santella, et al., 2009; 
Theoharidou, et al., 2009; Little, 2002). According to Little (2002), in the case of 
cascading and escalating failures, the disruptive effects tend to spread beyond the 
infrastructure from which they originated, and can induce tremendous impacts 
on other infrastructures, which then result in further disturbances of others 
infrastructures. Some infrastructures such as energy have a 
straightforward/linear/tight interdependency with other infrastructures, and as 
such tend to induce first order interdependent effects (Perrow, 2011; Santella, et 
al., 2009; Theoharidou, et al., 2009; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). For instance according 
to Lee (2007), impacts of power outage are easily predictable on the services 
delivery to other infrastructures such as water systems. These sorts of effects are 
categorized as being first order due to the fact that they directly affect the ability 
of an infrastructure to operate. When these first order effects propagate and 
provoke higher effects to other infrastructures, they eventually become second 
order, then third order and so on, depending on the extent to which damages of 
infrastructures are ultimately aggravated (Perrow, 2011; Santella, et al., 2009; 
Theoharidou, et al., 2009; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). According to Little (2002, p. 4), 
how far these effects propagate, and how serious overall damages become, 
depends on the types of interdependencies, how tightly coupled the 
infrastructure components are, how potent the effects are, and whether or not 
countermeasures such as redundant capacity are in place. For instance when 
water systems are impeded by electricity, this may not only affect how pumps 
and control systems are run (first order effects), but it could also affect the 
production of fuels for transportation systems (second order effects). 
The types of failures experienced by critical infrastructures also provide an 
indication on the criticality of these infrastructures within an interdependent 
network (Johansson & Hassel, 2010; Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; Rinaldi, 2004). 
Several studies have revealed that interdependencies formed between 
communication and information technologies (ICT) are the most precarious 
interdependencies (Pitilakis & Kakderi, 2011; Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; Rinaldi, 
et al., 2001). ICT systems are largely known to influence the system design of 
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other infrastructures including their construction, maintenance, operations, 
control  and so on (Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 2009; Little, 2002). To a large 
extent, ICT found their applications in coupled sensing, monitoring, and 
management systems, as well as in distributed and remote wireless control 
devices, internet-based data systems, multimedia information systems and so on 
(Buldyrev, et al., 2010; Alesch, 2005). According to Little (2002, p. 4), although 
ICT serves a greater purpose in the functionality of other critical infrastructures, 
the software element of control and data acquisition systems is usually the least 
robust part of an integrated system. Thus, priority should be given to an ICT 
system during recovery, as this infrastructure will further affect other 
infrastructures and introduce more vulnerability to them that could escalate to 
greater failures. According to Tsuruta et al. (2008), ICT is the most critical 
infrastructure to recover and rehabilitate from failures generated by earthquake 
during recovery period.  
 
3.3.7 State of Operation due to Interdependency 
During recovery, different types of failures may affect the state of operation 
of infrastructures. The state at which critical infrastructures operate after a 
disaster varies significantly according to the external disturbances that they are 
subjected to and how they respond to these disturbances. Within an 
interdependent network, the state of operation of CIs changes depending on 
particular infrastructure characteristics (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2007; O'Rourke, 
2007; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). As unpredictable as it may seem, particularly after a 
disaster, the state of operation of an infrastructure tends to be assessed visually 
(except in the case where ICT systems are involved) and through a series of tests 
performed by experts. Rinaldi et al. (2001) mentioned that such states generally 
vary from peak conditions (when infrastructures operate normally) to off-peak 
conditions (when infrastructures are damaged) (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2007; 
O'Rourke, 2007; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). During the restoration period, in the off-
peak condition, the state of operation of an infrastructure can range from optimal 
design (where the infrastructure is damaged but still considered to be functional) 
to complete failure with a total loss of services to all dependent infrastructures 
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(Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2007; O'Rourke, 2007; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). An 
infrastructure can function at well below its normal design state because one or 
more units, subsystems, or infrastructure entities have failed, but as long as it still 
provides what the engineer or project manager perceives as being what is 
needed, then it is considered to be functional during post-disaster recovery 
(Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2007; O'Rourke, 2007; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). For road 
transportation systems for instance, a series of inspections of the pavement 
conditions followed by a structural assessment using deflection of the pavement 
(if necessary) will inform engineers as to whether or not the infrastructure is still 
operational after a disaster. Therefore, beyond the fact that the state of operation 
of one infrastructure can affect the state of another infrastructure, this can also 
inform and guide the recovery of the damaged infrastructures. Table 3.5 provides 
a list of prioritization activities that have previously been adopted in countries 
such as Australia to rehabilitate the four critical infrastructures being 
investigated in this research. 
 
Figure 3.5: Peak and off-peak conditions of road infrastructure 
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Table 3.4: Prioritization of recovery activities based on the state of operation of critical infrastructures 
Depending on the type of 











Priorities of activities 
have been adapted from 
disaster management 
plan that essentially fit 
the type of disasters 
encountered in Australia.  
The order of activities 
varies according to the 
organisational 
management plan as well 
as the types of disasters 
and extent of damages.  
1. Identification of electrical 
assets defects  
 
2. Asset maintenance 
procedures 
 
3. Review business continuity 
plans (vegetation 
management plan for 
bushfires, flood management 
plan for  
 
4. Network operation 
response  
 
5. Pre-emptive disconnection 
and operation of switching  
 
6. Liaison with other 
organisation 
 
7.Restoration of supply 
processes 
8. Information to be provided 
to customers  
1. Getting clean access and 
isolating the site 
 
2. Review business 
continuity plans 
 
3. Assessing the damages on 
the site and removing all 
safety hazards (e.g. 
electrical cables, etc.) 
 
4. Reinstating pump 
stations, generators, tankers 
and hosing  
 
5. Repairing sewerage 
pumps  
 




1. Inspect pavement condition 
2. Decide whether structural 
assessment by deflection is 
necessary.  
     2.1. If yes, then commence 
structural assessment by 
deflection testing. 
     2.2 If no, go to 3. 
3. Then open the road and 
allow trapped vehicles to leave 
by control convoy down centre 
of pavement 
4. Strictly enforce current load 
limits (apply immediate 80% 
load restriction for severe 
damage); ban permit loads, and 
consider restriction by volume 
loads to 2-3 weeks maximum. 
5. Depending on the results of 
structural assessment by 
deflection, maintain 
restrictions for a maximum 
period of 3-4 weeks until 
complete repair. 
1. Assessing the damage 
and verifying  if the 
servers are down  
 
2.Verifying cause of outage 
 
3. Verifying if data has 
been backed up and is safe 
 
4. Retrieve stored data and 
test server and sensors 
 
5. Switch over to alternate 
server 
6. Install and test new 
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3.4 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
The incapacitation or destruction of large infrastructure systems will have 
debilitating impacts on the national security and overall well-being of a country. 
During post-disaster recovery such disturbances can potentially induce ‘domino 
effects’ that may then cascade or escalate to greater disturbances to other CIs, 
thus impeding the recovery efforts. Chapter 2 has reviewed some of the 
contributing and challenging factors in implementing effective recovery efforts. 
However, the main purpose of this chapter was to establish a relationship 
between infrastructure interdependency and post-disaster recovery. Previous 
studies have demonstrated that critical infrastructures per se have the tendency 
to fail not only due to their own attributes and complexities, but also due to the 
interdependent relationships that link them to other large infrastructure 
systems. As such, several modelling tools and simulation techniques continue to 
be developed in order to understand the complex emergent behaviours of 
interdependent systems.  
Nonetheless, to date, there are no theories, modelling techniques, or 
simulations capable of serving as tools in assessing the performance of 
infrastructure interdependencies and determining the influence of infrastructure 
interdependencies on post-disaster recovery. Rinaldi et al.’s (2001) original 
framework on independency was investigated to understand how elements of 
interdependencies such as the types and degrees of interdependencies, 
infrastructure behaviours and environment, as well as the types of failures and states 
of operation of infrastructure can influence the post-disaster recovery. In Figure 3.2, 
elements related to infrastructure characteristics and environment, as well as logical 
interdependency and common cause failures have been excluded from the scope of 
this research. Infrastructure characteristics and environment are confined within a 
single infrastructure paradigm, and generally issues related to these are dealt with 
by organisations regardless of disasters occurring or not. Common cause failures are 
not always directly related to infrastructure interdependencies, especially when 
infrastructures are not located within close proximity. Logical interdependency 
takes place before disasters occur and generally extend beyond recovery.  
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Figure 3.6: Elements of Infrastructure Interdependency 
Chapter 3-Infrastructures Interdependencie 
Erica Mulowayi 79 
 
Figure 3.7: Elements of Infrastructure Interdependency from a post-disaster 
recovery context 
 
This research mainly focuses on the types and degrees of interdependency, as 
well as the types of failures and the states of operation of infrastructures due to 
interdependency. The types and degrees of interdependencies are attributes, which 
contribute to the different types of failures. These attributes are invariants and exist 
even before disasters occur. However, exceptions such as logical interdependency 
have been excluded in the scope of this research. As previously mentioned, logical 
interdependency is entirely a reflection of human decisions that guides policies and 
public opinions of an organisation or a country. This generally tends to be subject to 
many changes in a variety of circumstances and as such cannot be considered as an 
attribute of interdependency.  
Additionally, common cause failures are not necessarily the result of 
infrastructure interdependencies. In fact, in some cases, they tend to be the result of 
man-made disasters such as explosions, which affect infrastructures that are not 
interdependent. Therefore, the scope of this research is limited to, and focuses on, 
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cascading and escalating failures. It is only after disasters that these types of failures 
are generated, depending on the types and degrees of interdependencies that exist 
across critical infrastructures. Cascading and escalating failures induce the different 
states of operations of infrastructures, which will determine the recovery approach 
to be adopted. Thus, the proposed conceptual framework depicted in Figure 3.6 and 
Table 3.5 was developed based on the assumptions that the types and degrees of 
interdependencies can induce or generate the different types of failures, which will 
engender or provoke the state of operation of infrastructures. This in turn, will 
critically influence the overall recovery effort.  
 
Table 3.5: Elements of interdependencies from a disaster recovery context 





Types of  
Failure 
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Figure 3.8: Interdependency Conceptual Framework 
Chapter 4-Research Design 
Erica Mulowayi 82 
  
Chapter 4-Research Design 
Erica Mulowayi 83 
Chapter 4: RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter demonstrated that infrastructure interdependencies 
are apparent in various forms at macro and micro-levels. As such, some 
interdependencies are imperceptible and difficult to identify using standard 
approaches. Interdependencies at the macro-level can generate different types of 
consequences, depending on the degrees of interconnectedness that exist among 
critical infrastructures (CIs). These consequences can affect the functioning of 
interdependent infrastructures, and if not minimized can also generate 
disastrous impacts that can impede or undermine the entire recovery effort. To 
date, this important area of research remains poorly investigated since most 
studies on post-disaster recovery have essentially focused on the rehabilitation 
of individual infrastructure. Very few studies have sought to link infrastructures 
together in a form representative of their actual interdependencies.  
The application of a purely qualitative strategy based solely on a critical 
review of existing theories appeared to be insufficient and ineffective to 
rigorously address the research problems being considered. Due to the 
exploratory and interpretative nature of this research, a case study approach was 
the methodology used to gain a better understanding of the reality under 
investigation and to specifically address the research problems. This chapter 
explains the rationale and philosophical views that led to the adoption of the case 
study methodology, which uses an inductive theory building approach to unveil 
the research questions.  
Section 4.2 reiterates the overall research problems and presents the 
research questions on which this study was founded. Section 4.3 (specifically 
section 4.3.1) explains the philosophical perspective adopted by the researcher 
with regards to selection of the most appropriate methodologies to undertake 
this study and answer the research questions. Additionally, in section 4.3.2 the 
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reasoning behind the research assumptions is explicitly depicted. Descriptions of 
inductive and deductive reasoning were also provided in section 4.3, followed by 
the rationale for using inductive theory building approach in this particular study. 
Section 4.3 concludes with an explanation of the principles behind the 
exploratory study investigation that took place in conducting a pilot study. In 
section 4.4, the methods of data collection, analysis and interpretation that used 
in response to the specific research questions is described. This section also 
provides the justifications for using the case study method and for selecting a 
multiple case studies approach to respond to the research questions. A 
description of the implementation process of the case study method is presented 
in section 4.5. Section 4.6 describes the data analysis process, followed by section 
4.7 which explains the different ways of maintaining research reliability, validity 
and analytical generalisation. The chapter concludes by explaining the ethical 
considerations followed in the development and implementation of the research 
methodologies. 
 
4.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The principal research problem emanates from the lack of an effective 
framework to guide the inclusion of various elements of infrastructure 
interdependencies when developing a post-disaster reconstruction strategy. 
Thus the focus of this study is primarily concerned with investigating the overall 
behaviour, as well as the inherent vulnerabilities of interdependent systems 
during post-disaster recovery. Secondly, the study describes the extent to which 
key elements of infrastructure interdependencies have the potential to impede 
recovery processes. Finally, the study provides insights into how the disruptive 
effects from infrastructure interdependencies could be minimized during the 
post-disaster recovery period. Viewed from this perspective, the following 
research questions were developed: 
1) What are the various elements of infrastructure interdependency 
which affect the post-disaster recovery effort? 
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As previously mentioned, the concept of interdependency has been 
examined within a broad spectrum of research studies including statistical 
physics, complex adaptive systems (CAS), discrete-event dynamical systems, and 
hybrid, layered networks studies (Agneessens & Skvoretz, 2012; Alesch, 2005; 
Brummitt, et al., 2012; Chiaradonna, et al., 2011; Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 2009; 
Eusgeld, et al., 2011; Kröger, 2008; Oliva, et al., 2010; Rinaldi, et al., 2001; Santella, 
et al., 2009). Under these various themes, some researchers have identified and 
explained six dimensional characteristics of interdependency. (Dudenhoeffer, et 
al., 2006; Johansson & Hassel, 2010; Rinaldi, 2004). These dimensions included 
the types of interdependency; the coupling and response behaviour of 
interdependent systems; infrastructure characteristics and environment; as well 
as the state of operation and types of failures of CIs due to their 
interdependencies (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; Johansson & Hassel, 2010; Rinaldi, 
2004). As comprehensive as these studies were, most of them were conducted 
within a preventive pre-disaster context and had little affiliation with the post-
disaster recovery process of CIs. Therefore, a real need arises to determine which 
of these six dimensions of interdependency could directly and specifically impact 
the post-disaster recovery effort. 
 
2) How do elements of infrastructure interdependencies impede post-
disaster recovery effort? 
Merely knowing which elements of infrastructure interdependencies have 
the potential to impede the recovery process is insufficient to conclude this 
research. The overall concern of this study was to gain deeper understanding of 
how infrastructure interdependencies influence the recovery effort. None of the 
previous research mentioned in chapter 2 and 3 has investigated how the 
emergent behaviours of interdependent CIs could potentially impede the 
recovery process (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; Johansson & Hassel, 2010; Rinaldi, 
2004). Amongst the few studies that have mentioned the cascading and escalating 
effects resulting from damaged infrastructures due to their interdependencies, 
only sporadic research has actually examined the impacts of these disastrous 
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phenomena on the recovery effort (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; Johansson & 
Hassel, 2010; Rinaldi, 2004). Additionally, there is no research which indicates 
how to identify which critical infrastructures have the potential to trigger 
cascading or escalating effects within the interdependent network during post-
disaster recovery. Although some of interdependency elements have little or no 
impact on post-disaster recovery activities (e.g. infrastructures environment), 
knowing which infrastructures are the most critical during recovery would 
dictate prioritization activities. 
 
3) How can the disruptive effects of the key elements of infrastructure 
interdependency be reduced or minimized during recovery period? 
To date no suggestions on how the disruptive effects generated from 
interdependencies have been found in any literatures or relevant documentation 
on post-disaster recovery such as standards, guidelines or disaster management 
plans.  
 
4.3 PHILOSOPHICAL POSITIONING 
A research is generally influenced by the way the researcher views the 
world. This section explains the philosophical position adopted by the researcher 
and the rationale that led to the use of an inductive theory building approach. This 
philosophical approach shaped both the particular ways of reasoning applied in 
this research and also the ways in which this influenced the methods used to 
undertake the research. As suggested by Creswell (2013), the researcher has 
sought to justify the methodological approach adopted in this research by 
explaining the philosophical assumptions and reasoning in which it subscribed 
to. In this research design, it was critical to identify what knowledge claims have 
been made, what strategies of inquiry should be used to inform the procedures, 
as well as what methods are required to be used to collect and analyse data 
(Creswell, 2013).  
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4.3.1 Research Philosophy and Assumptions  
The process of undertaking research involves challenging everything that is 
thought to be known (finding and filling the knowledge gap) and finding solutions 
to research issues (problem solving) (Creswell, 2013, p. 7). This process is 
generally influenced by the way a researcher views the world. Most studies refer 
to the fundamental principles or set of ideas or beliefs that guide a research 
investigation to a research philosophy or paradigm (Creswell, 2013; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Thus, in its simplest form a research 
philosophy is considered to be a researcher’s view of the world that shapes the 
way the research is conducted (Sellars, Rorty, & Brandom, 1997). The 
assumptions made from a specific research philosophy tend to reinforce the 
research strategy and the methods selected as part of that strategy (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994; Holden & Lynch, 2004). In this regard, the research philosophy 
adopted by a researcher has the potential to shape not only particular views of 
knowledge of a specific research topic but also the relationship between 
knowledge and the process by which a research is developed.  
Three major ways of thinking are said to guide the choice of a research 
philosophy in social science studies: ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological assumptions (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; 
Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Ontology relates to what the researcher knows about 
reality (the nature of reality) (Creswell, 2013; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). If there is 
a single reality or way of investigating or understanding a research, a research is 
said to be objectivist or independent from the researcher (Creswell, 2013). 
Such research generally exhibits a quantitative approach (Creswell, 2013). A 
research is said to be subjectivist or constructionist when there is more than a 
single reality or construct associated to it (Creswell, 2013; Denzin & Lincoln, 
2005; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Creswell (2013) mentioned that in qualitative 
research, reality involves the researcher, the individuals being investigated and 
the audience interpreting a study. Indeed, a qualitative research is said to be the 
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one that sees the world from participants’ perspectives to make discoveries that 
will contribute to the development of empirical knowledge (Neuman, 2005).  
Once the nature of reality is defined (whether it is single or not), a 
researcher is concerned on how to get to know that reality. Hence, Epistemology 
is concerned about the relationship of the researcher with what is being 
researched (Creswell, 2013; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
When there is more than a single reality to a research, for instance in the case of 
constructionist or subjectivist ontology, an interpretivist approach tend to be 
used and this is the nature of qualitative research (Creswell, 2013). An 
interpretivist etymology is based on the assumption that all researches do not 
necessarily use the same methods of investigation (Creswell, 2013). There is no 
predefined or predetermined methodology or criteria to judge the veracity of 
research knowledge. Thus, there is a need to investigate and interpret different 
theories in order to generate a certain level of understanding. 
In sharp contrast to interpretivist etymology, positivism is similar to an 
objectivist ontology as it assumes that there is a single observable reality from 
which the phenomena that can be observed, will lead to the production of 
credible truth (Creswell, 2013; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). This perspective is usually 
adopted for quantitative research where the data collected are likely to use 
existing theory to develop new hypotheses (Creswell, 2013). These hypotheses 
are then tested and confirmed, or refuted, leading to the further development of 
theory which may then be tested by further research (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; 
Sellars, et al., 1997). Several studies have recently adopted a revised approach to 
positivism, post-positivism. Although founded upon similar assumptions, unlike 
positivism, post-positivism considers scientific reasoning and common sense 
reasoning as being essentially the same process (Creswell, 2013; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Holden & Lynch, 
2004; Sellars, et al., 1997).  
Once, the nature of reality (ontology) is defined and the researcher comes 
to know ways to know reality (epistemology), practical steps are then defined to 
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guide the researcher to know that reality. This is when methodology is evolved. 
Methodology is focused on the specific ways or methods that the researcher 
need to understand a research topic better (Creswell, 2013). To a large extent, 
epistemology and methodology are closely related: Epistemology involves the 
philosophy of how the researcher comes to know the reality and methodology 
involves the practical steps to be taken to better understand it (Creswell, 2013; 
Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Methodology usually 
encompasses several methods depending on whether the research falls within a 
quantitative or qualitative paradigm (Creswell, 2013). Table 4.1 provides a 
summary of quantitative and qualitative paradigms based on the three research 
philosophies commonly used in social science studies.  
 
Table 4.1: Research philosophy including quantitative and qualitative paradigm 
Assumption Question Quantitative Qualitative 
Ontology 
 
What is the nature of 
reality?  
Reality if objective and 




multiple as seen 




What is the 
relationship of the 
researcher to that 
researched? 
Researcher is independent 







What is the process of 
the research?  
 
Deductive process, 
Cause and effect,  
Static design categories 
isolated before study,  
Context-free,  
Generalizations leading to 
prediction, explanation, 
and understanding 
Accurate and reliable 
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Source: Adapted from Creswell (2013) and Denzin and Lincoln (2005)  
 
For this specific study, the researcher has used qualitative techniques to 
collect data since the research topic was believed to have more than a single 
reality associated to it. The purpose of this research was to understand the 
influence of infrastructure interdependencies on post-disaster recovery. 
Inherent to this exploration is an understanding of how various elements of 
interdependency have the potential to impede the post-disaster recovery effort. 
The research was considered to be subjectivist or constructionist as it required 
several constructs to understand the reality behind the research topic (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994). Most of these constructs were physical or material constructs 
such as guidelines and standards which guided the recovery effort, as well as 
human constructs from which the success and failures of the project depended 
on their opinions, viewpoints and decisions. The human constructs consisted of 
individuals or group of individuals who had intensive experience in post-disaster 
recovery of infrastructure projects. Additionally, there was no predefined theory 
from which the veracity of research knowledge was able to depend upon. In fact, 
there were multiple realities to be understood both from infrastructure 
interdependencies perspectives and from a post-disaster recovery perspective. 
The research also required identifying and understanding the relationships 
between realities of each of these two fields. Hence, the researcher adopted an 
interpretivist etymology (Creswell, 2013; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Gray, 2013; 
Guba & Lincoln, 1994).  
Due to the exploratory and interpretive nature of this research, the analysis 
of data was essentially guided by an inductive theory building approach, 
through which the collection, examination and process of continual re-
examination of data informed the research findings. An inductive theory building 
approach is generally used when the researcher attempts to derive a theory by 
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using multiple stages of data collection and by refining and categorising 
information (Creswell, 2013). This research used an exploratory pilot study as 
well as case study methodology to create in-depth meaningful data on how 
elements of infrastructure interdependencies have the potential to impede the 
post-disaster recovery effort and what can be done to minimize the effects of 
infrastructure interdependencies on post-disaster recovery. Justifications and 
reasoning behind the use of these methods are provided in the next section. A 
summary of the philosophical stance of this research is provided in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1: Etymology, theoretical perspectives, and methodology adopted in 
this research (Gray, 2013) 
 
4.3.2 Reasoning behind Research Assumptions 
Two methods of reasoning are generally used in research: deductive and 
inductive reasoning (Cavana, Delahaye, & Sekaran, 2001; Collis et al., 2003; 
Sutrisna, 2009a). The original Latin etymology deducere means the action of 
subtracting something (OED, 2007) and thus deductive reasoning involves 
extracting hypotheses from existing theories, and testing them with the data 
collected in order to confirm assumptions made in the theories (Collis, et al., 
2003; Hayes, 2000). According to Hayes (2000) and Sutrisna (2009a), a deductive 
research begins with the development of a theory, which in most cases can be an 
explanation of sets of observations that are found in existing literatures (Babbie, 
2010; Hayes, 2000; Limpanitgul & Robson, 2009; Sutrisna, 2009a). This sort of 
explanation has a predictive and anticipatory facet, which is also viewed as a 
hypothesis as it can serve to determine what will or will not happen in a given 
situation (Hayes, 2000; Sutrisna, 2009a). Once the hypothesis has been 
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formulated, research processes such as experiments, observations or surveys are 
used to test it (Creswell, 2013). This explains why deductive researches are also 
referred to as hypothetico-deductive studies, which incorporate a theory-testing 
approach (Hayes, 2000).  
Researchers such as Collis, et al. (2003) denounced the lack of flexibility 
experienced in deductive research. Although deductive reasoning is used to 
enable the process of questioning the cause-effect relationship between 
variables, deductive researches follow a rigid methodology that does not allow 
the researcher to look beyond the imposed parameters of the study (Babbie, 
2010; Collis, et al., 2003; Easterby-Smith, 2002; Gill & Johnson, 2010). 
Additionally, the deductive approach does not search for alternative explanations 
of the context in which an event takes place, neither does it investigate the 
different ways in which events are interpreted in their social world (Collis, et al., 
2003). To a large extent, with relying essentially on a single truth, a deductive 
approach falls within a positivism paradigm (Sutrisna, 2009a). In view of these 
issues, many social sciences have strayed from deductive reasoning and have 
started to shift more towards an inductive approach.  
In contrast to deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning uses what is 
referred to as a theory-building approach instead of a theory-testing approach 
(Collis, et al., 2003; Easterby-Smith, 2002; Hayes, 2000; Sutrisna, 2009a). It is only 
after collecting and analysing data that information generated from data analysis 
is used to develop a theory (Hayes, 2000; Sutrisna, 2009a). The theory building 
process occurs when the researcher detects patterns and regularities in the data, 
and works toward developing a theory that could explain those patterns (Collis, 
et al., 2003; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The reasoning starts with a specific 
set of observations (found within data boundaries) followed by some tentative 
hypotheses and moves towards broader generalizations of theories (Sutrisna, 
2009a). Due to its less structured approach and its interpretivist nature, 
inductive reasoning is generally applied in qualitative research, where methods 
such ethnographies, grounded theory, case studies, as well as phenomenological 
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studies are used to establish different views of particular phenomena (Creswell, 
2013).  
Since an inductive research, by its very nature, is concerned with 
interpreting the broader perspective of a research topic and looking into the 
context in which events take place, many have raised the concern that it can only 
be effectively applied for smaller samples of subjects (Collis, et al., 2003; Sutrisna, 
2009a). This has proven to be quite a disadvantage for research which involves 
large numbers of subjects and have a narrow-centric approach. Inductive 
research generally falls within a qualitative research setting where the 
researcher is much more concerned with exploring the question of why 
something is happening rather than determining what is happening (Collis, et al., 
2003; Easterby-Smith, 2002). However recent studies, especially those in the 
field of social sciences have rather seen inductive and deductive reasoning as 
being complementary and applicable into a single research topic to 
counterbalance the strengths and weaknesses of each approach (Babbie, 2010; 
Collis, et al., 2003; Easterby-Smith, 2002; Gill & Johnson, 2010; Limpanitgul & 
Robson, 2009; Neuman, 2005; Sellars, et al., 1997; Sutrisna, 2009a).  
 
4.3.3 The Rationale for Using Inductive Theory Building 
As previously mentioned, inductive theory building approach is generally 
performed without a sound knowledge of the research topic, starting from a very 
broad understanding and moving toward specific theoretical ideas (Collis, et al., 
2003; Gill & Johnson, 2010; Sutrisna, 2009a). This does not imply that inductive 
theory building approach has no affiliation with previous theories or ideas (Gray, 
2013; Yin, 2009). According to Gray (2013), the very fact that an issue was 
mentioned already implied judgement from the researcher. This research was 
concerned with exploring how infrastructure interdependencies influence the 
recovery of infrastructure systems. Among the two theories discussed in section 
3.3.2, an inductive theory building approach was found to be the most 
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appropriate construct to guide the analysis of data. Several reasons justified the 
selection of an inductive theory building for this research: 
a) There have been no empirical studies that were able to evaluate the 
impacts of infrastructure interdependencies on the post-disaster 
recovery of critical infrastructures (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; 
Johansson & Hassel, 2010; Rinaldi, 2004). The review of literatures in 
Chapter 2 revealed that most existing studies on post-disaster recovery 
have focused on single infrastructure, without linking these 
infrastructures together in a form representative of their actual 
interdependencies (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; Johansson & Hassel, 
2010; Rinaldi, 2004). Studies that have investigated infrastructure 
interdependencies have focused on pre-disaster planning rather than 
post-disaster recovery. Thus, there were no tangible theories from 
which a deductive approach could have been applied to provide a 
feasible answer to the research questions.  
b) Furthermore, several researchers including Rinaldi, et al. (2001) 
proposed six dimensional characteristics to describe the concept of 
interdependency (Buldyrev, et al., 2010; Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2007; 
Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 2009; Johansson & Hassel, 2010; Rinaldi, et 
al., 2001; Santella, et al., 2009; Zhang, et al., 2005). However there was 
an insufficient body of knowledge within these studies to conduct a 
deductive theory-testing approach to fit the post-disaster recovery 
context. Additionally, several parameters mentioned in those 
studies, particularly those related to financial data and decision 
making are influenced by various human factors and vary 
considerably across countries over time (Setola, et al., 2009).  
c) Another risk in applying a theory-testing approach in this research 
resides in succinctly defining the sequence and duration of recovery 
phases and processes. Recovery can take few days, several months 
or even years, depending on the severity of the damage and the 
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availability of resources (Kates, et al., 2006). As such, many 
organisations have developed recovery plans which adapt to natural 
disasters commonly experienced within their own regional 
boundaries. This has resulted in the lack of unifying theories from 
which a deductive approach could have been harboured based on 
the sequence as well as the duration of recovery activities and 
processes (ADB, 2013; Emergency Architects Australia, 2011; 
Emergency Management Australia, 2004). Therefore in the absence 
of an already established theory, it would have been almost 
impossible to undertake a theory-testing approach.  
The reasons mentioned above dictate the adoption of a qualitative 
investigation, which applied an inductive theory building approach in this 
research. The theory-building construct was used to obtain rich data not only on 
the interdependency phenomenon, but also on the effects observed from the 
interconnection between critical infrastructures during post-disaster recovery.  
Although inductive theory building approach proved to be the most 
appropriate approach for this research, it has some limitation when it comes to 
building strong, efficient theories. Inductive theory building from cases is 
considered to be limited by the fairly thin descriptions of a phenomenon, which 
are usually the results of analysing words rather than numbers that can easily be 
quantified (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Fellows & Liu, 2015; Langley, 1999). Being a 
fractional part of what generally happens in reality; data collected through those 
cases are not considered to be robust enough to provide deeper explanations on 
social issues (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). In fact, researchers who are familiar 
with deductive theory-testing approaches have criticised the complexity and 
confusion generated by these theories (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007; Fellows & Liu, 2015; Gray, 2013; Langley, 1999). Nonetheless, to 
ensure a degree of reliability most inductive theory building researches have 
used multiple cases or instances where multiple observations are made to 
provide plausible conclusions rather than using just a single case study 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Gray, 2013). Additionally, such studies have 
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established consistent patterns, which have produced meaningful results 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Gray, 2013).  
 
4.4 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Yin (2003) compared the evolution of a research methodology to 
developing an action plan, which seeks to connect the initial research questions 
to be answered, to some sort of conclusions or answers to the questions. This 
section describes the form of data collection, analysis and interpretation that 
have been used in response to research questions. Ultimately, this research was 
intended to develop a framework that provides the theoretical underpinnings for 
investigating various elements of infrastructure interdependencies during post-
disaster recovery. Little research has been done on that specific issue, thus the 
meaning of the phenomenon being examined needed to be established through 
participants’ views (Creswell, 2013). An exploratory pilot study was first 
conducted to confirm which important variables of interdependency could 
potentially affect the post-disaster recovery. Then a case study method was used 
as a tool in investigating the multifaceted problems related to how infrastructure 
interdependencies affect the post-disaster recovery effort. The rationales for 
using these methods are also provided in this section. Figure 4.2 displays the 
research design adopted in this study. 
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Figure 4.2: Research Design 
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4.4.1 Exploratory Pilot Study 
According to Van Teijlingen and Hundley (2002), a pilot study is a miniature 
version of a full scale study which provides valuable insights on whether or not a 
research project can fail or succeed. Although it does not guarantee success in the 
main study, it is used to test the research methods and clarify the issues to be 
addressed with these instruments (Van Teijlingen & Hundley, 2002). The pilot 
study in this research combines both exploration for discovery and investigative 
exploration (Stebbins, 2001). Investigative exploration portrays a general picture 
of what occurs in a social science research (Saunders, 2011; Stebbins, 2001). 
Exploration for discovery starts by exploring the unknown to potentially discover 
concepts of great interest to the researcher (Stebbins, 2001). The exploration for 
discovery was conducted to obtain a firsthand understanding on which key 
elements of interdependency are positively associated to existing post-disaster 
recovery strategies. The investigative exploration was performed to understand 
the sequence of recovery activities in general as well as to determine when during 
those activities, infrastructure interdependencies, could potentially impede the 
recovery effort. Since these two types of exploration were used to test the 
feasibility of the research study, the researcher sought for flexibility and open-
mindedness in looking for the right data and knowing where to find this data 
(Creswell, 2013; Van Teijlingen & Hundley, 2002). A series of in-depth interviews 
on the research topic was conducted with general managers, disaster recovery 
coordinators as well as project managers to answer research question (RQ1). The 
pilot study was undertaken to: 
 understand the contextual framework of the research subject; 
 test the practicability of research constructs identified in the 
literature; 
 discover the link between the relational interdependency concepts 
with post-disaster recovery strategy 
(Amaratunga & Baldry, 2001). 
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The discussions provided indications as to whether or not participants fully 
understood the interview questions, if the research issues were well formulated 
through those questions, or if the questions reflected what the researcher was 
aiming to achieve, or if there were any ambiguities in understanding the research 
issues etc. The comments provided by those participants enabled the refinement 
of the research questions and the selection of a case study method to understand 
how elements of interdependency can impede the recovery effort.  
Table 4.2: Objectives of the Exploratory Study 
Methodological Stages Pilot Study  
Number of participants  6 interviewees 
Mode of interaction In-depth interviews  
Objectives of the study  Identify elements of interdependencies which 
could potentially impede the recovery effort 
 Test the feasibility of the proposed framework  
 
 
4.4.2 The Rationale for Using Case Study Method  
In his various books, Yin (2009, p. 13) has defined a case study as  
“An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundary between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident” (Gray, 2013; Yin, 2009, p. 13).  
According to Gray (2013, p. 162), a contemporary phenomenon can be an 
event, an organisation, an individual, or even a role or an occupation that is 
ongoing to, or has already happened. In this research, the case study method 
uncovered the relationship between the phenomenon of infrastructure 
interdependencies and the context in which it was occurring (during the post-
disaster recovery of the 2011 Queensland floods) (Dooley, 2002; Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007; Gray, 2013; Robson, 2002; Yin, 2003; Yin, 2009, 2012). Further 
descriptions on the phenomenon being examined and its context within this 
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study are provided at later stage of this report. Several reasons justify the 
selection of the case study methodology to unveil the research questions. The 
rationale accommodates the three conditions which, according to Yin (2003), 
should guide the selection of a research method: (1) The type of research 
question raised, (2) The extent of control that the researcher has on the actual 
course of events, and (3) The degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to 
historical events (Yin, 2003, p. 4).  
Types of research questions 
Also according to Yin (2003; 2009, 2012), a case study method is likely to 
favour ‘how’ or ‘why’ research questions, which involve a deeper probing of the 
issues investigated (Yin, 2014). The ‘what’, ‘where’ or ‘how many’ questions on the 
other hand are ideal for survey methods (Yin, 2014). The specific research 
questions raised in this study, along with the methods adopted were formulated 
as follows: 
1) What are the various elements of infrastructure interdependency 







2) How do elements of infrastructure interdependencies impede post-








Review of documents 
 Interviews  
Within and Cross-case 
analysis 
Methods-Exploratory 
pilot study & Literature 
review 
 In-depth Interviews 
Review of Documents 
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3) How can the disruptive effects of the key elements of infrastructure 






As mentioned by Yin (2009), some ‘what’ questions are exploratory and do 
not necessarily necessitate a survey research method. These sorts of ‘what’ 
questions are those that seek to develop pertinent hypotheses, or propositions, 
for further inquiry. The first research question (RQ1) investigates not only the 
various elements of interdependency, but also the dimensions of interactions 
portrayed in each of these elements. Infrastructure interdependencies are not 
quantifiable measures and as such, the purpose of this research was to explore 
and understand the functioning of interdependent networks, not to quantify 
them. However, since interdependency was being investigated in a post-disaster 
recovery context, the understanding to be gained was limited just to the level of 
understanding where the researcher could gain sufficient knowledge of how 
interdependent infrastructures rely on each other’s constant availability and also 
what occurrences or situations could lead to the disruption of that 
interrelationship. As previously mentioned, RQ1 was partially answered from the 
literature review conducted in Chapter 2. However, there was still a need to 
contextualise the elements of infrastructure interdependencies found in the 
literature within a post-disaster recovery context, in order to determine which of 
these elements were positively associated with existing recovery strategies. In 
this regard, an exploratory pilot study was performed through individually 
seeking experts’ participations in face-to-face interviews. The pilot study was 
essential to narrow down the elements of interdependency and to test the 
feasibility of the interview questions before embarking on the large scale study 
(Van Teijlingen & Hundley, 2002).  
Method-Case studies 
Review of documents 
 Interviews  
Within and Cross-case 
analysis 
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The second and third research questions (RQ2 and RQ3) both required deep 
investigation into the impacts of infrastructure interdependencies and the ways 
in which they could be minimized during post-disaster recovery. ‘How’ questions 
such as these deal with tracing what Yin (2009) referred to as operational links 
of events over time, rather than looking into mere frequencies or incidence factor 
like surveys would. Among the five most usual applications of the case study 
method, Yin (2009) has mentioned that the most important is to explain the 
causal effects between variables in a real-life context. RQ2 was concerned with 
determining effects of infrastructure interdependencies experienced in post-
disaster recovery projects, while RQ3 was concerned with knowing how the 
effects of infrastructure interdependencies have been successfully overcome in 
the past. As there were numerous variables (including timing, locations, 
processes, infrastructures, organisations etc.) involved in this research, this made 
the level of enquiry too broad for an experimental approach, thus a case study 
method was the only alternative to accurately reveal the causal relationships 
between these variables. 
 
The extent of control of the researcher  
The relationship between the phenomenon and the context was ambiguous 
and uncertain to the researcher (Gray, 2013). There were no previous studies 
which looked into infrastructure interdependencies in a post-disaster recovery 
context; hence, the researcher had little or no control over this research. As a 
result, there was a clear need to look into the phenomenon within its real-life 
context as post-disaster recovery generally only occurs in a real-life situation. It 
was only logical that the phenomenon of interdependency be investigated in its 
natural, rather than in an experimental, setting. Intrinsically, what was required 
of the researcher was to step beyond the known and enter into the world of 
participants, to understand the world from their perspectives in order to make 
discoveries that will contribute to the development of empirical knowledge. 
Therefore, a case study method proved to be ideal to question not only the 
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different types of interdependencies, but also the recovery processes of CIs, as 
well as the effects of infrastructure interdependencies on post-disaster recovery 
efforts. This also proved to be essential in capturing rich data for a clearer 
understanding of the research problems, while retaining the characteristics of the 
reality under investigation. 
 
The degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events 
Yin (2003) mentioned that a case study method is advisable for 
investigating contemporary events, as long as the relevant contextual variables 
are not manipulated. Though this research is concerned with understanding the 
emergent behaviours of interdependent infrastructures after disastrous events, 
the research focuses specifically on dealing with recovery after contemporary 
flood events, particularly those experienced in recent years in Queensland, 
Australia. Experts who experienced the 2010/11 Queensland floods are still alive 
to report what had occurred and some organisations currently continue to deal 
with the continuing effects of these floods in their recovery projects. The case 
studies selected were located within four organisations involved in the recovery 
of the 2010/11 Queensland flood events. These organisations represented the 
most affected regions of Queensland including the Brisbane City, Lockyer Valley, 
Toowoomba, and Bundaberg regions. The researcher explored the processes 
adopted by these organisations to deal with infrastructure interdependencies in 
response to the 2010/11 Queensland floods and also the outcomes, i.e.,  whether 
those approaches worked and what were the results that became part of the next 
sequence of action. 
Additionally, Yin (2012, p. 12) mentioned that decisions related to topics 
such as the ones that seek to uncover ‘why, how and with what result’ certain 
decisions influence a project, are the ones that most favour a case study 
methodological approach. Based on intent to determine the contextual conditions 
which could be highly pertinent to the enabling of infrastructure 
Chapter 4-Research Design 
Erica Mulowayi 104 
interdependencies, a case study method also proved to be essential in uncovering 
the principal organisations behind these decisions.  
 
4.4.3 The Use of Multiple Case Studies 
The interpretive and exploratory nature of this research led to the selection 
of a case study strategy to unveil the research questions. Case study research 
includes single and multiple case studies (Grünbaum, 2007; Patton, 2005; 
Robson, 2002; Saunders, 2011; Sutrisna, 2009a; Wortley, Vaughan, Davis, 
Morgan, & Thomas, 1992; Yin, 2003; Yin, 2009, 2012). A single case study tends 
to be used mostly when the researcher faces three circumstances (1) an extreme 
unique case, (2) a critical or intrinsic case, as well as (3) a revelatory case 
(Bengtsson, 1999; Grünbaum, 2007, p. 8). A case is considered extreme when the 
phenomenon being investigated is so rare that there is no other possible 
approach than investigating the case that has been presented to the researcher 
(Bengtsson, 1999; Grünbaum, 2007). A critical or intrinsic case is the one only 
case that has been considered strong enough to test a well formulated theory to 
verify whether or not the propositions already made are accurate (Yin, 2009, p. 
39). According to Stake (1995), an intrinsic case does not require the 
development of an hypothesis with general application since the hypothesis or 
theory already exist (Grünbaum, 2007). The researcher is only concerned with 
understanding the implications of a particular case study (Grünbaum, 2007; 
Stake, 1995). In a revelatory case on the other hand, the researcher uses the case 
as an opportunity to explore a phenomenon that has never been studied before 
(Bengtsson, 1999; Grünbaum, 2007). These sorts of approaches have been 
criticised over the years for being overly simplistic and conducted at an abstract 
level, to the point where in some cases research constructs and data have been 
lacking or could not be clearly perceived. In fact researchers such as Yin (2009) 
have warned the danger of falling into misinterpretation of the real population 
when the research questions shift and become unclear during a single case study 
investigation.  
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As previously mentioned, the phenomenon of interdependency found its 
root in a plethora of descriptive expertise across various disciplines, ranging from 
statistical physics to complex systems studies (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2007; 
Johansson & Hassel, 2010; Rinaldi, 2004). As such, a multiple case studies 
approach was used in this research to compare data from several cases, 
generalise knowledge from the interactivity of those data, in order to produce 
more compelling results (Amaratunga & Baldry, 2001; Collis, et al., 2003; Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2005; Dooley, 2002; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; 
Yin, 2009). It is by following this process that the multiple cases approach 
provided better theory grounding and produced more accurate generalised 
theories (Eisenhardt, 1989; Proverbs & Gameson, 2008; Yin, 2009). This proved 
to be sufficient in meeting the overall objective of this research, which consisted 
of presenting a generalised understanding of how infrastructure 
interdependencies influence the post-disaster recovery effort. The multiple cases 
used in this study also met the research objectives of: 
 examining generic dimensions of infrastructure interdependencies 
that were provided in the theoretical framework; 
 finding ambiguities related to these dimensions, particularly their 
problems and consequences on post-disaster recovery projects; 
 presenting a general theory from which interferences can be drawn 
for future research. 
According to Stake (1995) collective case studies are limited due to the fact 
that they generally require external validation since their investigations are not 
necessarily based on valid existing theories (Grünbaum, 2007; Stake, 1995; Yin, 
2009). Additionally, Amaratunga and Baldry (2001) mentioned the risk of 
subjectivity during data collection which can also hinder the validity of the 
results. This is why Stake (1995) suggested the need of having a level of 
transferability of the results obtained from the case studies to ensure that validity 
of findings are met (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gray, 2013; Grünbaum, 2007; Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994). According to Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2009), it is preferable to 
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follow a replication logic where theories are likely to be extended into future 
research rather than a sampling logic, which is likely to produce statistical results. 
In multiple case studies, the goal is to be able to inform the audience about the 
success factors as well as the factors of failures of a research project in order to 
generalise theories that could be easily applied to a broader population (Yin, 
2009).  
The study approach of this research examined and explored how key 
elements of infrastructure interdependencies have the potential to impede the 
recovery effort. A multiple case studies approach provided the opportunity to 
explain how the disruptive effects generated from these elements can be 
minimized or reduced during the recovery period. The exploratory phase 
provided the opportunity to gain deeper insights on the phenomenon of 
infrastructure interdependencies in a post-disaster recovery context, while the 
explanatory phase allowed in the development of testable propositions for future 
research. While following replication logic, four cases were selected in this 
research. The cases were chosen with the intent to produce either similar 
predictive results (literal replication) or contrasting results with a predictive 
aspect (theoretical replication) (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). In this regard, data 
generated from the first two cases, specified the conditions under which 
infrastructure interdependencies were likely to impede the post-disaster 
recovery, while the second group of two cases specified the conditions when the 
phenomenon was not likely to be an issue to the recovery process. The four cases 
combined led to the generalisation of the theory and, more particularly, to the 
development of recommendations that could be applied to new cases. Pursuing 
this approach has led to the development of a rich, theoretical framework that 
can be applied in post-disaster recovery projects of flood events.  
 
4.5 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESEARH METHOD 
A description of the implementation process of the case study method is 
depicted in this section. The section describes the unit of analysis of the case 
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study method, the protocol followed in conducting the case study, as well as the 
process used in deriving theories from investigating the multiple case studies 
selected.  
4.5.1 Case Study Selection and Unit of Analysis 
A unit of analysis (also commonly referred to as a case study object) is the 
central issue or the focus of a case, used to understand, prepare and implement a 
case study method (Grünbaum, 2007; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003). According to 
Patton (2002, 2005), the key issue in selecting a unit of analysis is to determine 
in advance what is the final message that the researcher wants to convey at the 
end of the study. Thus, to a large extent the question of selecting appropriate units 
of analysis is closely linked to establishing the meaning of the case being studied 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Gray, 2013; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003). If a unit of analysis is not 
clearly stated, the meaning of a case study would probably not be clearly 
understood (Grünbaum, 2007; Patton, 2002). Therefore, the unit of analysis 
constitutes the problem within the case study that the researcher intends to 
clarify (Patton, 2002).  
To Wortley (1992), the researcher is responsible of deciding what will be 
the unit of analysis and this can generally vary from an individual, an 
organisation, dyads, groups, divisions, an event or an activity (Cavana, Delahaye, 
& Sekaran, 2001; Cooper & Schindler, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007; Gray, 2013; Langley, 1999; Robson, 2002; Saunders, 2011; 
Sutrisna, 2009a; Yin, 2003; Yin, 2009). Selecting a unit of analysis allows the 
researcher to stay within feasible limits of the research period when collecting 
information on specific cases (Cavana, Delahaye, & Sekaran, 2001; Yin, 2009). 
Without these boundaries, the researcher may be tempted to collect everything, 
losing the opportunity to elaborate congruence amongst the case studies findings 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  
Since qualitative research focuses on generating in-depth information, the 
cases were selected purposefully with the intent to produce valid theory (Patton, 
2002, 2005). According to Patton (2005), such information are those from which 
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the audience can learn a lot more about the importance of the issues being raised 
as part of a research investigation. Eisenhardt (1989) referred to purposeful 
sampling as being a theoretical sampling where cases are chosen for theoretical 
purpose, not statistical reasons. Generally, this is done with the intent to replicate 
previous cases or extend theory or even to fill theoretical gaps within existing 
body of knowledge (Eisenhardt, 1989). For this research, the cases were selected 
with the intent of filling the theoretical gaps between the post-disaster recovery 
field and the information systems field in order to produce emergent theory for 
future studies. The purposeful sampling followed the extreme or deviant case 
sampling strategy recommended by Patton (2005, p. 4), where cases were used 
to portray outstanding success or notable failures of the research problem to 
produce clear logical conclusions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). Although 
multiple cases were selected, each case study was treated as an individual 
experiment to ensure that irrelevant variations are reduced and strong research 
constructs are produced (Yin, 2003). 
The case studies method employed in this research investigated the 
implementation process of effective recovery strategy after flood-related 
disasters, and as such the unit of analysis was the current or existing recovery 
plan or guidelines used by large organisations involved in post-disaster 
recovery. The case study method was concerned with looking into how large 
organisations involved in the recovery process deal or cope with recovering 
critical infrastructures such as water (including sanitation), transport systems 
(including roads and railways), as well as energy and ICT systems from natural 
disasters. The focus was essentially to investigate how these organisations deal 
with the impacts of interdependencies amongst these critical infrastructures on 
recovery processes.  
A total of four cases were investigated in this research. According to 
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 15) the maximum number of cases to be added in a research 
depends on the ‘theoretical saturation’ reached during case studies 
investigations. Theoretical saturation tends to be reached when the researcher 
start observing a series of redundant information from previously encountered 
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phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). In most cases, this 
generally occurs between 4 and 10 cases depending on the research subject 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Theoretical saturation including similar responses and 
information started to be observed when the fourth case was reached in this 
research, thus the researcher decided to limit the total number of cases to four. 
For a full time research performed over a three years period, Pettigrew (1990) 
recommended not more than four cases to be efficiently investigated. Therefore, 
the number of cases was deemed to be reasonable for the three years elapsed 
time given to easily manage and control the numerous variations of cases.  
The four organisations which constituted the four case studies were 
principally large local governments, known as city councils or regional councils, 
from the most affected regions of the 2010/11 Queensland floods in Australia. 
Queensland is the most flood-prone region in Australia and floods related 
disasters per se, are the most costly natural disasters in Australia, affecting both 
urban and rural environments (Middelmann, 2007). The 2011 floods were 
nowhere near what Queensland experienced in previous years. Infrastructures 
damages reached $2.38 billion, exceeding the 1974 cost of damage, which was 
estimated at $68 million (ADB, 2013; Emergency Architects Australia, 2011; 
Queensland Government, 2012; Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2014). 
Therefore, the recovery from 2011 Queensland floods was the most challenging 
recovery experienced in the last 10 years.  
Although responsibility of the management of flood recovery in Queensland 
involved all levels of government including non-government agencies and 
groups, and the general community (Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 
2014), the selected organisations were the ones which were directly involved 
with the community and participated and oversee the recovery activities of each 
critical infrastructure. Additionally, disaster coordination centres can be found 
within each of these organisations, where representatives of organisations 
responsible for the four critical infrastructures collaborate to deliver fast efficient 
recovery. This provides a better platform in observing the phenomenon of 
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interdependency within a post-disaster recovery context. Overall the purposeful 
selection of the four case studies relied on the following criteria:  
 Industry sector: Local government lead agencies including local 
councils from urban and rural flood prone areas;  
 Role in the recovery process: General Managers, Disaster 
Recovery Coordinators, Project Managers; 
 Experience in post-disaster recovery: more than 10 years of 
experience in managing disaster recovery projects;  
 Geographical Jurisdictions: Queensland, Australia; 
 Natural disaster event: The 2011 Queensland floods; 
 Approach to recovery: Disaster management plan or recovery 
guideline consistent with the Disaster Management Act 2003 for 
floods events; 
 Organisational sector: Local councils which include service 
providers from water sector (including sanitation), transport sector 
(including roads and rails), energy sector (including electricity 
landline providers), and Information and Communication 
Technology sector (including internet providers), in their disaster 
coordination centres 
 Recovery Time: From 2010 to 2013;  
 Damaging state of infrastructures: between rehabilitation state to 
complete devastation state. 
For the pilot study and the main case studies investigation, a summary of the 
stages following the selection criteria is provided in Table 4.3.  
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Table 4.3: Summary of the research methodological stages 
Methodological Stages Pilot Study Main investigations 
Number of 
participants  
6 interviewees 24 interviewees 
Mode of interaction In depth-interviews Open-ended interviews 
Objectives of each 
study 
 Identify elements of 
interdependencies which 
could potentially impede 
the recovery effort 
 Test the feasibility of the 
research subject 




 Determine ways to 
overcome disruptive effects 
of interdependency during 
post-disaster recovery 
 
4.5.2 Case Study Protocol  
Yin (2009) mentioned the need of following a case study protocol to 
maintain research consistency when investigating multiple cases. In this regard, 
the case study protocol does not only serve as an instrument but it is also 
considered to be the set of processes needed to complete the study investigations 
(Wortley, et al., 1992; Yin, 2009). Adhering to a protocol was found to be useful 
to avoid losing the focus of the case studies, and to anticipate the potential 
problems which could hinder the completion of their investigations (Yin, 2003; 
Yin, 2009). The hypotheses made in the theoretical framework guided the data 
collection protocol, which was used for the four case studies. The protocol 
followed in this research was provided in Appendix B. It included the overview of 
the four case study projects as well as the case study questions and data collection 
procedures followed in this research.  
 
4.5.3 Field Procedures 
As previously mentioned, case studies provide the opportunity to 
investigate a phenomenon within its real-life context with little to no influence 
from the investigator (Yin, 2009). This implies that respondents need to be 
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approached in an environment where the researcher acts like a simple observer 
who is unaware of the information that will be shared (Yin, 2009). The first step 
in entering the field was to gain access to key correspondent from related 
organisations that will serve to create the spider web, through which all other 
interviewees will be approached. A template of the types of emails that were sent 
to the respondents in the field is provided in Appendix C.  
Correspondents were highly knowledgeable informants who, through their 
various disaster management experiences, had developed the capacity to view 
the phenomenon from different perspectives (Eisenhardt, 1989). The key 
respondents were principally General Managers with years of extensive 
experience in major disaster recovery of infrastructures projects. Being the main 
influencers in decision making for recovery operations, General Managers were 
approached to contact other respondents including Disaster Coordinators as well 
as Project Managers who oversee the disaster management program of work to 
ensure effective and efficient response to and recovery from disasters and 
emergencies.  
Respondents were well aware of the privacy and confidentiality agreement 
prior to starting the interviews. The Information consent form, which was 
presented to them, assured them of the strict confidentiality and non-disclosure 
of any information on their identities or on the company name to be exposed in 
the research. Only the researcher will be analysing the data provided. The QUT 
Ethics Approval Number was 1500000140. The form was filled with information 
regarding the research project including the potential benefits to participating 
organisations. Participants were also well aware that they could voluntary decide 
to withdraw from the interview at any time during the course of the project. The 
information consent form used in this research has been provided in Appendix D.  
Once the Information consent form was signed, a permission to use a 
recording device to conduct the interview process was granted by respondents. 
Each interview commenced with an explanation of key concepts of both post-
disaster recovery and interdependency, including the context in which they were 
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being investigated. Interview questions had two main focuses; (1) the program 
of work or sequence of activities for post-disaster recovery of critical 
infrastructures affected by flood events, as well as (2) the impacts of the key 
elements of infrastructure interdependencies identified in the theoretical 
framework.  
Questions related to post-disaster recovery investigated the factors of 
success and failures in recovering CIs (in terms of time, cost and recovery 
activities), the challenges due to interdependencies experienced during recovery, 
the order of priorities of the recovery activities, as well as the level of 
collaboration that takes place between infrastructure providers and government 
lead agencies such as local and federal government. Interview questions on 
interdependency focused on the effects of physical (including geographical) and 
cyber interdependency on post-disaster recovery. The questions also focused on 
determining how the degrees of such interdependencies impede the post-
disaster recovery effort and what measures had been taken by these 
organisations to overcome those disastrous effects. Additional questions were 
used, depending on the participants’ initial answers. Some questions were asked 
to clarify information that was quite unclear and in most cases such questions 
provided additional information that was later added in the research.  
Each interview lasted approximately one hour. Data obtained from these 
one-on-one interviews were recorded with a recording device and also in the 
form of written field notes, which were later transcribed. The data was then 
organised in a way that provided readable narrative descriptions of major themes 
which were later analysed using analytical software.  
The interviews provided richer insights into the complex issues of 
infrastructure interdependencies experienced during the post-disaster recovery. 
They also revealed respondents’ preferences for mechanisms used to prioritize 
recovery activities in a timely manner and overcome issues related to CIs.  
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4.5.4 Sources of Evidence 
The case study method generally requires the use of various sources of 
evidence to collect meaningful data and increase its credibility (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007; Patton, 2002). Several sources of evidence were used in this 
research including a review of archival documents, in depth-interviews  and open-
ended interviews. Table 4.4 lists the numerous advantages that can result from 
adopting these data collection instruments. The combination of these sources of 
evidence has provided strong relevant conclusions to the research questions. A clear 
depiction on how these sources of evidence were used in this research is presented 
in this section. 
 
Table 4.4: Strengths and weaknesses of sources of evidence 
Sources of Evidence Strengths Weaknesses 
Documentation -Stable- can be 
reviewed repeatedly 
-Unobtrusive- not 
created as a result of a 
case study 
-Exact- contains exact 
names, and details of an 
event 
-Broad coverage- long span of 
time, many events and many 
settings 
 
-Retrievability can be low 
-Biased selectivity, if collection 
is incomplete 
-Reporting bias-reflects 
(unknown) bias of author 
-Access-may be deliberately 
blocked 
Interviews -Targeted- focuses directly on 
case study topic 
-Insightful- provides perceived 
causal inferences 
-Bias due to poorly constructed 
questions  
-Response bias 
-Inaccuracies due to poor 
recall 
-Reflexivity-interviewee gives 
what interviewer wants 
to hear 
Adapted from (Yin, 2009, p. 80) 
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4.5.5 Review of Documents  
According to Bowen (2009, p. 3), document analysis is usually performed 
together with other forms of data collection, to seek convergence and corroboration 
across the data used in the case studies (Eisner & Eisner, 1991; Patton, 2002, 2005). 
A multiple case study investigation allows the reduction of potential bias usually 
associated with case studies and adds to the credibility of research findings (Bowen, 
2009; Eisner & Eisner, 1991; Patton, 2002). In the document analysis performed in 
this research, a series of organisational charts, disaster management standards, 
plans and guidelines, as well as reports and seminar presentations were examined. 
Reviewing archival documents of organisations being investigated provided three 
main benefits to this research: 
1) Historical background information: The historical context and 
background of past and recent disaster recovery projects could be 
accessed and examined. This helped in understanding when recovery 
guidelines were last implemented and also what were the major 
changes and improvements made in the guidelines to fit the current 
types of disasters experienced in Queensland and improve 
infrastructure resilience ability.  
2) Organisational characteristics and committees’ involvements; The 
review of documents provided a better understanding of each 
organisation’s profile and structure including the company objectives 
and core purposes in regards to delivering effective disaster recovery 
practices. This sort of information suggested areas of improvement in 
prioritization of the rehabilitation, and reconstruction process, of 
interdependent infrastructures. It also showed that each company was 
embedded within a disaster coordination centre, in which 
infrastructure providers of critical infrastructures collaborated and 
exchanged reports during the response and recovery phases of 
emergency. 
3) Supplementary research data: The documents raised several questions 
that were not initially thought of by the researcher. Questions related 
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to external governance at state and local levels for instance; seeking 
understanding on how the collaboration between state and local 
government as well as with infrastructure providers could potentially 
affect the recovery process. 
 
4.5.6 In-depth Interviews  
Interviews are considered to be the most important instruments in collecting 
data for case studies (Yin, 2009). Six face-to-face structured interviews were 
conducted for each case study. Chapter 5 discussed in detail the procedure for 
conducting, and findings obtained from, interviews with selected respondents. The 
reason for choosing in-depth interviews rather than open-ended interviews was that 
some prior knowledge on interdependency existed in the literature, and this led to 
the development of the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 3. Thus, the 
researcher was concerned about corroborating these concepts of interdependency 
into a post-disaster recovery context. There was less need in understanding the 
broader, open-ended nature of the topic (Yin, 2009). 
Since no leading questions were asked, the researcher was able to discern the 
respondents’ real opinions on which elements of infrastructure interdependencies 
were of concern during post-disaster recovery. The interviews revealed that four 
elements of infrastructure interdependencies, including the types and degrees of 
interdependencies, as well the types of failures and state of operation of CIs after a 
disaster, had major influence on the recovery processes at different stages of the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction programme. The interviews also provided a 
platform in clarifying information found in the literatures and acquire valuable 
feedback from the respondents concerning the research topic (Gray, 2013). The in-
depth interviews also served as a pilot study where non-verbal cues, as well as 
insightful comments from respondents revealed the overall feasibility of 
investigating the influence of infrastructure interdependencies on post-disaster 
recovery practices.  
 
Chapter 4-Research Design 
Erica Mulowayi 117 
4.5.7 Open-ended Interviews  
A series of open-ended interviews were also conducted with approximately 
twenty-four informants. According to Yin (2012), open-ended interviews provide 
richer and more extensive data due to the prolonged conversational mode that 
usually takes place between the interviewer and the interviewees. The attractive 
facet of an open-ended interview is the fact that it usually offers the flexibility in 
changing the way of understanding research questions (Gray, 2013). In this 
regard, King (1994, p. 3) recommended the use of preponderant open questions 
with low degree of structure imposed to them, but which focus more on the world 
of the interviewee rather than abstractions and general opinions. 
In this research, the interviews mostly exceeded the one hour allocated to 
the interview. This was due to the fact that respondents were provided the 
opportunity not only to provide answers to the research questions, but also to 
construct their own reality and think about alternative situations that could be 
related to the research topic (Yin, 2012). The interviewees were asked to propose 
insights on how the disruptive effects of infrastructure interdependencies could 
be reduced or minimised during post-disaster recovery. These open-ended 
interviews questions were found to be ideal for investigating the effects of 
infrastructure interdependencies on post-disaster recovery and identifying how 
these effects could be minimised or reduced. Since very few suggestions were 
found in the literature, such valuable information from interviewees provided 
much greater insight into the issues of interest and also suggested new additional 
ways of corroborating evidence from the case studies (Yin, 2009). Yin (2003) 
suggested the need of searching for contrary evidence when using open-ended 
interviews in order to not become overly dependent on information provided by 
respondents. Therefore, an additional follow-up review of literature, as well as 
revisiting the document analysis results were performed after the interviews to 
further corroborate the data obtained from the interviewees. 
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4.6 DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS 
Analysing qualitative data is generally viewed as ‘cooking without a recipe’ 
(Graebner, et al., 2012; Yin, 2012). This perspective results from the lack of well-
defined qualitative tools needed to maximise the analysis of case study evidence 
(Gray, 2013; Yin, 2012). Data analysis for qualitative case studies involves a series 
of activities including examining, categorizing, tabulating, recombining the 
evidence to address the initial propositions of a research (Yin, 2009, p. 102). The 
inductive theory building approach adopted in this research focuses on exploring 
what has actually been discovered through the four case studies in order to 
develop emergent theories (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Gray, 2013). 
According to Yin (2009; 2003), the best way to start analysing data is to refer back 
to the objectives of the research questions. This is done to verify whether or not 
data from the cases are consistent with the initial theoretical propositions 
generated from the research questions (Gray, 2013; Yin, 2009). If cases prove to 
be consistent with the initial assumptions, then the hypothesis can be confirmed. 
However, when the cases are deviant from the hypothesis, the hypothesis would 
either have to be reformulated or redefined (Bell & Bryman, 2007; Gray, 2013).  
The research questions of this study shaped the review of the literature, the 
initial theoretical propositions and the data collection methods. To achieve a 
better quality of analysis, every element of infrastructure interdependencies was 
analysed to demonstrate both similarities and rivalries of interpretation of their 
influence on post-disaster recovery. The data analysis took place within the 
spatial constraints of the research questions. This allowed each part of the 
emergent theory to be supported by evidence from the cases. The computer 
analysis software (QSR International NVivo 10 software), supported the coding 
and management process of data analysis.  
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4.6.1 Data Coding Processes Using QSR International NVivo 10 
software  
The rationale of using a coding process in this study was similar to that 
depicted in Miles (1994)’s flow model for qualitative data analysis, where the 
researcher looks at (1) reducing data, (2) displaying data, and (3) drawing 
conclusions and verifications. Data reduction consists of selecting, focusing, 
simplifying, abstracting, as well as transforming data initially extracted from the 
field (Flick, 2011; Miles & Huberman, 1984, p. 23). Data display consists simply 
in grouping information that will lead into conclusions drawing (Miles & 
Huberman, 1984). These two activities are essential in sorting and organizing 
data in such a way that strong conclusions are drawn from them (Flick, 2008; 
Miles & Huberman, 1984).  
Using QSR International NVivo 10 software, the reduction and display of 
data were achieved during the open-coding and axial coding process. According 
to Hoover and Koerber (2011), QSR International NVivo 10 software is widely 
used due to its efficiency, multiplicity and transparency of data. Using this 
qualitative data analysis software provided substantial advantages including 
grouping, checking, analysing and comparing data, as well as importing and 
exporting data to other tools when necessary (Hoover & Koerber, 2011). The 
coding process began with uploading the transcribed data into QSR International 
NVivo 10 software (Gray, 2013). Then, data were stored into allocated files in 
form of nodes and tree nodes associated to each different topic (Bradley, Curry, 
& Devers, 2007; Saldaña, 2015). The storing of data was performed in such a way 
that the original sources of information were kept intact. With the large amount 
of data, QSR International NVivo 10 software proved to be useful in capturing the 
information into multiple nodes (Saldaña, 2015). The coding process was 
performed following a sequence of activities which consisted of an open coding 
process, a building of the structure of tree nodes, as well as a review of the nodes 
(Ellram, 1996; Fernández, 2004).  
 
Open-Coding (descriptive coding) 
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According to Fernandez (2004, p. 50), open-coding implies ‘running the 
data open’. This is generally done by breaking the data into as many categories as 
possible to detect new concepts (Ellram, 1996; Fernández, 2004). Gray (2013) 
suggested the need for constantly making comparisons and asking questions to 
help the coding of phenomena in terms of ‘concepts and categories’. This was 
initially performed when the theoretical framework was developed, however, 
after the focus group and open-ended interviews the data were transcribed and 
additional nodes were created to add to the new lines of enquiry that emerged 
from these instruments. The nodes were created as a one or two word summary 
of each segment of the transcribed text and coded according to their meanings. 
Throughout the entire coding process, the researcher referred back to the initial 
research questions to ensure that information being evolved fitted with the 
research objectives and questions (Gray, 2013; Strauss & Corbin, 1994). When 
unanticipated results emerged from the data, the researcher made sure to re-
conceptualize them within the research boundaries. For the in-depth interviews, 
the segments of text from each interview were labelled in a way that four parent 
nodes and eight tree nodes or child nodes were created. This represented the 
elements of infrastructure interdependencies that hade the most potential to 
impede the post-disaster recovery. 
 
Axial-Coding (Pattern coding) 
In axial coding or pattern coding, the nodes generated from the open-coding 
process are investigated individually, then compared with each other in order to 
group them into sub-categories, depending on the similarity of patterns found 
(Ellram, 1996; Fernández, 2004; Miles & Huberman, 1984). The patterns usually 
encompass the conditions and the context, in which the information arise, as well 
as the actions, interactions and consequences that emerge from it (Gray, 2013; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1994). This iterative process was performed between open and 
axial coding until a comprehensive parent and child nodes structure was 
developed for both the in-depth and the open-ended interviews. This constant 
comparison approach provided better insights into the data and the writing 
Chapter 4-Research Design 
Erica Mulowayi 121 
memos developed, which served later in performing the within–case and cross -
case analyses.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Example of open-coding process of the in-depth interviews 
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Selective Coding (Close coding) 
The theories and memos retrieved from both open and axial coding nodes 
were reviewed during the selective coding process (Ellram, 1996). This was 
performed to delimitate the theories utilised, to one or two principal theories 
from which the data analysis could further extend (Ellram, 1996; Gray, 2013; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1994). A series of nodes emerged from open coding and axial 
coding and these themes included ordinary themes (the ones that were 
expected), the unexpected themes, as well as those that were hard to classify. The 
purpose of the axial coding was to find a clear story line across the core data 
information that emerged from those various themes. Some child nodes had 
similar content around how the phenomena of interdependency were to be 
described, which in most cases produced redundant information. As such, there 
was a need to merge these nodes with other nodes for ease of more effective 
content analysis. Some nodes on the other hand, were too vague and 
unstructured and needed to be split into additional child nodes. Once the 
regrouping and fragmentation of nodes was completed, the coding structure was 
firmly established and the within-case analysis was started. 
 
4.6.2 Within-Case Analysis 
Yin (2003; 2009) suggested the need to conduct a within-case analysis prior 
undertaking a cross-case analysis, in order to gain an in-depth understanding of 
the phenomena under study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gray, 2013; Paterson, 2010). 
Within-case analysis allows the researcher to be completely immersed within 
each case individually and become familiar with the unique case attributes before 
comparing them with other cases (Amaratunga & Baldry, 2001; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Gray, 2013; Paterson, 2010). During the within-case analysis performed in this 
research, each case was approached as a single case study within which the 
researcher identified intrinsic aspects of infrastructure interdependencies that 
could be generalised to other cases (Amaratunga & Baldry, 2001). The results of 
the investigation revealed which patterns support, refute or expand on the initial 
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propositions made by the theoretical framework. This allowed the development 
of a preliminary theory or hypothesis, which needed further validation across 
various other cases. A detailed description of the results obtained from the 
analysis is provided in Chapter 5. The logic of the pattern matching process used 
in the within-case analysis is also explained in section 4.6.4. 
 
4.6.3 Cross-Case Analysis 
According to Miles (1994), cross-case analysis is likely to provide more 
robust accurate results in comparison to use of only a within-case analysis 
(Burns, 2010; Yin, 2009). This is primarily due to the fact that cross-case analysis 
follows a replication logic or pattern matching approach similar to that of 
multiple experiments, where data is viewed from various different perspectives 
(Amaratunga & Baldry, 2001; Burns, 2010; Yin, 2003; Yin, 2009). Cross-case 
analysis was used in this research to find common similarities and differences 
between the four case studies. An easiest way to begin was to examine both the 
within-group similarities found earlier and intergroup differences of case studies 
simultaneously. The findings were compared with dimensions or constructs 
found previously in the literature. Key distinctions and commonalities from the 
within-case analyses led to the development of tables, which displayed data 
related to what were perceived to be the resulting impacts of infrastructure 
interdependencies on Queensland regions after the 2010/11 floods (Burns, 2010; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009).  
To avoid premature or false conclusions being derived from cross-case 
analysis, 10 software were performed, to compare various types of data at the 
same a number of queries from QSR International NVivo time (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Hoover & Koerber, 2011; Yin, 2009). The queries in QSR International NVivo 10 
software involved coding, matrices, text search, as well as theoretical annotations 
and memos (Hoover & Koerber, 2011). Justifications on why and how these 
queries were used in this research are as follows:  
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 Matrices: 2x2 matrices from QSR International NVivo 10 software 
offered the possibility to compare two nodes and create new nodes 
from the amalgamation of these pairs of nodes (Bazeley & Jackson, 
2007; Hoover & Koerber, 2011; Saldaña, 2015). This allowed the 
data to be displayed in a coherent manner, where the nodes could 
easily be accessed and exploited during the analysis phase. During 
the cross-case analysis of this research, matrix coding queries were 
used to view all the dimensions of each of the elements of 
interdependency separately, and the level of their impacts across the 
four case studies. 
 Text search queries: The text search queries were used to find 
specific texts or words in the transcript. In QSR International NVivo 
10 software for instance, connecting words such as ‘and, or’ were 
used to find a range of indicative words which were related to 
availability of resources (Bazeley & Jackson, 2007; Saldaña, 2015).  
 Theoretical annotations and memos: The writing process of memos 
initially occurred as soon as the open-coding process started. This 
was performed with the intention to capture the relationships 
between codes, as well as any memorable ideas that would later be 
part of the development of the theory (Fernández, 2004). During 
cross-case analysis, the memos allowed the adding of comments and 
feedback to the data without altering it (Hoover & Koerber, 2011; 
Miles & Huberman, 1984). This proved to be useful in adding 
essential ideas and improving interpretation of the ones that had 
been previously written.  
 
4.6.4 Dominant Techniques of Analysis 
Four dominant modes of analysis, including pattern-matching, explanation 
building, time-series analysis as well as programme logic models are widely used 
in qualitative analysis of case study data (Yin, 2009). In this research, three 
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analytical techniques (pattern-matching, explanation building, and numerical 
counts analysis) were proven to be most effective in exploring and explaining the 
case studies data.  
4.6.5 Pattern-Matching  
Pattern-matching logic is considered to be one of the most desirable 
strategies for analysing case studies (Yin, 2009). This is mainly because it 
provides the possibility of strengthening the internal validity of a case study by 
comparing its empirical patterns with predicted ones (Trochim, 1989; Yin, 2009). 
For both within-case analysis and cross-case analysis conducted in this research, 
a pattern-matching logic was followed. The prediction of patterns initially 
mentioned in the theoretical framework was compared with the empirical data 
from the four cases. For instance, the theoretical framework mentioned in 
chapter 2 predicted that the types and degrees of interdependencies have the 
potential to induce cascading failures of critical infrastructures during recovery. 
The empirical data from the four case studies the case studies supported that 
prediction by demonstrating that there is a relationship between the types and 
degrees of interdependencies and the types of failures resulting from these 
interdependencies. With few other alternatives available to use, the pattern-
matching approach was extended to encompass a search for similarities and 
dissimilarities between other empirical and predicted elements of 
interdependencies within and across the four cases.  
 
4.6.6 Explanation Building  
Explanation building techniques are used to analyse case study and 
construct a set of explanations around the case (Yin, 2009). To Yin (2009; 2003), 
this process is similar to a pattern-matching process except that the goal is not to 
provide a comparative conclusion, but instead to extend a case study (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). In explanatory study, the analysis is conducted in five stages;  
(1) Examining case study evidence,  
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(2) Reviewing theoretical hypothesis,  
(3) Examining case study from a new perspective,  
(4) Developing plausible explanations, and  
(5) Repeating the process when required.   
(Yin, 2003; Yin, 2009). 
In this research, the gradual explanation building was evident when the 
findings from the cross-case analysis were compared with the initial hypothesis 
and then the hypothesis was revised and compared again with the case findings 
and vice versa. The whole process involved a constant refining of a set of ideas. 
Ideas based on how elements of infrastructure interdependencies affect the 
recovery process, and why this posed tremendous challenges for the recovery, 
which were refined throughout the explanation building process. The discussions 
and implications that emerged from this approach are provided in Chapter 8. This 
analytical technique proved to be essential in understanding the relationships 
between elements of infrastructure interdependencies and their implications on 
the post-disaster recovery process. A summary of the explanation building 
process has been provided in Figure 4.4.  
 
Figure 4.4: Explanation building process 
4.6.7 Numerical Counts Analysis 
A numerical counts analysis was used as a proxy for disclosure to determine 
the importance of each element of infrastructure interdependencies during 













Step 1 Step 3 Step 2 Step 4 
Repeat the steps in iterative mode 
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to evaluate the importance of an element by counting the number of times an 
issue was raised, the strengths and weaknesses of an issue, or simply the number 
of people who raised the issue (Bazeley & Jackson, 2007). In this research, it 
specifically measured the frequency of words found in the transcripts to indicate 
the importance of the various dimensions of interdependency. Results of the 
within-case and cross-case analysis are found in Chapter 6 and 7 of this research.  
 
Figure 4.5: Within and Cross-case analysis techniques 
 
4.7 QUALITY JUDING CRITERIA 
Qualitative research has to meet certain logical tests to demonstrate the 
quality and trustworthiness of its design and methodological approach 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Gray, 2013; Krefting, 1991; Mason, 2002; Yin, 2009). A 
number of social science researchers have used various criteria to test the 
effectiveness and validity of their studies (Cavana, Delahaye, & Sekaran, 2001; 
Sutrisna, 2009a; Yin, 2003). Since there are no universal or concrete ways to 
determine the strength and credibility of a qualitative research, some have used 
criteria from quantitative research, while others have developed their own 
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2009). This research followed the case studies approach developed by Yin (2003; 
2009, 2012) and hence, has also measured the quality of the study with the 
criteria provided in that approach. These criteria include validity, reliability as 
well as generalizability or transferability (Gray, 2013; Mason, 2002; Yin, 2009).  
 
4.7.1 Validity  
Validity is used to determine whether the findings of particular research has 
produced the expected results, or proven what was initially claimed (Cavana, 
Delahaye, & Sekeran, 2001; Gray, 2013; Sutrisna, 2009b). Yin (2009) mentioned 
three types of validity; construct validity, external validity and internal validity. 
Construct validity is concerned with establishing a chain of evidence to support 
the concepts being studied (Sutrisna, 2009a; Yin, 2003). External validity on the 
other hand, refers to the degree to which research findings can be generalised or 
replicated (Gray, 2013; Sutrisna, 2009a; Yin, 2003). Internal validity is generally 
used in explanatory studies to establish causal relationships between emergent 
theories and initial hypothesis (Gray, 2013; Sutrisna, 2009a; Yin, 2003).  
To meet construct and external validity requirements, this research used a 
series of interviews from which multiple sources of evidence were collected. The 
in-depth and open-ended interviews allowed the researcher to achieve a better 
perspective on the reality of the research problems. The researcher made sure 
that a multiple case study approach, rather than a single case study method, was 
selected to increase the chance of generalization of the research findings beyond 
the immediate case study (Yin, 2009). The use of a replication logic for cross-case 
analysis ensured that findings from the first case were replicated in the second, 
third and fourth cases to validate the emergent relationships of elements of 
infrastructure interdependencies (Eisenhardt, 1989). The process was followed 
by data and methodological triangulation to guarantee greater rigour and 
integration of the study (Sutrisna, 2009a; Yin, 2003; Yin, 2009). Data 
triangulation was necessary to validate the process due to the collected 
information originating from multiple sources (Tellis, 1997; Yin, 2003). It 
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ensured that similar facts or phenomena revealed from the four cases were 
corroborated effectively. Methodological triangulation was needed to validate 
the multiple methods utilised including document analysis, focus group and 
open-ended interviews that were used to collect data (Tellis, 1997; Yin, 2003).  
To meet internal validity requirements, pattern-matching and explanation 
building approaches were used to find the link between evidence and theoretical 
ideas developed from them (Gray, 2013, p. 622; Yin, 2009). Both Yin (2009) and 
Gray (2013) have recommended to make use of experts to check for accuracy of 
the interpretation of the results. The draft report of the results was reviewed by 
peers, academic experts and the case study participants (or experts from the 
field) to seek their feedback on the findings. Additionally, the researcher explored 
rival explanations from various sources of literature, including reviewing 
analysis from negative cases which contradicted the results, to improve the 
quality of findings (Gray, 2013).  
 
4.7.2 Reliability and Consistency 
Reliability is used to ensure that a research study can be replicated elsewhere 
using the same data collection instruments, and the same methods of data analysis 
to obtain the same results (Grafton, Lillis, Ihantola, & Kihn, 2011; Gray, 2013; 
Sutrisna, 2009a; Yin, 2009). Reliability focuses on the consistency of the results; if 
the results obtained are similar to the previous results, then the data collection 
method is considered to be reliable (Gray, 2013; Yin, 2009). For qualitative research, 
reliability is usually considered to be unattainable due to the fact that such studies 
are not conducted in the same settings, with the same participants and do not 
necessarily use the same case studies(Gray, 2013). However, to be reliable, any 
research study has to be valid first. So to a large extent, validity is an essential 
attribute of reliability. With valid documentation procedures, valid research 
questions and if the research follows a valid case study protocol, reliability can be 
achieved (Yin, 2009).  
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According to Yin (2009), the best way to achieve reliability is to conduct the 
research as if someone was looking over the researcher’s shoulder. This research 
ensured that every step involved was as operational and understandable as possible 
(Yin, 2009, p. 37). A comprehensive case study protocol was developed to provide 
clear depiction of the procedures followed to collect data (Yin, 2009). For 
consistency of the results, a case study database was maintained as Yin (2009, p. 37) 
recommended. The database encompassed all of the data and transcriptions stored 
in such a way that they could be easily retrieved at a later stage. Copies of 
organisational charts, maps etc. were stored in a protected format so that they could 
be used as evidence in the research. Additionally, purposeful selection of participants 
was performed in a way that respondents included essentially General Managers, 
Disaster Recovery Coordinators, and Project Managers who had extensive years of 
experience in managing the recovery projects of large infrastructures. Furthermore, 
as suggested by Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988), two series of analyses were 
conducted over a three months span to ensure that reliability of the research 
findings. There were no significant variations in results from the two analyses, thus 
ensuring the objectivity of the findings.  
 
4.7.3 Generalisability  
Generalisability refers to the notion of being able to transfer research 
findings from one setting to another setting (Cavana, Delahaye, & Sekaran, 2001; 
Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Yin, 2009). For quantitative research, 
generalisation of findings is achieved through analytical generalisability, whereas 
in qualitative research generalisability of findings is achieved through multiple 
cases and replication logic (Yin, 2009). Generalisability was confirmed in a 
similar way to external validity, through the comparison of findings with the 
existing extant literature (Gray, 2013). Research findings were compared and 
contrasted with previous studies. Since there was a body of evidence that 
supported the results, this indicated that the initial claims and assumptions made 
in the research were valid and also, that the analysis of data in general was based 
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upon appropriate evidence (Gray, 2013). Generalisability was attained proving 
that the interpretation of results was valid.  
 
4.8  ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This research complied with Queensland University of Technology (QUT) 
Code of Conduct for Researchers (2014). Ethics approval number 1500000140 
was attributed by the QUT Research Ethics and Integrity committee. The research 
was considered to be of negligible low risk since there was no foreseeable risk of 
harm or discomfort to the participants. Participants in this study were not subject 
to any physical, psychological, social, economic or legal harm, and the study did 
not lead to devaluation of participants’ personal worth. Interviews took place in 
locations in which the respondents were comfortable, most commonly their 
organisational premises, thus minimising risks to their safety. Furthermore, 
participants’ confidentiality was maintained at all times and any publications 
arising from the research will ensure that participant information is presented in 




This chapter has outlined the overarching design, and methodological 
approach adopted in this research. The chapter started by explaining the 
research strategy as well as the reasoning and philosophical views of the author. 
This research is driven by multiple realities and required several constructs, thus 
it was found to be subjectivist and constructionist needing an interpretivist 
etymology to understand the relationships between infrastructure 
interdependencies and post-disaster recovery strategies. Furthermore, an 
inductive theory building approach was chosen to develop the detailed research 
questions. The rationale for using inductive theory building approach was 
discussed in section 4.3.3. The theory building approach was found to be the most 
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appropriate construct to guide the analysis of data, due to the limited amount of 
empirical studies upon which the research problems could be founded. Detailed 
discussions on the exploratory pilot study and case study methods, including the 
rationale for using these two approaches were presented in section 4.4. A 
multiple case study approach was used in this research to compare data from 
several cases in order to produce more compelling results. The implementation 
of the methodology, including the case study selection, protocol and sources of 
evidence were presented in section 4.5. The data analysis of this research 
followed within, and cross-case, and includes the use of a large number of 
relevant analytical techniques such as, pattern-matching, explanation building, as 
well as a numerical counts approach. The coding of data was performed with the 
QSR International NVivo 10 software. The quality of the research methods and 
the research in general was proven to fit validity, reliability and generalisability 
requirements. The next chapter present the results of the pilot study. 
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Chapter 5: EXPLORATORY 
PILOT STUDY 
5.1 OVERVIEW 
A review of the methodological approach and analytical techniques used in 
this research was presented in the preceding chapter. The methods used to unveil 
research questions encompassed an exploratory pilot study and a within and 
cross-case analysis of a total of four case studies. This chapter presents the results 
of the exploratory pilot study. The study was performed with the intent to test 
the feasibility of the overall research, but more importantly, to identify elements 
of infrastructure interdependencies that have the potential to impede the post-
disaster recovery effort. This proved to be essential in answering research 
question (RQ1) and verifying that the initial hypotheses made in the conceptual 
framework in chapter 3 could be applied or extended to a post-disaster recovery 
context. As previously mentioned, with very few studies in the disaster 
management field considering the phenomenon of interdependency during post-
disaster recovery, there was a critical need for understanding the contextual 
framework of the research subject; test the practicability of research constructs 
identified in the literatures; and discover the link between the relational 
interdependency concepts and post-disaster recovery strategies.  
This chapter begins with an overview of the interview procedures and 
provides the demographic characteristics of the respondents interviewed. The 
exploratory pilot study individually sought experts’ participation in face-to-face 
interviews. The analysis of data and the results obtained are also depicted in this 
chapter. Comments provided by participants enabled the subsequent refinement 
of the research questions and the selection of a case study method to perform the 
main study. 
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5.2 PROCESS AND METHOD 
As depicted in Chapter 4, the exploratory pilot study used in-depth 
interviews as the principal method of data collection. An overview of the 
collection, transcription and coding of data is provided in this section. The section 
also describes the detailed analysis of the data and the concluding results of the 
overall pilot study. 
 
5.2.1 Participants Profile  
A number of highly knowledgeable participants with more than 10 years of 
experience and expertise in overseeing post-disaster recovery projects were 
interviewed. The selection criteria (shown in Table 5.1 below) targeted not only 
those who were directly involved in the recovery process of major critical 
infrastructures, but also those who were the main influencers in decision making 
for recovery operations. This enabled a clear identification through the thoughts 
of participants, as to which elements of infrastructure interdependencies have 
the most potential to impede the recovery effort. The primary objective of the 
interviews was to capture respondents’ views of the overall influence of 
infrastructure interdependency on post-disaster recovery. The interviews also 
offered the possibility to build a firsthand understanding of the current recovery 
program and practices used and implemented in large organisations across 
Queensland, Australia. With Queensland being a disaster prone region of 
Australia, participants have accumulated extensive experiences in constantly 
dealing with the impacts of natural disasters, particularly those related to floods 
and severe storms.  
From six different organisations, six participants including General 
Managers, Disaster Recovery Coordinators, as well as Project Managers were 
invited to partake in face-to-face interviews. The group was considered large 
enough to provide a wide variety of rich and profound ideas on the discussed 
topics. Participants were essentially from State and Local government lead 
agencies, including organisations responsible of the four critical infrastructures 
(water, transport, energy and ICT). With extensive experience in dealing with 
large infrastructure systems, these participants provided different insights on 
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how to cope with the impacts of infrastructure interdependencies on the post-
disaster recovery effort and suggested what sort of interdependency issues are 
considered most challenging to the recovery of critical infrastructures. This 
proved to be vital in developing a unique blend of cognitive properties of 
elements of infrastructure interdependencies at a macro-level. Furthermore, 
participants provided a platform to understand the collaborative environment 
from which each infrastructure owner sustains infrastructure interdependencies 
during recovery.  
Table 5.1: Participants demographic characteristics 












































5.2.2 Interview Procedures  
Participants were initially approached via email correspondence, where a 
formal invitation was sent along with a consent form, as well as a copy of the 
research project flyer. Although a description of the research project was 
highlighted in the email, the flyer reiterated the research questions, and the aims 
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and objectives of the study including the potential benefits to participating 
organisations. The information consent form was used to reassure participants 
that strict confidentiality would be maintained throughout and after the 
completion of the research and any publications arising from the research would 
be presented in a de-identified manner. Once the consent form was signed and 
returned, interviews took place at which permission to use a recording device to 
conduct the interview process was sought from/granted by the respondents. 
Each interview lasted approximately one hour, at a location where participants 
felt at ease to thoughtfully respond to questions. Explanations of key concepts of 
both post-disaster recovery and interdependency, including the context being 
investigated, were provided at the beginning of each interview.  
The discussion revolved around ten questions among which, six were 
essentially focused on the dimensions of interdependency found in the literatures 
and four highlighted the post-disaster recovery practices. Questions were 
structured in a way that they were short, straightforward, open-ended questions. 
A convergent interviewing process was followed within which questions on post-
disaster recovery were broadly focused (“How are recovery activities organised 
between the short-and the long-term recovery phases?”), whereas questions on 
infrastructure interdependencies were more specific (“How does the lack of 
services or information from other infrastructures affect the recovery process of 
your infrastructure?”) (Driedger, Gallois, Sanders, & Santesso, 2006). The 
research questions were developed according to De Vaus and de Vaus (2001) 
suggestions, which recommended that the questions should highlight the scope 
of the main concepts identified in the literature review including how general the 
description need to be and what aspect of the topic is of great interest to the 
researcher. Each question was adjusted to suit interviews on an incremental 
basis. A sample of the interview questions for the exploratory study was provided 
in Appendix B.  
Data obtained from the interviews were manually transcribed and 
uploaded into QSR International NVivo 10 software. The transcription followed a 
verbatim style where the exact words spoken by respondents were accurately 
transcribed. The coding and analysis processes are depicted in following sections.  
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5.2.3 Data Coding Process  
The qualitative data coding process performed for this pilot study was 
previously explained in detail in Chapter 4, section 4.6.1. As mentioned, the 
coding process followed the low model for qualitative data analysis provided by 
Miles (1994), where data was initially selected and simplified (data reduction), 
then the information obtained from data was grouped into major themes (data 
display) to draw strong plausible conclusions (Hoover & Koerber, 2011). Data 
reduction and display took place during open-coding activities, where data were 
broken into as many categories as possible and then labelled and stored into 
allocated files in form of tree nodes and parent nodes. Furthermore, an axial 
coding process was performed to compare the nodes generated from the open-
coding process depending on the similarity of patterns found. This iterative 
process was performed until a comprehensive parent and child nodes structure 
was developed. The relationships between tree nodes and parent nodes, as well 
as parent nodes and child nodes are clearly illustrated in Figure 5.1 and 5.2 
respectively. 
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Figure 5.1: Example of open-coding process of the in-depth interviews 
Chapter 5-Exploratory Pilot Study  
Erica Mulowayi 140 
 
Figure 5.2: Example of parent nodes and child nodes from the in-depth 
interviews 
 
5.3 STUDY ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A qualitative analysis of the data obtained from the exploratory study was 
performed to address the research question (RQ1): What are the various elements 
of infrastructure interdependencies which affect the post-disaster recovery effort? 
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The exploratory study was concerned with identifying key elements of 
interdependency that have the potential to affect the recovery of critical 
infrastructure systems. The main objective was to determine among elements of 
interdependency identified in the literature, those that are directly related to 
some of the major issues encountered during post-disaster recovery. This 
exercise proved to be essential in testing the practicability of the research 
constructs identified in the literatures, before embarking on a large scale study. 
It also contributed to deriving further qualitative measurement items concerning 
the concept of interdependency to be applied in a disaster recovery context. 
According to Gray (2013), for a research to be persuasive to the reader, the 
results from the qualitative analysis should be more concrete than simple 
numbers. In this regard, the qualitative data analysis performed in this research 
followed a rigorous and logical approach within which data were described and 
classified into smaller groups. Data with similar meanings were connected to 
allow for new ideas and themes to emerge (Gray, 2013). A deductive theory 
building (or top-down) approach was followed to derive emerging concepts that 
answer research question (RQ1) (Collis, et al., 2003; Hayes, 2000). Interview 
questionnaires were developed and written on elements of interdependencies 
that were previously discovered in the literatures. However, the purpose of this 
study was to verify which of those elements most impacts the recovery and 
rehabilitation of interdependent infrastructures. The study also aimed at 
discovering additional elements of interdependency that were not mentioned in 
the literatures. Although there are no widely accepted rules about how 
qualitative results should be presented, findings from the in-depth interviews 
were presented by using quotes and comments from respondents including 
interpretations of quotes and tables and figures.  
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Figure 5.3: Conceptual Framework (Repeated from Chapter 3) 
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5.3.1 Challenges due to the Types of Interdependencies  
Interdependencies are generally driven by the need to maintain 
interactions between critical infrastructures, in order to deliver efficient services 
that are transmitted both physically and through a host of information and 
communication technologies (O'Rourke, 2007; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). Challenges 
related to the types of interdependencies were described by participants as one 
of the major challenges encountered during post-disaster recovery (P1, P2, P3, P4, 
P5, and P6). One of the participants (P3) mentioned:  
“Very often during recovery, there are all sorts of interdependencies that exist 
between water, energy, transport and ICT which generate constant problems in the 
repair of these critical infrastructures. However, what falls within the types of 
interdependencies are the most challenging” (P3). 
In the interview questions provided to participants (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and 
P6), the types of interdependencies were depicted according to the nature and 
sorts of interactions that exist between CIs. The types of interdependencies were 
classified as: 
a) Physical Interdependency based on the sharing of physical services and 
commodities; 
b) Cyber Interdependency due to communication and the sharing of 
information between infrastructures;  
c) Geographical Interdependency based on infrastructure being located at the 
same geographical location; 
d)  Logical Interdependency based on interdependency induced by 
legislations and public opinions (O'Rourke, 2007; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). 
 
Critical success factors to Physical Interdependency  
50% of respondents mentioned that critical infrastructures have to be 
operational to remain physically interdependent after a disaster (P1, P2, P5, and 
P6). For instance, participant (P1) clearly mentioned that:  
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“Energy has to be available during recovery because without electricity, we 
have all sorts of problems; we can't operate transport, and we can’t have access to 
water and ICT…” (P1).  
This reveals that infrastructure availability is an indication of the 
performance of an infrastructure within the interdependent network (P1, P2, P5, 
and P6). In this case, the availability of an infrastructure is perceived as the level 
of functioning which a critical infrastructure needs to achieve in order to 
maintain its interdependency with other infrastructures (P1, P2, P5, and P6).  
40% of respondents explained that the expectation for infrastructures to 
remain operational and continue to share resources during post-disaster 
recovery requires a certain level of reliability to be established between 
interdependent infrastructures and their organisations before disasters occur 
(P3, P4, and P6). From the perspective of these respondents, reliability is closely 
related to the probability that an infrastructure will still be available to provide 
resources or services to other damaged infrastructures during post-disaster 
recovery (P3, P4, and P6). Respondent (P3) noted:  
“During post-disaster recovery, the common issue is to be able to rely on other 
infrastructures to provide the services that your infrastructure needs at the time. 
We had IT system that was down in some situations where we couldn’t actually 
remotely operate the plant and we couldn’t get access to the plant by helicopters 
because all the helicopters were prioritised to go and fix the IT asset first. So there 
is quite a strong reliance on the other infrastructure, which in this case was 
transport, to still be functioning and to provide transport when needed. That 
reliability depends entirely on the availability of the other infrastructure” (P3). 
According to respondent (P3), “infrastructure reliability is developed over a 
certain period of time, once organisations have established a level of trust where a 
pattern or a routine of sharing resources or services has been established over time”. 
Although reliability is an attribute that needs to be established prior a disastrous 
event, respondent (P4) mentioned that, such attribute needs to be ongoing, 
particularly during the post-disaster recovery. Therefore, participants 
collectively agreed that an infrastructure is considered less reliable when it 
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produces little to no resources to the other dependent infrastructures during the 
recovery period (P3, P4, and P6). 
One of the main issues with regards to physical interdependency raised by 
participant (P2) was “the necessity of having inexhaustible resources or services to 
allow infrastructures to operate and be rapidly restored after a disaster”. According 
to four participants (P1, P2, P5, and P6), the common issue during recovery is to 
provide and receive resources from other infrastructures. In this regards, 
respondent (P2) stated:  
“Infrastructures are dependents on each other resources and services but they 
have to be able to receive and provide these resources in order to operate. The big 
issue for us is to maintain the supply between critical infrastructures, not only when 
the event is still ongoing but also after a disaster has occurred”. 
Thus, to remain physically interdependent, shared resources between 
critical infrastructures needs to be constantly available (P2). Respondent (P2) 
mentioned that “having available resources from energy and ICT systems 
guarantee the functioning of transport and water infrastructures”. Thus, the lack 
of resources or services from an infrastructure can delay the recovery of other 
damaged infrastructures (P2). According to respondent (P1), if access to the 
distribution channels from which resources are conveyed and delivered from an 
infrastructure to another are disrupted, physical interdependency would also 
cease to exist, regardless of the availability and reliability of the infrastructure 
(P1). Participant (P1) related: 
“After 2011, we couldn't get a mobile tower so when the powerlines went 
down; some of us had battery packs which stayed up from 24 hours to 48 hours only 
after the cyclone. Then the batteries went flat. As much as we were prepared, we 
still needed constant access to electricity for the repair of our critical 
infrastructure". 
As shown in table 5.2, 50 % of respondents revealed that infrastructure 
availability is the main contributors to physical interdependency, while 40 % 
mentioned infrastructure reliability and 10% mentioned resources 
transferability as essential attributes to physical interdependency.  
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Table 5.2 : Critical success factors of physical interdependency 
 
 
Proposition 1: Physical interdependencies across critical infrastructures 
will fail if infrastructure availability, infrastructure reliability and resources 
transferability are not satisfied during post-disaster recovery. 
 
Critical success factors to Cyber Interdependency 
Most respondents (P3, P4, and P5) indicated that “the lack of virtual 
interactions through communication and information would have greater impacts 
on the recovery of critical infrastructures”. According to these respondents, 
energy, transportation, as well as water including sanitation systems are strongly 
dependent on information and telecommunications services provided by ICT 
systems during post-disaster recovery (P3, P4, and P5). The functionality of these 
infrastructures is highly dependent on cyber interdependencies that exist among 
them before and during recovery (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6). Respondents also 
revealed that ICT systems play a crucial role in protecting critical infrastructure 
against the propagation of failures and contribute to the rehabilitation of these 
infrastructures after a disaster (P4, P5). One of the participants even suggested 
that recovery processes should be prioritised in function of ICT system (P5). 
Participant (P5) mentioned:  
“We need to be prioritising recovery behind ICT systems to get us going, it will 
be easier to understand the linkages across critical infrastructure systems and 
minimize damages across the state of infrastructures if we were to start with ICT”.  
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Figure 5.4: Interdependency between ICT and other critical infrastructures 
 
Most participants mentioned that their critical infrastructures “possess a 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system”, which allows them to 
individually function (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6). However, participants (P1, P4) 
acknowledged that “ICT systems are essential in coordinating recovery activities, 
particularly when it comes to communicating with infrastructure providers, the 
community and organisations involved in the recovery effort”. These respondents 
described the main role of ICT systems as of one providing at any given time, 
telecommunication and information services necessary for the supervision, 
control and evaluation of other interdependent infrastructures during the 
recovery period (P1, P4). Thus, it is through the sharing of virtual information and 
communication that cyber interdependency exists between critical 
infrastructures. 20 % of respondents (P1, P4) revealed that “in the same way that 
physical interdependency would fail if there is no infrastructure available during 
recovery, cyber interdependency would also fail if communication and information 
are not available to other interdependent infrastructures”. Respondent (P4) 
mentioned: 
“We need the control of systems to be done online because if we don’t have 
telecommunication, no water goes anywhere during recovery”. 
70% of respondents explained that reliability is also needed to maintain 
cyber interdependency during recovery (P1, P3, P5 and P6). Respondent (P6) 
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mentioned that “the issue of communication was one of the biggest issues during 
the 2010/11 Queensland post-disaster recovery, particularly around Grantham 
area as everybody relied on computers to operate their infrastructures”. Participant 
(P6) indicated that “every infrastructure is heavily reliant on ICT systems and 
interdependencies across these systems are quite evident from things like mobile 
towers and computers, phones, telecommunication, SCADA and so on”.  
Only 10 % of respondents mentioned that resources transferability is 
needed to maintain cyber interdependencies in the same way that it is needed for 
physical interdependencies across infrastructures. According to respondent (P6), 
communication and information need to be conveyed to and received by other 
interdependent infrastructures to maintain cyber interdependency during post-
disaster recovery. Respondent (P6) indicated: 
“If we have energy and telecommunication we can often operate the plants 
remotely for three or four days if there is a need for that during recovery. ICT 
systems are essentials…If we don’t have communication we could start the recovery 
to some degree because some of our plants can operate manually but we won’t have 
enough operators to maintain that mode of operation 24/7”. 
 
Table 5.3: Critical success factors of cyber interdependency 
 
 
As shown in Table 5.3, 70 % of respondents revealed that infrastructure 
reliability is indispensable in promoting cyber interdependency. 20 % of 
respondents on the other hand, revealed that infrastructure availability is 
essential in maintaining cyber interdependency across critical infrastructures, 
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while only 10% mentioned being able to convey and access information as being 
essential during the post-disaster recovery.  
Proposition 2a: Cyber interdependency is critical to the recovery of 
infrastructure systems such as energy, water, transportation and ICT systems.  
Proposition 2b: Cyber interdependencies across critical infrastructures 
will fail if infrastructure availability, infrastructure reliability and resources 
transferability are not satisfied during post-disaster recovery. 
 
Geographical Interdependency 
Participants (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6) revealed that during post-disaster 
recovery, geographical interdependency is considered to be an almost integral 
part of physical interdependency. Respondents (P3, P5) stipulated:  
“It comes down to the physical damages that we found on infrastructures. We 
actually run an eye -cam style investigation of the roots cause of what’s triggered 
the failure of the infrastructure independent of whether or not the other 
infrastructure was at close proximity or as you might have mentioned, 
geographically interdependent” (P3). 
“It’s all about just looking at how much damages there are and if we need to 
spend more money…. You treat it as if there’s no geographical issues and visually 
just check to find physical damages and start the recovery process to address these 
damages” (P5).  
Among these participants, respondent (P3) explained that “to be physically 
interdependent, critical infrastructures need to be somehow geographically 
interdependent (within the same location, region or country etc.), even though the 
reverse is not obvious”. Additionally, respondent (P1) emphasized that critical 
infrastructures that are geographically interdependent, are not necessarily 
physically interdependent. The change in conditions of geographically 
interdependent infrastructures does not necessarily affect the functioning of 
other infrastructures as it does for physical interdependency (P1, P3, and P5).  
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Proposition 3: During post-disaster recovery, physical interdependencies 




Most respondents found logical interdependency difficult to explain (P1, P2, 
P3, P5, P6, P4 and P3). This was primarily due to the fact that during post-disaster 
recovery, critical infrastructures are presumed to have already met laws, or 
legitimacy requirements, that shape their functioning and their 
interdependencies before a disaster strike (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6). Participants 
could not relate that sort of interdependency to any of the attributes mentioned 
earlier. To them, logical interdependency does not induce issues related to 
resource availability, reliability and transferability which directly affect the 
recovery process. Respondents revealed that logical interdependencies are 
essentially tailored by human decisions or factors, including procedures and 
policies that shape a specific region (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6). One participant also 
associated logical interdependency with the conformity of critical infrastructures 
to the laws, rules and regulations of their organisations (P6). The example 
provided by participant (P6) was described as follows: 
“Logical interdependency can be observed after a road closure following a 
natural disaster, which destroyed a section of a motorway. The decision of closing 
the road could necessitate an increase in traffic on a parallel railway due to a large 
number of persons and goods travelling by railway instead of using personal vehicle, 
bus or truck. The increase in rail traffic volume would require more electric power 
to sustain the traffic flow, which in turn could possibly generate an overload usage 
of the electrical network and possibly lead to a failure of the latter”.  
This indicates that logical interdependency (based on human decisions) 
influences all other types of interdependencies and has the potential to hinder 
the reconstruction or repair of critical infrastructures during post-disaster 
recovery (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6) as shown in Figure 5-5.  
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Figure 5.5: Types of infrastructure interdependencies 
 
Proposition 4: Logical interdependency is unstable as it varies according 
to decision makers of each organisation. It influences the broader context of 
disaster management.  
Table 5.4: Types of interdependencies and success factors 
Types of Interdependencies Critical Success Factors 
Physical (including Geographical) Infrastructure Availability 
Infrastructure Reliability 
Resources Transferability 
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5.3.2 Challenges due to the Degrees of Interdependencies  
According to respondents (P4, P5, and P6), the degrees to which 
interdependencies exist between critical infrastructures is perceived through the 
influence that they exert on one another. Respondents (P4, P6) mentioned that 
this can be observed through the mutual exchange of services between critical 
infrastructures. For most participants (P2, P3, P4, and P6), the degrees of 
interdependencies vary considerably across different infrastructures (P2, P3, P4, 
and P6). Therefore, one way to determine the degrees of interdependencies 
would be in investigating these in function of the services shared by 
infrastructures and the frequency at which the exchange takes place (P2, P3). To 
support this assumption, one of the respondents (P2) mentioned: 
“To determine how strongly or loosely dependent infrastructures are, what we 
usually think about is what are the services that are needed by others 
infrastructures and at which frequency can we lose supply from an infrastructure 
but still able to operate. It’s essential to determine what is the frequency at which, 
it is acceptable for the other infrastructure to go without services for a certain 
period of time…It’s a trade-off process”.  
Therefore, the types of interactions that take place among critical 
infrastructures, as well as the frequency at which these interactions occur, are 
both indicative of the degree of interdependencies that exist between 
infrastructures (P2, P3, P4, and P6). As mentioned by participants (P4, P6), the 
extent to which infrastructures are interdependent is a “trade-off process”. This 
implies that the interactions and the frequency at which they occur are 
symmetrical, or bidirectional between critical infrastructures. Viewed from the 
same perspective, participant (P1) added that “it is usually about knowing in which 
infrastructure your infrastructure is most dependent and at which rate it requires 
services from that infrastructure”. Thus, to determine the extent to which two CIs 
are interdependent, it is also essential to identify for each infrastructure the other 
infrastructure that it continuously (or nearly continuously) depends on to 
operate normally (P1). 
Overall, 40% of participants agreed that the degrees to which 
infrastructures are interdependent are manifest through the types of 
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interactions that occur among them and the frequency at which these 
interactions take place. Only 20% mentioned the relationship with the most 
connected infrastructure or the critical enabling infrastructure as being 
important to determine the degrees of interdependencies.  
 
Table 5.5: Critical success factors of the degrees of interdependency 
 
Proposition 5a: The degrees of interdependencies are manifest through 
the types of interactions, the frequency of exchange of services as well as the 
relationship with the other infrastructure.  
 
Disruptions due to Tight Interdependency 
Participants (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6) were able to provide an overview of 
the degree of interdependencies that exist among the four critical infrastructures 
(ICT, energy, water, transport systems) being investigated in this research. For a 
more succinct understanding, interview questions related to the degree of 
interdependencies used terms such as “highly” and “weakly” dependent to 
discover whether tight or loose interdependencies were experienced across 
infrastructures.  
Respondents associated tight interdependency to infrastructures that are 
strongly dependent on resources or services provided by others infrastructures that 
are essential to their functioning (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6). Respondent (P6) 
mentioned: 
“There was a very strong interdependence between water system and 
electricity. We constantly needed power to operate water system. It didn’t matter if 
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we could fix up our sewerage treatment plant, without power, we couldn’t operate 
things...” 
Therefore, interdependency among infrastructures is considered tight when 
constant interactions are needed with the other infrastructures in order to function. 
Although in some cases, tight interdependency would mostly be associated with 
energy systems, participants reiterated that ICT systems are considered to be the 
most critical infrastructures during recovery (P3, P4, P5, and P6). It is primarily with 
ICT that most infrastructures form a tight interdepend relationship (P3, P4, P5, and 
P6). On the other hand, other respondents mentioned that some infrastructures have 
tight interdependent relationships with transport systems due to the amount of 
services that need constant accessibility through transport systems (P1, P2, P3, and 
P5). Participant (P3) stated:  
“After 2011, we had a lot of roads blown out when water drowned from the 
culverts under the roads, and there was so much water that tried to force a way out 
until it blew the water drains. This made accessibility through roads almost impossible. 
We couldn’t reach most damaged infrastructures and couldn’t repair the damaged 
water infrastructure systems…”  
Respondents also denounced the lack of flexibility in repairing and restoring 
tight interdependent infrastructures (P1, P3). According to some respondents (P1, 
P3), when the critical enabling infrastructure is damaged, there are no other 
alternatives than to restore the damaged infrastructure first to allow the other 
infrastructures to function: 
“So if we don’t have electricity, no water goes anywhere. In 2011 there were some 
generators or switch boards which got inundated; we needed to recover those quickly. 
There was a pump at a lower water treatment plant that got washed away (the all 
water pump), so we needed to get an alternate water pump up from Sydney to be able 
to maintain that line. It had to be done really within 24 hours. However we were having 
difficulties in getting that water pump and we had to delay the recovery…” (P1). 
“After 2011, we couldn't get a mobile tower so when the powerlines went down 
after cyclone YASI, they had battery packs on them but the towers only stayed up I think 
it was from 24 hours to only 48 hours after the cyclone and then the batteries went flat. 
Chapter 5-Exploratory Pilot Study  
Erica Mulowayi 155 
So the towers that withstood the cyclone then shut down because they didn't have any 
power” (P3). 
Proposition 5b: Strong or tight interdependencies are manifest across 
infrastructures that interact constantly to provide or receive essential services to 
their functioning.  
 
Disruptions due to Loose Interdependency 
Infrastructures that were not considered tightly interdependent were 
eventually classified as being loosely interdependent by respondents (P1, P2, P3, 
P4, P5, and P6). In fact, some respondents explained that infrastructures that are 
loosely interdependent have certain measures in place that allow them to 
function when the critical enabling infrastructure is damaged. For instance, 
respondent (P6) stated:  
“In terms of transport, obviously we’ve got our own fleets and we’re quite 
happy to move staffs around with our own logistic capability. Our vulnerability is 
when we actually start struggling with fuel. If we start struggling with fuel like 
diesel...then that’s become an issue”. 
Respondent (P3) added: 
“In the case of electricity since for a period of about ten years from about 2005, 
we’ve adopted the N-1 rule, where we were essentially saying that we want full 
redundancy on everything and that drove a lot of cost in terms of the level of 
reliability. We’ve been fortunate in that the connected system gives us something 
close to that….” 
According to these participants, there are always other alternatives to 
restore loose interdependent infrastructures when the critical enabling 
infrastructure is damaged (P6, P3). Therefore, such interdependent 
infrastructures are considered easier to repair and rehabilitate after a disaster 
(P6, P3). 
Proposition 5c: Loosely interdependent infrastructures are those that 
have very few services in common and thus have few interactions. Such 
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infrastructures are relatively easy to rehabilitate when the critical enabling 
infrastructure is damaged.  
 
Table 5.6: Degrees of interdependencies and their success factors 
Degrees of Interdependencies Critical Success Factors 
Tight  Types of interactions  
Frequency of exchanges  
Critical enabling infrastructure 
Loose  Types of interactions  
Frequency of exchanges  
Critical enabling infrastructure 
 
 
5.3.3 Challenges due to the Types of Failures and the State of 
Operation of CIs  
Although various elements of interdependency have the potential to 
impede the post-disaster recovery of critical infrastructures, participants 
mentioned that impacts related to the types of failures due to interdependency 
are those which directly affect the recovery processes and inform the 
prioritization process of recovery activities (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6). To 
participants, cascading and escalating failures are those that tend to generate 
extensive damages to interdependent infrastructures (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6). 
One of the respondents (P1) reported: 
“After the 2011 floods, we had a lot of roads blown out when water drowned 
from the culverts under the roads. There was so much water that was trying to force 
their way out until they blew the water drains and infrastructures and the roads 
surface started to have potholes …” (P1).  
According to respondents (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6), “the types of failures 
commence as a common cause failure when induced by natural disasters before 
cascading and escalating into a domino effect of infrastructure damages”. 
Respondents emphasized that cascading failures rather than escalating failures 
are more likely to occur within an interdependent network that exists between 
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energy, ICT, water and transport systems (P1, P2, P5, and P6). To participants, 
escalating failure would generally occur only in extreme scenarios when damages 
from the most critical infrastructure go unnoticed and escalate to cause greater 
damage (P5, P6).  
According to respondents (P5, P6), it is only after experiencing the different 
types of failures that the state of operation of infrastructures can be assessed and 
eventually decisions can be made as to the recovery measures that need to be 
adopted (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6). To these respondents, interdependencies 
greatly affect the recovery effort, once the states of operation of infrastructures 
have been determined (P5, P6). For instance, one of the participants mentioned 
that a visual assessment and a series of tests related to pavement deflection are 
used to determine the states of operation of road systems after a disaster (P3). 
The participant (P3) stated:  
“It’s a visual assessment. You treat it as if there’s no underlying issue and the 
road hasn’t been eroded underneath and visually just check on the side where it 
drains, and then that’s pretty much it because sometimes even though damage is 
still there, it’s probably still ok to drive on that road…”. 
“We measure the deflection to prove that the road is damaged. Even if the cars 
can still use the road, the trucks can still use the road, we do that to show the 
strength of the road even if it is deteriorated and after that we determine how much 
the road can deflect before we start working on it. So there are a lot of testings in 
different places” (P3). 
This indicates that the rehabilitation and repair of infrastructures depends 
entirely on the state in which various infrastructures are found. The state of 
operation of infrastructures not only drives prioritization, but also dictates 
decision making on whether or not to rehabilitate, or fully recover, damaged 
infrastructures (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6). Respondent (P6) revealed that decision 
making also tend to agree with specific recovery guidelines.  
“We follow a pretty strict guideline that says that you have to prove that the 
infrastructure was damaged as a result of that event… so we had to show full photos 
of before the flood, record and computers, and everything like that, and the same 
photos after the event, to show that the infrastructure had visually deteriorated …it 
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really came down to photographic evidence of knowing that yes it was damaged” 
(P6).  
Participants also mentioned that the state of operation of infrastructures 
can be critical to the recovery of other interdependent infrastructures (P1, P2, P3, 
P4, P5, and P6). To respondents (P4, P5), prioritization begins with identifying 
which infrastructure is critically damaged and then how this would have great 
impact on the rehabilitation of other infrastructures (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6). In 
this regard, participants explained that the inoperability of ICT would inevitably 
hinder the recovery efforts of not only the dependent infrastructures, but also of 
the recovery crews involved in the reconstruction process (P2, P3, P5, and P6). 
Being unable to communicate with the recovery crews and the community was 
considered as being the worst case scenario that could be encountered during 
and after disasters (P2, P3, P5, and P6). Other respondents rated energy and 
transport systems as being the second most critical after ICT systems (P1, P4). 
Having constant electricity available and also constant access and mobility 
(through roads, bridges or railways) to reach damaged infrastructure was 
considered indispensable during recovery (P1, P4). Respondent (P2) stated: 
“So one way to look at prioritization is that the critical infrastructure comes 
first because if you don’t get the critical infrastructure up and running, society as 
we know will collapse. So what we concentrate on is what critical infrastructure we 
need to recover first to ensure that society functions at some form. For example, 
with telecommunications, you’ve got to get your telecommunications up and 
running…Without that critical infrastructure, you can forget about having that 
society” (P2).  
Table 5.7: Elements of interdependencies from a disaster recovery context 
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Proposition 6: The types of failures induce the state of operation of critical 
infrastructures, which will guide the recovery process of critical infrastructures 
particularly, prioritization activities.  
 
5.4 SUMMARY 
The preliminary results of the pilot study conducted for this research in 
Queensland, Australia, revealed that the types of interdependencies, including 
physical and cyber interdependencies, as well as the degree to which 
infrastructures interact, have the potential to impede the post-disaster recovery 
effort. The results also revealed that within these elements, critical factors such 
as infrastructure availability, reliability and resources transferability can also 
impede the post-disaster recovery effort. The continued reliability of critical 
infrastructures is paramount during the post-disaster recovery period. As 
mentioned previously, the escalating complexity and vulnerability of 
infrastructures due to their interdependencies has been evidenced in recent 
years by their notable failures. For instance, a large-scale power outage could 
affect simultaneously all the interdependent critical infrastructures. The reliable 
exchange of services that occurs between interconnected systems also depends 
on the uninterrupted functioning of these infrastructures. Supposing that 
interconnected infrastructures fail to achieve their intended purpose, 
interdependencies will be likely to cause more harm than benefits to the entire 
network system during recovery. In this case, there are two paradoxical effects 
associated to the existence, or inexistence, of interdependencies between critical 
infrastructures. On one hand, interdependencies could generate widespread 
cascading failures amongst critical infrastructures in the aftermath of disasters. 
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On the other hand, the absence of interdependencies as such, could also interrupt 
the functioning of the entire interdependent network. Viewed from this 
perspective, in a post-disaster reconstruction framework, it is crucial to maintain 
reliable infrastructure interdependencies to both the constancy of shared 
services as well as to the safety of critical infrastructures. The results also 
revealed that the various types of failures, including cascading and escalating 
failures, will induce the state of operation of CIs, which eventually guide the 
decision making and prioritization of recovery activities.  
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Chapter 6: WITHIN-CASE 
ANAYSIS 
6.1 OVERVIEW 
A within-case analysis and a cross-case analysis were performed in this 
research to unveil research questions (RQ2) and (RQ3). The answers were 
provided to the questions of how elements of infrastructure interdependencies 
can impede the post-disaster recovery effort and how the disruptive effects from 
these elements can be reduced or minimized during the recovery period. The 
exploratory pilot study performed in the previous chapter confirmed that 
elements of interdependencies including the types and degrees of 
interdependencies have the potential to impede the post-disaster recovery 
process. The study also revealed that the types of interdependencies have the 
potential to induce physical and cyber disruptions through the lack of 
infrastructure availability and reliability, as well as resources transferability, 
which can also impede the post-disaster recovery effort. Along with these, 
effective recovery of critical infrastructures also depends on the types of 
interaction, the frequency of exchange, as well as the critical enabling 
infrastructure with which interdependency takes place. The aim of this chapter 
is to determine how these elements can impede the post-disaster recovery. A 
series of open-ended interviews was performed to guide the case studies 
investigation.  
This chapter encompasses four principal sections within which a thorough 
investigation of each case was performed. A total of four case studies were 
selected to investigate the implementation process of recovery strategies after 
flood-related disasters. The cases provided a better platform in observing the 
phenomenon of interdependency within a post-disaster recovery context. The 
unit of analysis was the current or existing recovery plan or guidelines used by 
large organisations involved in post-disaster recovery. The focus was essentially 
to investigate how these organisations dealt or continue to deal with the impacts 
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of infrastructure interdependencies on the recovery processes. As previously 
mentioned, anonymity of organisations being investigated will be kept 
throughout this research and on this basis; each case has been referred to as case 
study (1), (2), (3) and (4). 
 
6.2  WITHIN-CASE PROCEDURES  
Within-case procedures are usually performed to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon under study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gray, 2013; 
Paterson, 2010). The within-case analysis performed in this study was used to 
describe the influential relationships that exist between infrastructure 
interdependencies and the post-disaster recovery effort. Each case investigation 
begins with an individual depiction of the case, followed by explanations on how 
large organisations involved in the recovery coped with rehabilitating 
infrastructure systems such as water, transport, energy and ICT from natural 
disasters. The analysis examined the recovery approach and coordination of the 
four organisations being investigated. The study of the cases also explored how 
disruptions related to the lack of infrastructure availability and reliability, as well 
as resources transferability could subsequently affect the recovery effort. 
Additionally scenarios where the degrees of interdependency (including the 
types of interactions, and the frequency of exchange as well as the critical 
enabling infrastructure) influenced the recovery were examined.  
The four organisations corresponding to the four case studies are mainly 
large city councils and regional councils from the most affected regions by the 
2011 Queensland floods, in Australia. These regions included cities in South East 
Queensland (SEQ) and in the Southern parts of Queensland such as Brisbane, 
Lockyer Valley, Toowoomba and Bundaberg. The selected regions are located on 
floodplains and the majority of their superficies are situated on coastlines, 
making them more vulnerable to flooding. SEQ alone encompasses 15 major 
catchments which cover a total of 22,672 km2 of catchment area and major 
drainage networks such as the Brisbane River catchment, which incorporates the 
Lockyer, Bremer, Stanley, and the upper, mid and lower Brisbane River sub-
catchments.  
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Queensland is the most flood-prone region in Australia and flood related 
disasters per se, are the most costly natural disasters, affecting both urban and 
rural environments in Australia (Middelmann, 2007). Approximatively 47 % of 
natural disasters that occur in Queensland are mainly floods, causing 
approximately $314 million of damage costs on average each year (Middelmann, 
2007). The 2011 Queensland floods were considered to be one of the deadliest 
and most damaging floods that have occurred in the state in the last ten years. 
The 2011 floods were nowhere near what Queensland experienced in previous 
years. Damages reached approximately $2.8 billion, exceeding the previous 
costliest floods in 1974, where the cost of damage was estimated at $68 million 
(ADB, 2013; Emergency Architects Australia, 2011; Queensland Government, 
2012; Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 2014).  
 
Figure 6.1: Regional characteristics covered by the four organisations 
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Figure 6.2: Geographical jurisdictions of the four case studies 
 
6.2.1 Data Analysis Process  
The data coding process performed for the case studies investigation was 
previously explained in detail in Chapter 4. As previously mentioned, the analysis 
and coding process was performed using QSR International NVivo 10 software. 
Using this qualitative data analysis software provided substantial advantages 
including grouping, checking, analysing and comparing data, as well as importing 
and exporting data to other tools when necessary (Hoover & Koerber, 2011). The 
queries in QSR International NVivo 10 software involved coding, matrices, text 
search, as well as theoretical annotations and memos (Hoover & Koerber, 2011). 
Techniques such as pattern-matching, explanation building and numerical counts 
were used in this research to analyse data and build theories from each case study 
(Hoover & Koerber, 2011). These techniques were previously described in 
sections 4.6.5, 4.6.6 and 4.6.7 in chapter 4. The results of the investigation 
revealed which patterns support, refute or expand on the initial propositions 
made by the theoretical framework. 
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Figure 6.3 Data analysis process of case studies investigation 
 
6.3 CASE STUDY (1) 
6.3.1 Organisation’s Profile  
This section provides a background on the roles and responsibilities of the 
organisation investigated in Case Study (1). The organisation has been referred 
to as “Organisation 1” in this research. The geographical boundaries of 
Organisation 1 extend throughout the entire city of Brisbane, which is considered 
as the capital of Queensland, Australia. Brisbane is known to be a disaster prone 
area due to the relentless series of floods that have hit the region over the past 
thirty years. In 2011, Brisbane experienced its second highest floods after the 
highest being those induced by the 1974 cyclone Tracy. The 2011 flood caused 
loss of life and tremendous damages to some of the city’s essential services 
including power, telecommunication, gas, water supply and sewerage. 
Approximately 19,000 kilometres of roads, 28 percent of rail networks and 3 
major ports were significantly impacted by the floods. A record of 28,000 homes 
needed to be rebuilt, instigating approximately $2.55 billion of insurance claim.  
A total of six key informants including General Managers (G11, G12), Disaster 
Recovery Coordinators (D11, D12), and Project Managers (P11, P12) were 
interviewed to provide insights on the recovery effort related to Organisation 1. 
The demographic of Organisation 1 is presented in Table 6.1. It was in 1924 that 
Organisation 1 received the authorisation from Queensland State Parliament to 
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become a single government entity. Since then, it is considered as one of the 
largest local governments in Australia with 26 departments and 27councillor 
positions. The role of Organisation 1 is to provide efficient infrastructure (such 
as transport, water, energy, telecommunications, and waste management) that 
meet the anticipated demand of the communities and contribute in enhancing 
economic growth and environmental protection of its city. Organisation 1’s 
profile was summarised in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.1: Case Study (1)’s profile 
CASE STUDY (1) 
Industry sector Local government council from urban flood prone areas 
Project 
description 
-The 2010/11 Queensland floods recovery  
-approx. $400 million to $2 billion of devastation repair 
Recovery 
approach  
Disaster management plan consistent with the Disaster 
Management Act 2003 for floods events 
Recovery sub-
committees 
-Community Recovery Sub-Committee: 4 and more departments 
-Finance & Economic Recovery Sub-Committee: 6 and more 
departments 
-Infrastructure Recovery Sub-committee: 5 and more 
departments 




-General Managers (G11, G12),  
-Disaster Recovery Coordinators (D11,D12),  
-Project Managers (P11,P12)  




-Transport (including roads and rails),  
-Water (including Sanitation), 
-Energy,  









Organisation 1 is considered to be a leader in disaster management in 
Queensland, engaging closely with infrastructures providers, as well as with 
several emergency management departments including Queensland Police 
Service (QPS), Queensland Fire and Rescue Services (QFRS), Queensland 
Ambulance Service (QAS), Emergency Services Queensland (ESQ), the State 
Emergency Service (SES), the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and other councils 
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and non-profit organisations (D11, D12, G11, G12). As previously mentioned, the unit 
of analysis of this study is the recovery plan or disaster management plan used 
by this particular organisation to coordinate the recovery effort. Participants 
(G11, G12, D11, D12, P11, and P12) mentioned that in the aftermath of a disaster, 
Organisation 1 usually follows a well-established disaster management plan, 
which complies with the Queensland Disaster Management Act (2003) (G11, G12, 
D11, D12, P11, and P12). The plan provides an outline for prevention, preparation, 
response and recovery arrangements (G11, G12, D11, D12, P11, and P12). The focus of 
the disaster management plan is to minimise the effects of a disaster by 
addressing all disaster management phases, outlining recovery guidelines, 
specifying roles and responsibilities etc. (G11, G12, D11, D12, P11, and P12). However, 
respondents (G11, G12, D11, D12, P11, and P12) revealed that the disaster 
management plan currently in place does not consider interdependencies between 
critical infrastructures. Respondent (D12) clearly stated: “We don’t even look at 
interdependencies between infrastructure systems. We know they exist but we just 
assume that they will always be restored, regardless of which recovery approach we 
adopt”.  
Respondent (D12) added that Organisation 1 was still not really aware and 
prepared to face consequences from infrastructure interdependencies, especially 
when it comes to dealing with infrastructure providers for Energy, Transport, 
and Water. According to respondent (D11, P11), these organisations do not have a 
robust continuity plan and their current plans focus more on areas outside of the 
interdependency context.  
Additionally, respondents explained that after the 2011 floods, 
Organisation 1’s disaster management plan was considered to be outdated and 
inaccurate for overcoming disaster impacts from the 2011 Queensland floods 
(G11, G12). The plan was last used in the aftermath of the 1974 Cyclone Tracy and 
had not been updated since that period (G11, G12). For example, the disaster 
management plan was still focusing on rebuilding infrastructures with the Q100 
(a 1 in 100 year event) flood planning standard, which was implemented for the 
1974 Cyclone Tracy recovery, while this was no longer considered to be valid for 
the 2011 recovery (G11, G12). The 2011 floods were nowhere near what 
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Queensland experienced in previous years. There was a need for a more 
‘community led’ approach which focused on the specific needs of affected 
communities and more funding was needed from the state and federal 
government to lead the recovery process after the 2011 floods (G11, G12, P11, and 
P12). Thus, these improvements along with those related to maintaining effective 
collaboration between council and state government lead agencies were essential 
for the establishment of a new disaster management plan (G11, G12, P11, and P12). 
As such, respondents collectively agreed that the recovery plan in place needed 
to be updated to meet the requirements of the 2010/11 floods and those of future 
disasters to come (G11, G12, D11, D12, P11, and P12).  
 
6.3.2 Recovery Approach for Infrastructure Interdependencies  
Decision making  
According to respondents (G11, G12, D11, D12, P11, and P12), disaster 
management in Queensland involves local, district and state governments. 
Respondents explained that responsibilities are progressively spread across 
these government entities when each organisation reaches its capacity (G11, G12, 
D11, and D12). When local government reaches its capacity during recovery, the 
district government takes over the recovery effort (D12, P12). When district 
government is incapable to react, which was the case with the 2010/11 floods 
recovery, the state government is involved (D12, P12). This generally occurs after 
all the resources, networks and supports from the local and district governments 
have been exhausted (D12, P12).  
Respondents explained that local governments are directly involved with 
the community and this is why recovery begins at local government level as 
shown in Figure 6.2 (G11, G12, D11, D12, P11, and P12). After the 2011 floods, an 
interdependent flood response review entity, the ‘Local Disaster Coordination 
Centre (LDCC)’, was established by local government to review the effectiveness 
of councils’ disaster management plans (G12). The decision making body of the 
LDCC is referred to as the Local Disaster Management Group (LDMG) (G12, D12). 
According to one of the respondents (D12), “it is at the LDCC that all the 
operational response activities including prioritization and recovery activities are 
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coordinated and begin to take place”. Respondents also revealed that it was during 
meetings at the LDCC that issues related to infrastructure interdependencies 
were discussed by infrastructure providers and government lead agencies (G11, 
G12, D11, D12). According to respondents, infrastructure providers would take that 
opportunity to discuss scenarios where the damage of an infrastructure was 
affecting the recovery of other infrastructures and very often a program of 
recovery would be established to overcome these issues (G11, G12, D11, D12, P11, 
and P12). This suggests that issues related to infrastructure interdependency 
were resolved through a reactive rather than a proactive approach. There was 
little collaboration between infrastructure providers prior to a disaster occurring 
and after a disaster, collaboration only took place occasionally during LDCC 
meetings (G11, G12, D11, D12, P11, and P12). 
The District Disaster Management Group (DDMG) would take decisions 
when the LDMG was unable to reach a decision. Then decisions would be made 
by the state government when recovery reaches the state level. A Queensland 
Reconstruction Authority board (QRA) was established at a state level after the 
2011 floods (G11, G12, D11, D12, P11, and P12). The role of the board was to work 
closely with local governments and communities in order to develop and 
implement a state-wide plan for rebuilding infrastructures and communities 
across Queensland (P11, P12). According to respondent (G11), QRA followed a 
National Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA) established by the 
state and federal government to provide funding to local governments for eligible 
recovery activities. QRA used its own disaster management plan, which focused 
on community recovery, economic recovery, infrastructure recovery, as well as 
environmental, ward, and planning recovery (G11, D11, and D12). Organisation 1 
was required to collaborate and report to QRA during the 2011 floods recovery 
(P11, P12). A depiction of the structure of the recovery governance involved in the 
2011 recovery is provided in Figure 6.2 and 6.3.  
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Figure 6.4: Decision making units involved in the response and recovery phases 
(adapted from Queensland Government, 2003) 
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Figure 6.5: Post-disaster recovery structure (adapted from BCC, 2011) 
 
Prioritization  
Respondents (D11, D12) revealed that Organisation 1’s response and 
recovery was in accordance with its disaster management plan. In the plan, 
recovery activities were subdivided into the short, medium and long-term 
recovery with the following timeframes:  
a) Phase 1 - Initial Recovery – (1 week to 1 month) 
b) Phase 2 – Medium term Recovery (1-6 months) 
c) Phase 3 - Long Term Recovery (6 months to 24 months). 
 
According to respondent (D11), recovery activities provided in the disaster 
management plan follow a linear approach, where response would precede 
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recovery and during recovery, the medium term would only start once the short-
term was completed. However, due to extensive time constraints and delays as 
well as the many issues related to resources availability, a cyclic recovery 
approach rather than a linear recovery approach was adopted during the 2011 
floods recovery. Respondent (D11) revealed that “there is no definite trigger 
during recovery about what should be completed first; activities tend to overlap 
each other”. Respondent (D12) explained that in the field, there is no concrete 
short, medium and long-terms recovery. “In some cases, we don’t actually know 
when activities move from medium-term to become long-term” (D12). Recovery 
activities are essentially guided by the sort of activities and infrastructures that 
needs fast recovery for the community (D11, D12). Regarding this, respondent 
(P11) stated:  
“It is hard to define recovery prioritization. I don't think there's a concrete 
short-term or medium-term but we prioritize according to activities. For example, 
restoring electric power would be considered as short-term recovery. However, the 
restoration of the entire power infrastructure can extend from short-term to 
medium and then long-term recovery.” 
One respondent (D12) emphasized that short-term recovery focuses in 
restoring and rehabilitating the infrastructure that is considered to be critical to 
the community at the time and this generally can take up to 3 months. However, 
as much as an organisation is willing to rebuild the damaged infrastructure, 
funding generated by the NDRRA also guide prioritization of recovery activities 
(G11, G12, D11, D12). Recovery for the 2011 floods followed the NDRRA funding 
requirement implemented by the state and federal governments. Council 
Divisions were required to reprioritise milestones of the recovery effort to fit the 
NDRRA requirements and when necessary re-allocate budget supplemented by 
NDRRA funding and by other alternative sources of funding (G11, P11, and P12). 
 
6.3.3 Impacts of the Types of Interdependencies on Post-Disaster 
Recovery 
This section describes how Organisation 1 dealt with the impacts of 
infrastructure interdependencies on the 2011 Queensland floods recovery effort. 
This study required deep investigations into the impacts of the types of 
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interdependencies, whether physical (including geographical) or cyber, together 
with the ways by which these impacts also affected the recovery effort. The 
understanding to be gained from this exercise was to be limited to the level of 
understanding where sufficient knowledge on how infrastructure availability and 
reliability, as well as resources transferability have the potential to impede the 
recovery effort. 
 
Table 6.2: Types of interdependencies and success factors 
Types of Interdependencies Critical Success Factors 
Physical (including Geographical) Infrastructure Availability 
Infrastructure Reliability 
Resources Transferability 
Cyber Infrastructure Availability 
Infrastructure Reliability 
Resources Transferability 
       (Repeated from Table 5.4) 
 
Availability 
Most respondents recognised that infrastructure availability plays a 
significant role in maintaining interdependencies among critical infrastructures 
such as water (including sanitation), energy, transport and ICT after the 2011 
Queensland floods (G11, G12, P11, and P12). According to respondent (P12), “critical 
infrastructures are dependents on each other but when subject to severe damages, 
failure to recover one infrastructure could delay the recovery of others 
infrastructures”.  
Respondent (G11) recalled that the flooding that occurred from December 
2010 to February 2011 across the region caused more damage to roads than to 
any state infrastructures. Damages extended to road pavement surfaces and 
shoulders, as well as to drainage infrastructures of many major roads and 
highways, including the Bruce Highway (G11). According to respondents (G11, 
D12), “recovery was taking place in 110 locations when the inundation of roads 
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induced the inundation of sewerage systems in 65 locations. This resulted in the 
discharge of untreated sewerage through overflow relief structures then into 
private properties, posing high risks to human health. Recovery activities in these 
65 locations had to be stopped until the recovery of roads was completed and roads 
were re-opened’ (G11).  
Respondent (G11) explained that roads unavailability impeded the 
provision of resources needed to begin the recovery of sewerage systems. 
According to Respondent (G11), there was a series of events that succeeded to 
roads damages; “towns were isolated, roads were taking quite long to be 
rehabilitated, and there were no resources to begin the recovery of sewerage 
systems” (G11). Another respondent (D12) added that even when roads were 
repaired, some of the utilities providers were still out of reach due to the damage 
to their own infrastructures and as a result could not supply resources needed to 
start the recovery of sewerage systems. Respondent (D12) explained that to a 
large extent, the unavailability of infrastructures also affects the accessibility to 
resources needed to begin the recovery effort. 
 
Figure 6.6: Geographical interdependency between roads and sewerage systems 
 
Respondents (G12, P11, and P12) also revealed that a six day power outage 
took place in the entire region after the floods, due to a large number of fallen 
power lines found on the roads. According to respondents (G12, P11, and P12), the 
lack of electricity resulted in the failure of certain communication channels, 
Shipping of resources
Access to resources 
Access to damaged 
infrastructures
Roads Sewerage 
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which isolated communities and impacted the ways that Organisation 1 sought 
information from and with external and internal stakeholders. This indicates that 
infrastructure unavailability also has the potential to result in cascading failures 
across other interdependent infrastructures and this can directly affect the 
community (G12, P11, and P12). 
 
Figure 6.7: Physical interdependency between energy and ICT systems 
 
Reliability  
Respondents described reliability as the probability of an infrastructure to 
be available and continue to provide resources and services necessary for the 
well-functioning of others infrastructures (G11, G12, D11, D12, P11, and P12). Most 
respondents (D11, D12, and P12) explained that infrastructures tend to be reliable 
prior to disasters, but after a disaster, reliability depends on the types of disasters 
and the extent of damages experienced by infrastructures. From respondents’ 
perspectives, infrastructure reliability is closely linked to infrastructure 
availability during recovery (G11, G12, D11, D12, P11, and P12). Respondent (D12) 
revealed that energy system was the most reliable infrastructure system due to 
its availability after the 2011 floods. According to respondent (D12), “Without 
electricity, water couldn’t go anywhere”. Thus, availability and reliability affect the 
recovery effort simultaneously; “without infrastructure availability, there is no 
reliability of the infrastructure either “(D12).  
For some respondents transport infrastructures were the least reliable 
infrastructures after the 2011 flood events. Respondent (G11) stated:  
Power for swicthes
Power for operating 
equipments
Energy ICT 
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“So from my perspective, transport systems were the least reliable 
infrastructures during recovery. I could say ICT but the only major issues we had 
with ICT were those related to ICT within transport infrastructures. We had a bit of 
issues with water but not so much with energy. I don’t think there was any lack of 
reliability that persisted with energy as soon as electricity was restored.” 
This indicates that “it is only when damages of an infrastructure impede the 
recovery of others infrastructures that such infrastructure is considered unreliable” 
(G11). According to respondent (P11), to be reliable, infrastructures need to 
continuously produce the intended services necessary for the functioning of the 
other interdependent infrastructures during recovery. Respondent (P11) 
explained that transport infrastructures such as roads tend to be severely 
damaged by floods and in most cases such damages cascade, or escalate, to affect 
other infrastructure systems (P11). Additionally, damages from ICT and energy 
systems tend to easily cascade and escalate to other infrastructures. However, 
these failures generally last for only a short period of time (P11). Respondent (P11) 
mentioned that “there is pretty strong demand on resources from ICT and energy 
after natural disasters but it’s really only for that three or five days during which 
the event is at its strongest impact”. Thus to respondent (P11), ICT and energy 
systems are considered more reliable than transport systems because their 
impacts on other interdependent infrastructures only span over a short period of 
time, whereas transport systems tend to delay the recovery of other 
infrastructures for a longer period of time. This indicates that reliability is also 
perceived according to the extent of impacts of one infrastructure upon others 
(G11, P11).  
Respondents also highlighted that the lack of reliability of one 
infrastructure can also impinge on the reliability of other infrastructures (D11, 
D12, and P12). As much as an infrastructure produces the required resources in a 
timely fashion, if those resources do not reach the supporting infrastructure, then 
the providing infrastructure is considered to be unreliable (D11, D12, and P12). 
Most respondents indicated that the lack of reliability of water infrastructures 
tended to be caused by the lack of transportation resources. Reliability of water 
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infrastructure highly depends on the reliability of road transportation systems 
(D11, D12, and P12). 
 
Transferability  
Issues that affected the transfer of resources after the 2011 floods were 
mainly those related to transport infrastructures (G11, G12, D11, D12, P11, and P12). 
Respondents revealed that there were minimal issues encountered with 
communication lines as the recovery was completed within 15 days (D11, P12). 
However, most of the roads across Queensland were severely damaged after the 
2011 floods and this impeded the transfer of resources from one infrastructure 
to the other and from one region to another (G11, P11). Some respondents recalled 
that the “power station from Mount Stuart was dangerously running low on fuel 
with just 10 hours of fuel supply remaining. Roads were closed in many regions of 
Queensland including in Brisbane where the fuel needed to come from. The entire 
North Queensland was at risk of power outage and this would have cost enormous 
budgets to restart the power station” (G11, P11). Respondents mentioned that 
during the 2011 floods recovery, various types of transportation systems were 
used to ensure that infrastructures demand was met (G11, P11). However as 
demand peaked across the city, priority was given to the most affected regions, 
resulting in some of recoveries being delayed without any means of receiving and 
providing resources to other infrastructures (G11, P11). Thus, according to 
respondent (P11), without the supply or transfer of resources from one 
infrastructure to another, recovery could not begin. The incapacity to physically 
access and transfer resources through transport infrastructures in a timely 
manner resulted in cascading and escalating failures, which subsequently 
delayed the recovery processes of various other infrastructures (G11, P11). 
 
6.3.4 Impacts of the Degrees of Interdependency on Post-Disaster 
Recovery 
Types of interactions  
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Respondents (G12, P11, and P12) collectively mentioned that recovery 
challenges encountered after the 2011 floods were those that affected the re-
establishment of geographical and cyber interdependencies among damaged 
infrastructures. There were issues from damaged roads that affected the 
recovery of sewerage systems. Although interdependencies issues between 
sewerage and roads systems were geographically related, interactions between 
these infrastructures were considered to be loose by most respondents (G12, P11, 
and P12). Respondents (G12, P11, and P12) explained that there was a slow 
propagation of failures from roads to sewerage systems across 65 sites in the 
region when damages from roads escalated to sewerage systems. This indicates 
that failures tend to propagate slowly for loosely interdependent systems until 
they ultimately escalate to become greater failures (G12, P11, and P12). 
According to respondents (G11, G12), rapid propagation of failures was 
experienced between energy and ICT systems. The strong interactions between 
these infrastructures induced fast propagation of electricity outage, which 
affected communication channels (G11, G12). Respondents explained that the 
recovery of certain infrastructures such as water infrastructures could begin 
without electricity, however the lack of electricity resulted in the failure of 
communication channels and this impeded the start of recovery activities in the 
region. Without communication, Organisation 1 could not begin and coordinate 
the recovery effort.  
 
Frequency of exchange 
Some infrastructure systems such as energy and communication operate in 
real-time and thus require constant uninterrupted exchange of services. 
However, during recovery, most respondents (G11, G12, D11, D12, P11, and P12) from 
Organisation 1 revealed that the frequency at which resources were exchanged 
across infrastructures after the floods did not directly affect the recovery effort. 
According to respondents (D12, P11, and P12); what was needed after the floods 
was the provision of the minimum services or resources to recover and 
rehabilitate infrastructures from flood damages. To these respondents (D12, P11, 
and P12), the real problem did not quite reside in the frequency of exchange, 
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rather in the accessibility of resources. One respondent (G11) highlighted that the 
frequency of exchange had greater interest for the organisation before disaster 
occurs, due to the need to maintain the operability of their infrastructures. 
However, after disasters, organisations are more concerned with recovering 
infrastructures in a timely manner using existing resources (D12, P11, and P12).  
 
Critical enabling infrastructure  
Respondents unanimously revealed that transport infrastructures, 
particularly roads, were critical enablers to most infrastructures (G11, G12, D11, 
D12, P11, and P12). According to respondents (D11, D12), cascading and escalating 
failures begin from the critical enabling infrastructure and vary in function of the 
extent of damages and the degrees of interdependencies that exist across 
infrastructures. To most respondents (D11, D12), critical infrastructures such as 
transport systems are the primary enablers of accessibility and transferability of 
resources and as such disruptions to these infrastructures will affect the recovery 
of other infrastructures on a global scale. According to respondents (G11, G12, and 
P12), damages to the critical enablers can easily trigger cascading and escalating 
failures across other interdependent infrastructures.  
 
6.3.5 Summary  
This section explored the influence of elements of infrastructure 
interdependencies on post-disaster recovery effort. Findings from the data 
analysis are summarised below.  
 
RQ2 –How do elements of infrastructure interdependencies have the 
potential to affect the post-disaster recovery effort?  
The evidence from data suggests that physical disruptions across 
interdependent infrastructures were widely spread within Organisation 1’s 
regional boundaries. Failures of infrastructure systems such as roads can escalate 
to other infrastructure systems across several sites. The unavailability of an 
infrastructure can also affect access to resources needed to begin the recovery 
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effort of others infrastructure systems. Data also revealed that the lack of cyber 
interdependency due to unavailability of ICT systems can result in cascading 
failures of other infrastructure systems such as energy, which will subsequently 
certainly affect the community. This indicates that infrastructures availability is 
a critical success factor in recovering interdependent infrastructures from 
physical and cyber disruptions.  
Respondents (G11, G12, P11, and P12) revealed that water systems including 
sanitation or sewerage systems need transport for distribution, supply, and 
collection of resources during post-disaster recovery. Transport systems, on the 
other hand need water for processes such as fuels production and for 
manufacturing slurry during reconstruction (G11, G12, P11, and P12). These 
respondents revealed that during the 2011 floods recovery, physical 
interdependency between roads and sewerage systems was very loose; it was 
geographical interdependency that induced damages to sewerage systems (G11, 
G12, P11, and P12). However, the recovery of sewerage systems was impeded by 
the lack of resources available. Thus, resources availability plays a significant role 
during recovery even when geographical interdependency is predominant across 
infrastructures. 
Data indicated that cascading and escalating failures begin from the 
primary contributing, or critical enabling infrastructures and vary in function of 
the extent of damages and the degrees of interdependencies that exist across 
infrastructures. To most respondents, transport infrastructures, particularly 
roads systems, are critical enablers of accessibility and transferability of 
resources to infrastructure systems such as water (including sewerage) systems. 
Transport infrastructures allow accessibility of recovery crews to the damaged 
infrastructures, but more importantly, accessibility of resources from/to the 
others infrastructures. To a large extent damages to transport infrastructure 
would directly impede the recovery efforts of water and sewerage systems.  
The cyber interactions between energy and ICT systems were described as 
being strong and according to respondents, such interactions generated a rapid 
propagation of failure across these infrastructures. This suggests that systems 
tend to easily cascade across infrastructures that are strongly interdependent to 
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one another. Respondents also suggest that slow propagation of failure tend to 
be experienced among infrastructures that are not strongly interdependent such 
as sewerage and transport systems. Failures of sewerage systems originating 
from damaged roads were due to their geographical interdependencies and also 
due to the lack of physical resources. Their interdependencies were considered 
to be loose. Respondents revealed that it is through a slow propagation of failures 
that damages from roads escalated through to promulgate greater failures to 
sewerage systems at various sites. Therefore damages to infrastructures that 
possess a loose degree of interdependency can easily escalate and result in 
greater damages, if not restored in a timely manner. 
Respondents were unable to clearly describe how the frequency of 
exchange and the reliability of resources directly affect the recovery of 
interdependent infrastructures. In fact, most respondents associated reliability 
with a certain level of expectation based on receiving resources from other 
infrastructures, in order to continue to operate. According to most respondents, 
such expectancy can only be maintained before a disaster occur, and is hard to 
evaluate after a disaster. To respondents, energy and ICT systems are the most 
reliable infrastructures in providing electricity and information and 
communication services to other interdependent infrastructures across 
Organisation 1’s region. Both energy and ICT systems are considered reliable due 
to their ability to operate in real-time and provide uninterrupted services, 
allowing other infrastructures to operate. Respondents suggested that the 
primary contributing infrastructures which were identified as transport 
infrastructures are not necessarily the most reliable infrastructures during 
recovery. In fact, when an infrastructure does not fulfil its intended role in 
providing resources to other interdependent infrastructures, the infrastructure 
is considered unreliable and damages of such infrastructure can have direct 
impact on the recovery effort. Therefore, to a large extent particularly in the case 
of transport infrastructures, issues resulting to resources availability are directly 
associated to accessibility and transferability of resources. The incapacity to 
physically access and transfer resources through transport infrastructures in a 
timely manner resulted in cascading and escalating failures, which subsequently 
delayed the recovery processes of various other infrastructures.  
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RQ3- How can the disruptive effects of elements of infrastructures 
interdependencies be minimized or reduced during the recovery effort?  
Respondents revealed that Organisation 1’s disaster management plan does 
not provide guidelines in restoring interdependencies among critical 
infrastructures. In fact, infrastructure interdependencies still remain an abstract 
concept for most organisations during the post-disaster recovery period. Hence, 
some respondents suggested that one way in minimizing issues related to 
cascading and escalating failures of interdependent infrastructures, (i) would be 
to incorporate elements of interdependency into Organisation 1’s existing 
disaster management plan. Respondents suggested that (ii) infrastructure 
interdependencies issues should be identified, reported and documented in 
various reports and guidelines on disaster management, to keep organisations 
informed and aware of ways in dealing with infrastructure interdependencies 
during recovery. Rather than adopting a reactive approach, respondents 
suggested that (iii) it would be more beneficial to adopt a proactive insight insight 
in recovering interdependent infrastructures. Such proactive approach would 
require a collaborative approach among infrastructure providers and other 
organisations involved in the recovery effort. Collaborations would take place 
regularly during and outside of meetings organised at the LDCC, where issues 
relating to infrastructure interdependencies would be discussed. Most 
respondents also recommended providing intensive training sessions using 
simulations and modelling techniques which portray cascading and escalating 
failures of interdependent infrastructures before their occurrences. Neglecting or 
underestimating these interdependencies can cause planners and decision 
makers to underestimate overall risks. It is therefore vital that methods are 
developed to better understand these infrastructure interdependencies and 
ensure all risks are fully understood. 
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6.4 CASE STUDY (2)  
6.4.1 Organisation’s Profile  
Data revealed that Organisation 2 was established in 2008 from the 
amalgamation of the former two previous Shire Councils. With seven elected 
councillors, Organisation 2 employs between 340 and 350 staff, among whom a 
“Flood Recovery Committee” was established. The committee includes five 
recovery sub-committees, each chaired by a Senior Recovery Officer. The sub-
committees focus specifically on (1) Human and Social recovery, (2) Economic 
recovery, (3) Natural Environment, as well as (4) House and Infrastructure 
recovery. Six participants including General Managers (G21, G22), Senior Recovery 
officers (S21, S22), and Project Managers (P21 and P22) provided insights on the 
recovery efforts typically performed by Organisation 2 after the 2011 Queensland 
floods. The interviews were conducted in one of the most disaster affected 
regions of the 2011 floods, Lockyer Valley. Lockyer Valley is traversed by the 
Lockyer Creek, which is one of the largest tributaries of the Brisbane River. 
Lockyer Creek comprises a catchment of 2,600 km2 including tributaries, which 
extend to Murphys Creek, Laidley, Helidon, Withcott, Grantham and Gatton. 
Unprecedented flash floods that occurred across the region around January 2011 
resulted in all the catchments becoming severely damaged. The floods caused 
severe damage to Murphys Creek, Spring Bluff, Withcott, Postman’s Ridge, 
Helidon, Grantham, and Gatton. 19 lives were lost (12 of them in Grantham), 2798 
houses were inundated, and 1, 380 km of roads and 48 bridges were severely 
damaged as a result of the Lockyer Valley floods. 
Respondents revealed that Organisation 2 follow a local disaster 
management plan (LDMP) that was established since 2009 (G21, G22, S21, S22), 
however very little was done in terms of planning for the 2010/11 disasters. 
There were no sub-plans or contingency planning for emergencies, nor was a 
dedicated disaster response command centre established (G21, G22, S21, S22). This 
is why a local disaster management group (LDMG) was established in December 
2010 to review the LDMP in collaboration with Emergency Management 
Queensland (EMQ) (D1). Major ramifications were identified and revisions 
implemented to the plan after the floods (G21, G22, S21, and S22). However, it took 
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a certain period of time for the plan to be approved, delaying the recovery process 
after the 2011 floods (P21 and P22). According to respondents (P21 and P22), 
essential information such as response and evacuation plans were still missing 
from the overall plan. Respondents also revealed that there was no information 
found in the LDMP on restoring interdependencies between large 
infrastructure systems (G21, G22, P21 and P22). Additionally, no plans or 
information on how to minimize the effects of infrastructure interdependencies 
were incorporated into the existing plan (G21, G22, S21, S22, P21 and P22). 
Organisation 2’s profile was depicted in Table 6.3.  
Table 6.2: Case Study (2)’s profile 
                                                      CASE STUDY (2) 
Industry Sector Local Regional Council from rural flood prone areas 
Project 
Description 
-The 2010/11 Queensland floods recovery  
-$180 million of repair cost through NDRRA 
Recovery 
Approach  
-Disaster management plan consistent with the Disaster 
Management Act 2003 for floods events 
Recovery Sub-
Committees 
-Human and Social Recovery Sub-Committee 
-Economic Recovery Sub-Committee 
-Natural Environment Recovery Sub-committee 
-House and Infrastructure Recovery Sub-Committee 
Informant Roles -General Managers (G21, G22),  
-Senior Recovery Officers (S21, S22),  
-Project Managers (P21 and P22) 




-Transport (including roads and rails),  











6.4.2 Recovery Approach for Infrastructure Interdependency  
Decision making  
Respondents mentioned that the decision making body for disaster 
management is the Local Disaster Management Group (LDMG) (G21, G22, S21, S22, 
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P21 and P22). Usually after disasters, the LDMG organises meetings of the Local 
Disaster Coordination Centre (LDCC) with state government representatives as 
well as water, transport, energy and ICT infrastructure providers (G21, G22). Due 
to the overwhelming challenges experienced by Organisation 2 at the local 
government level, the district government was also involved in the recovery and 
even the state government became involved at a later stage (G21, G22, S21, and S22). 
A number state government agencies including Emergency Management 
Queensland (EMQ), Queensland Police Services (QPS), as well as the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF) responded and were involved in the recovery (G21, G22, S21, 
and S22). 
Respondents revealed that it was only during meetings organised at the 
LDCC that infrastructure providers met and discussed issues related to 
infrastructure interdependencies (G21, G22, and S21). Respondents confirmed also 
that these meetings did not comply with the extant legislation at the time, which 
stipulated that disaster management groups were to meet at no greater than six 
month intervals. However, after the 2011 floods, meetings were conducted 
irregularly and as such infrastructure providers were poorly informed of the 
recovery process of other infrastructures (G21, G22). This resulted in tremendous 
challenges in restoring interdependencies among critical infrastructures. There 
was little or no communication with regard to the extent of damages of each 
infrastructure as well as to the progress of the recovery effort of each 
infrastructure system (G21, G22, S21, and S22). Infrastructure providers had their 
own recovery teams, which were focused on their own infrastructures and did 
not have a coordinated approach so that issues related to infrastructure 
interdependencies were resolved (G21, G22, S21, and S22).  
 
Prioritization 
Due to the complexity and extent of damages from the 2011 floods, 
Organisation 2 struggled to establish priorities for recovery after the floods (G22, 
and P22). Respondents mentioned that the response phase after the 2011 floods 
began immediately after the disaster, while the recovery had a slow start where 
strategies that needed to be implemented were still being investigated (G21, G22, 
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S21, S22, P21 and P22). According to respondent (G22), these strategies included 
trying to understand the complexity of the event, trying to collect data, as well as 
performing rapid damage assessment and so on. Respondents (G22 and P22) 
revealed that Organisation 2 was still trying to understand how to organise 
recovery activities, whilst during this period, damages continued to spread across 
the region. Organisation 2 had difficulties in deciding which infrastructure would 
be restored first as respondent (G22) mentioned: 
“We were looking into whether to restore roads, bridges or houses first and 
we tried to compare those with the rest of critical infrastructures. It was hard to 
define the objectives for recovery and which infrastructure would be back up and 
running first”. 
Respondents revealed that there was no specific timeframe for recovery 
phases (G21, G22, S21, S22, P21 and P22). “A rule of thumb was used during recovery to 
decide what will be the next activity once the preceding activity was completed” 
(G21). Organisation 2’s recovery phases included the short, medium and long-
term phases from which recovery activities and their durations depended solely 
on expert judgements (G21, G22, P21 and P22). Respondents collectively revealed 
that the recovery was considered to be unsuccessful due to the long period of 
time it took to restore the community to a rehabilitated condition (G21, G22, S21, 
S22, P21 and P22). It took approximately three to four years to restore some of the 
major roads across Organisation 2’s regional boundaries (G21). According to 
respondents (G21, G22), recovery undertaken by Organisation 2 was more 
challenging in Grantham, one of the severely impacted regions of Lockyer Valley, 
which required a relocation of the entire city. The short-term recovery extended 
up to two years later, resulting in the resettlement of Grantham (G21, G22). This 
affected prioritization of recovery activities by way of collaborative, economical 
and coordination factors (G21, G22, S21, S22, P21 and P22).  
 
6.4.3 Impacts of the Types of Interdependency on Post-Disaster 
Recovery 
The following section describes the influence of the types of infrastructure 
interdependencies on the recovery efforts being implemented by Organisation 2 
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after the 2011 floods. Recovery issues described by interviewees were mainly 
those related to physical and cyber interdependencies, which affected 
infrastructure availability and reliability, as well as resources transferability. 
 
Availability  
Respondents (G21, G22, S21, S22, P21 and P22) revealed that the recovery of 
damaged infrastructures in Lockyer Valley was mostly affected by unavailability 
of ICT systems. Respondent (S22) mentioned that “Major roads and bridges were 
washed away by the floods and most infrastructures providers were incapable to 
start the recovery due to the lack of information and communication”.  
Respondent (G22) also explained that “main roads near Mount Sylvia were 
washed away by the floods and the community lost their mobile communications. 
There were people on one side of the road, who could not get to the other side 
because it was hard to know what was going on the other side, and whether it was 
safe or not to go through the other side of the roads”. According to respondent 
(P21), issues related to communication prevailed over any other recovery 
problems. The respondent explained that the lack of communication affected 
recovery coordination tremendously; it was difficult to obtain information from 
various government agencies and from ICT providers to determine the extent and 
severity that the floods had on the infrastructures. (P21). Thus, without available 
communication and information technologies, the recovery effort of most 
infrastructures could not be coordinated and implemented (G21, G22, S21, S22, P21 
and P22).  
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Figure 6.8: Cyber interdependency between ICT systems and roads 
 
Data revealed that interruptions of information and telecommunication 
services in 375 sites at Lockyer Valley were mostly due to the loss of major 
electrical network systems (S22, P21 and P22). Electricity distributors were only 
able to hold their first disaster management group meeting at a relatively late 
stage of the recovery, and as such very little information was provided before 
outages occurred (S22, P21 and P22). According to respondent (S22), provision of 
better information about the location and the duration of the power outages 
could have enabled the deployment of sufficient generators and networks to cater 
for them. Thus, failures to energy systems cascaded to ICT systems and eventually 
escalated to other infrastructure systems, thus impeding their recovery effort 
(S22, P21 and P22).  
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Figure 6.9: Cyber interdependency between ICT and energy systems 
 
Reliability 
From respondents’ perspectives, it appeared evident that after the 2011 
floods, the recovery of water and transport infrastructures relied essentially on 
information and communication services obtained through ICT systems (S21, S22, 
and P22). Respondents (S21, S22, and P22) mentioned that “infrastructure systems 
that operate in real-time such as ICT and energy are the most reliable 
infrastructures because their providers make sure that demands are continuously 
satisfied. There is no possibility of stockpiling, and that is why these systems have to 
be "on" all the time”. This indicates that the most reliable infrastructure is the one 
that provides uninterrupted resources during recovery. Reliability is closely 
linked to an infrastructures effective functioning and its ability to provide 
services to others infrastructures to enable their functioning. “Without 
infrastructure availability, there won’t be any reliability”, stated respondent (P22).  
According to respondent (S21), infrastructure availability is more important 
than its reliability because reliability can change after a disaster. Respondent 
(S21) explained that “a reliable infrastructure can become unreliable especially 
when its damages result in cascading and escalating damages to other 
infrastructures.” According to respondent (S21), “ICT systems became unreliable 
after the 2011 floods due to the lack of internet and mobile phone receptions around 
Murphys Creek, Spring Bluff and Postman’s areas”. Very little was done to fix these 
Power for swicthes
Power for operating 
equipmentsEnergy
ICT 
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problems within a short period of time (S21). Data revealed that the lack of 
information and communication services shared between infrastructures, as well 
as with organisations involved in the recovery, affected the coordination of 
recovery activities and delayed the overall recovery efforts (S22, P21 and P22). This 
resulted in cascading and escalating failures across ICT systems, and transport 
and energy systems (S22, P21 and P22).  
Some respondents (P21 and P22) rated water infrastructure systems as the 
most reliable infrastructures after the 2011 floods. These respondents revealed 
that after the floods, water supply alternatives were provided while 
infrastructures were progressively being restored (P21 and P22). Water 
infrastructure providers were able to remotely test the quality of water due to 
their in-built instrumentation within the system of bulk water pipelines (P21).  
 
Transferability  
The issues encountered with resources transferability were mainly those 
engendered by the lack of transferring information across organisations involved 
in the recovery process (G21). According to respondent (G21), lack of information 
affected the coordination of recovery activities, which delayed the recovery 
process across Organisation 2 regions. Respondent (G21) explained that it was 
difficult to get the recovery crews on site without information on the extent of 
damage on infrastructures and the location of the damaged infrastructures. With 
the delay in repairing roads, resources could not be transferred to damaged water 
infrastructures (G21). Thus, the lack of resources transferability can affect the 
coordination of recovery activities (G21). This can also delay the recovery effort 
of interdependent infrastructures, resulting in cascading failures across 
interdependent infrastructures (G21).  
 
6.4.4 Impacts of the Degrees of Interdependency on Post-Disaster 
Recovery 
Types of Interactions  
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Cyber interactions induced most of the challenges during the 2011 recovery 
processes implemented by Organisation 2 (S21, S22, P21 and P22). Although 
physical interactions had a significant role in impeding the recovery, respondents 
(S21, S22, P21 and P22) recognised that some of the issues relating to physical 
disruptions could have been reduced if cyber interactions were restored in a 
timely manner during post-disaster recovery (S22, P21 and P22):  
“If roads get damaged by floods, we can fix them. However, in 2011, it was 
more than that. We had no information and we did not know where to start with 
the recovery...” (P22). This indicates that if interdependency issues from one type 
of interaction are not minimized or eliminated on time, this could escalate and 
affect other types of interactions (S22, P21 and P22).  
Respondents (P21 and P22) explained in a previous section that “Major roads 
and bridges were washed away by the floods and most infrastructures providers 
were incapable to start the recovery due to the lack of information and 
communication”. According to respondents (P21 and P22), interdependencies 
between roads and bridges with ICT systems were loose and the failures 
propagated slowly to the point where it affected the recovery coordination of 
roads and bridges. Therefore, failures tend to propagate slowly and escalate 
among infrastructures that are linked through a loose interdependent 
relationship (P21 and P22).  
 
Frequency of Exchange  
Respondents (P21, P22) highlighted the importance of having constant access 
to energy and ICT systems during post-disaster recovery. According to these 
respondents, even a short interruption to the functioning of infrastructures such 
as ICT systems due to a power outage can easily cascade and escalate into failures 
that will affect the functioning and the recovery of other infrastructures (P21, P22). 
Respondents (G21, G22) explained that the frequency, at which certain services 
such as electricity and communication are provided and received, is crucial in 
recovering damaged infrastructures and coordinating recovery activities. This 
indicates that both energy and ICT systems need to operate in real-time in order 
to start the recovery processes (P21 and P22).  
Chapter 6-Within-case analysis  
Erica Mulowayi 193 
 
Critical Enabling Infrastructure  
Respondents (S21, S22, P21 and P22) mentioned that ICT systems were critical 
enablers to the recovery of most infrastructures after the 2011 floods. According 
to these respondents, without such critical enabling infrastructure, it was difficult 
to operate other interdependent infrastructures:  
“We had cases where ICT systems were down and we could not remotely 
operate the water plants. The systems were down for five to six days and it had some 
of the strongest impacts on the rest of the infrastructures” (S21, S22, P21 and P22). 
This indicates that the inoperability of critical enabling infrastructures such as 
ICT systems can have a great impact on the operability of other interdependent 
infrastructures (S21, S22, P21 and P22).  
Some respondents (G21, G22) indicated that not all interdependent 
infrastructures are considered to be critical enablers. Energy systems for 
instance, are critical enablers of ICT systems, but not necessarily of transport 
systems such as roads (G21, G22). Although transport systems required power for 
signalling and switches, power outages would not necessarily impede the 
recovery efforts for road systems to restart. According to respondents (G21, G22), 
the recovery of road systems was able to begin without electricity in certain 
regions after the 2011 floods. Thus, a critical enabler is not simply an 
interdependent infrastructure, but it is an interdependent infrastructure that is 
so critical that failure of such infrastructure would easily result in cascading and 
escalating failures to other infrastructures (G21, G22, S21, S22, P21 and P22).  
 
6.4.5 Summary  
Findings from the analysis of data for Organisation 2 on how elements of 
infrastructure interdependencies impeded the recovery effort are summarised 
below. 
 
RQ2 –How do elements of infrastructure interdependencies have the 
potential to affect the post-disaster recovery effort?  
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The analysis of data revealed that Organisation 2 faced tremendous 
challenges during the 2011 floods recovery. Some of these challenges were due 
to physical damages to infrastructures; whereas most of them were related to 
cyber interdependency, which had higher impacts on the overall recovery effort. 
Respondents revealed that the lack of communication and information impeded 
coordination of recovery activities. Most infrastructure providers did not know 
where to begin the recovery activities or which approaches were best suited for 
the recovery of their infrastructures. Without clear direction and unifying 
information, the recovery effort of critical infrastructures was delayed across the 
region. Respondents mentioned that the lack of virtual resources was the result 
of cascading failures that originated from energy systems. These failures 
escalated into greater failures of other interdependent infrastructures, thus 
delaying the recovery of transport and water infrastructure systems.  
ICT systems were considered critical enablers for the recovery of transport 
and water infrastructures. However, failures of ICT infrastructures originated 
from failures of energy systems. This suggests that energy was a critical enabler 
of ICT systems. Accordingly, there is a strong interdependency between energy 
and ICT systems from which failures can propagate rapidly. On the other hand, 
loose interdependencies are experienced between ICT systems with transport 
infrastructures and ICT with water infrastructures and so failures from ICT 
systems propagate slowly across these infrastructures prior to escalating to 
greater damage levels in the region. Therefore, the lack of virtual resources can 
result in cascading and escalating failures across interdependent infrastructures, 
thus delaying the recovery effort.  
Respondents associated the most reliable infrastructure with those that 
provide uninterrupted resources during recovery. Water infrastructures were 
considered to be the most reliable in providing needed resources to enable the 
recovery of other interdependent infrastructures. ICT systems were the least 
reliable infrastructures. In this respect, from respondents’ perspectives, it 
appears evident that resources reliability is closely related to constantly 
providing resources to enable the other infrastructures to operate. Hence, it is 
through infrastructure availability, that resources reliability impedes the 
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recovery effort. The lack of services shared from one infrastructure can result in 
cascading or escalating failures to other infrastructures, depending on how 
strong or loose are the interdependencies that exist through the critical enabling 
infrastructure. These failures have the potential to affect the coordination of 
recovery activities and delay the recovery effort in general. Respondents also 
mentioned that for certain infrastructures such as energy and ICT systems, the 
frequency at which they provide services for the functioning of other 
infrastructures can affect the recovery effort if it is going to be interrupted even 
for a short period of time.  
 
RQ3- How can the disruptive effects of elements of infrastructures 
interdependencies be minimized or reduced during the recovery effort?  
In Organisation 2’s recovery context, several suggestions were provided by 
respondents, aimed at overcoming infrastructure interdependencies issues. 
Respondents recommended having an effective disaster management plan in 
place, which will incorporate recovery activities that are prioritised based on the 
functions of infrastructures that are critical enablers of other dependent 
infrastructures. Respondents also recommended the use of recovery plans for 
pre-emptive disconnection of ICT and energy infrastructures since these are 
constantly needed for the recovery of other infrastructures. Most respondents 
also highlighted the need for effective collaboration among infrastructure 
providers and organisations involved in disaster recovery across the region. Such 
collaboration should be driven by regular communication and involve the sharing 
of information though regular joint meetings across these organisations before 
and after a disaster. Respondents suggested that each infrastructure provider 
should implement alternative means of providing resources to other 
infrastructures in case severe damages are experienced by their own 
infrastructure.  
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6.5 CASE STUDY (3)  
6.5.1 Organisation’s Profile  
Organisation 3 was established in 2008 after the amalgamation three 
former Shire Councils. Organisation 3 supervises the Bundaberg regional area of 
approximately 6450 km2 with an estimated population of 89,810. The area is 
surrounded by 100 km of coastline that extends from Baffle Creek in the north 
part of the region to Theodolite Creek in the south part of the region. The region 
is generally subject to unpredictable weather patterns which generally result in 
frequent cyclonic and flooding conditions. Potential risk of flooding comes 
essentially from the Burnett River and two major dams of concern; Paradise Dam 
and Monduran Dam. Excessive peaks recorded at the Burnett River between 
2010 and 2011 resulted in major floods around the region, which severely 
affected infrastructures and destroyed numerous properties (approx.300 houses 
in total). Six respondents, including General Managers (G31, G32), Disaster 
Recovery Coordinators (D31, D32), and Project Managers (P31, and P32), were 
interviewed to provide insights on the recovery efforts of Organisation 3 after the 
2010/11 floods. These respondents (G31, G32, D31, D32, P31, and P32) revealed that 
after a disaster, Organisation 3 uses its Local Disaster Management Plan (LDMP) 
to ensure that there is adequate coordination and implementation of recovery 
activities. However, the LDMP currently in place does not provide guidelines 
on how to minimize or reduce the effects of infrastructure interdependencies 
during post-disaster recovery (G31, G32, D31, D32, P31, and P32).  The profile of Case 
Study (3) is shown in Table 6.4 below.  
Table 6.3: Case Study (3)’s profile 
CASE STUDY (3) 
Industry Sector Local Regional Council from rural flood prone areas 
Project 
Description 
-The 2010/11 Queensland floods recovery  
-$709, 200 cost of devastation repair 
Recovery 
Approach  
Disaster management plan consistent with the Disaster 
Management Act 2003 for floods events 
Recovery Sub-
Committees 
-Community Recovery  
-Economic Recovery  
-Infrastructure and building Recovery  
-Environmental Recovery  
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Informant Roles -General Managers (G31, G32),  
-Disaster Recovery Coordinators (D31, D32),  
-Project Managers (P31, P32) 
All with more than 10 years of field experience 
Critical 
Infrastructures  
-Transport: two road bridges and a rail bridge, the Isis 
Highway, the North Coast Railway, the Goodwood road  











6.5.2 Recovery Approach for Infrastructure Interdependencies  
Decision making  
Data revealed that local government is directly involved in the post-disaster 
recovery in Queensland. According to respondents (G31, G32), the decision making 
body of Organisation 3 is the Local Disaster Management Group (LDMG), which 
coordinates and manages the recovery activities at the local disaster coordination 
centre (LDCC). Some of the objectives of the LDMG include detailing the disaster 
management structure for the region; providing guidelines for disaster 
preparedness, prevention, response and recovery; as well as providing special 
procedures to cope with identified problems (D31, D32, P31, and P32). When the 
recovery effort is beyond the LDMG’s capacity, the District Disaster Management 
Group (DDMG), which is chaired by Queensland Police Services (QPS), becomes 
involved (D31, D32). Then the state government takes over the recovery effort 
when it goes beyond the DDMG’s capacity (D31, D32, and P31). From respondents’ 
perspectives, issues related to infrastructure interdependencies were discussed 
informally among infrastructure providers in the field (G31, G32, D31, D32, P31, and 
P32). Respondents revealed that these meetings comprised a total of 19 
representatives from various organisations including infrastructure providers as 
well as district and state government representatives, as shown in Table 6.5 and 
figure 6.3.  
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Table 6.4: LDMG members and positions 
LDMG Members and Positions 
6 representatives of Organisation 3: 
o Mayor and Deputy Mayor 
o CEO 
o Division 2 Councillor + Division 3 Councillor 
o Disaster Management Officer 
3 representatives of Queensland Police Service (QPS): 
o District Disaster Coordinator 
o District Disaster Management 
o Officer in Charge 
4 representatives of State Emergency Services (SES): 
o SES Local Controllers 
2 representatives of Queensland Fire Emergency Services (QFES): 
o Area Inspector 
o Inspector 
1 representative from Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS) 
1 representative Queensland Health 
1 Representative Ergon Energy 
1 representative from Telstra 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Disaster management structure followed by Organisation 3 
 
Prioritization  
Respondent (P32) mentioned that “the 2011 flood was an enormous event 
which affected quite a large area and resulted in the isolation of the community”. In 
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this regard, the 2011 recovery activities were prioritised according to the funding 
arrangement established by the state government through Queensland 
Reconstruction Authority (QRA) (G32, D32, P31, and P32). Organisation 3 was 
required to provide evidence of meeting eligibility criteria from the Natural 
Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA) guidelines in order to 
receive funding for recovery (D31, D32, P31, and P32). “All the recovery works being 
performed in the region were funded through the council, which received funding 
from Queensland Reconstruction Authority (QRA) in compliance with the NDRRA. 
The work was funded for the recovery activity that was considered to be eligible. 
The council had to apply for funding through NDRRA, gets QRA’s approval and then 
go on and do the work” (D32). 
Respondents (P31, and P32) explained that eligibility for recovering roads 
infrastructure was granted once visual assessments (including photos of 
damaged infrastructures) along with a series of tests were performed and then 
submitted to QRA. According to respondent (P32), “the deflection of the roads was 
measured to provide sufficient evidence that the road was damaged. Even if cars 
and trucks could still use a road, a series of test was performed to determine the 
strength capability of the road and how much the road has deflected.” According to 
respondents (P31, and P32), it was all about showing that there was a need for 
NDRRA funding to restore the damaged infrastructure. Therefore to a large 
extent, funding availability guided prioritisation of recovery activities.  
 




Respondents revealed that after the 2011 floods, major roads were 
inundated and this affected the supply of resources from road infrastructure 
systems to water infrastructure systems (G31, G32, D31, D32, P31, and P32). However, 
most respondents considered the recovery after the floods as being successful 
(D31, D32, P31, and P32). According to respondent (D31), initially there was a two 
year recovery program, however following the 2011 floods, most essential 
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recovery activities were completed approximately 8 to 9 months after the event. 
For instance, electricity was restored 3 days after the floods and water and 
wastewater infrastructures were rehabilitated within a couple of weeks (D31, 
D32). This indicated that the recovery effort was completed ahead of schedule 
(G31, G32, D31, D32, P31, and P32).  
 
  
Figure 6.11: Physical interdependencies between roads and energy, and roads 
and water system 
 
There were minimal impacts from electricity outages on infrastructure 
systems such as water systems across Organisation 3’s regional boundaries (D31, 
D32). According to respondents (D31, D32), “the sewerage treatment plants at 
Millbank and East Bundaberg continued to function even without electricity and 
the rest of the systems could be restored more efficiently once electricity was 
running and the floods subsided. This was essentially due to preventive actions 
performed by water providers and distributors”. Therefore, this indicates that to a 
certain extent, the unavailability of an infrastructure does not always affect the 
functioning of other infrastructures, particularly when efficient preparedness 
and preventive measures are implemented in advance to operate infrastructures 
after disasters (D31, D32). Respondents also revealed that some roads were 
restored within a short period of time after the floods, due to the use of 
alternative transportation modes such as helicopters to supply resources to 
inundated areas during recovery (G31, G32, D31, D32, P31, and P32). Although 
Water 
Delivery and 
transportation of fuel and 
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damages of road systems resulted in cascading failures, failures did not escalate 
across interdependent infrastructures (G31, G32, D31, D32, P31, and P32).  
 
Reliability  
Respondents (P31, P32) revealed that energy systems were the most reliable 
infrastructures after the 2011 floods. Data revealed that in 2007, a sub-station was 
built on Walla Street which is a flood-prone area. However, essential services were 
built above the defined flood level of 8.5 metres. When floodwaters began to enter 
the substation’s yard in December 2010, electricity providers disconnected 
electricity, preserving the infrastructure. Three days later, on 1 January 2011 
electricity was restored in the region having minimal impacts on other 
interdependent infrastructures (P32). According to respondents, preventive 
measures taken by electricity providers and distributors prior to the 2011 floods 
contributed to maintain its reliability after the disaster (P31, P32). Therefore, 
according to respondents (P31, P32), when appropriate preventive and 
preparedness measures are implemented before disasters, this increases 
reliability of interdependent infrastructures and minimizes their impacts on the 
recovery efforts of other infrastructures (P31, P32).  
 
Transferability  
Some respondents mentioned difficulties in communicating and sharing 
information among disaster management groups during meetings organised at 
the Local Disaster Coordination Centre (LDCC) (D31, D32). According to 
respondents (D31, D32), local and district management groups used different 
terminologies when providing information and this caused great confusion in 
understanding critical information being disseminated during recovery. 
However, these respondents also highlighted that issues such as these were 
considered to be minimal in comparison to transferability issues induced by 
roads, bridges and rail system damages (D31, D32). After the 2011 floods, there 
were difficulties in accessing flooded areas to provide resources and assistance 
across the region because most of the roads, bridges and rail lines across the 
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region were inundated and damaged by the floods (D31, D32). Respondents 
revealed that major recovery efforts across the region could only start once these 
infrastructures were rehabilitated (D31, D32). Therefore, this indicates that the 
transferability of both physical and virtual resources plays an important role in 
starting the recovery process of critical infrastructures (D31, D32).  
 
6.5.4 Impacts of the degrees of interdependency on post-disaster 
recovery 
Types of Interactions  
The types of interactions between critical infrastructures had minimal 
impacts on the recovery effort implemented by Organisation 3 after the 2011 
floods (G31, G32, P31, and P32). Most respondents mentioned that their 
interdependency issues were minimised due to effective preparedness and 
mitigation measures (G31, G32, P31, and P32). Few respondents indicated that 
sufficient recovery funding played any significant role in speeding-up the 
restoration of damaged infrastructures after the floods (D31 and P32).  
 
Frequency of Exchange  
Respondents (D31, D32, P31, and P32) recognised the need of having constant 
access to transport systems in order to facilitate the supply of resources during 
recovery. However after the 2011 floods, respondents (D31, D32, P31, and P32) 
revealed that the frequency of exchange of services across infrastructures had 
little impact on the recovery process of most infrastructures. These respondents 
explained that when an infrastructure was unable to provide resources, they had 
to acquire resources from other infrastructures and sources (D31, D32, P31, and 
P32). According to respondents (D31, D32), the focus during recovery was to obtain 
only the minimum required resources for the recovery and rehabilitation of 
damaged infrastructures. Some resources took quite a long to be delivered, while 
others took a short period to arrive (D31, D32). Nonetheless, sufficient resources 
were provided to recover most damaged infrastructures (D31, D32). 
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Critical Enabling Infrastructure  
Respondents described transport infrastructures, and particularly roads, as 
being critical enablers to energy and water infrastructures (D31, D32, P31, and P32). 
Some respondents also mentioned communication as being critical, however to 
these respondents, transport infrastructures were the most needed 
infrastructures during the 2011 post-disaster recovery. Without the fast 
rehabilitation of roads, recovery crews could not access damaged infrastructures 
and more importantly, could not receive resources to begin the recovery. This 
indicates that a critical enabling infrastructure can impede infrastructure 
availability, but also resources accessibility and transferability (D31, D32,).  
 
6.5.5 Summary 
This section provides a summary of how element of infrastructure 
interdependencies impeded the recovery effort implemented by Organisation 3 
after the 2010/11 floods. Recommendations on how to minimise the effects of 
infrastructure interdependencies during recovery have also been summarised in 
this section.  
 
RQ2 –How do elements of infrastructure interdependencies have the 
potential to affect the post-disaster recovery effort?  
Evidence from the recovery approach implemented by Organisation 3 after 
the 2011 floods, suggested that physical disruptions of road infrastructures 
affected the recovery effort on energy and water (including sanitation) 
infrastructures. Overall, respondents considered the recovery effort to be 
successful since restoration of most damaged infrastructures spanned over a 
relatively shorter period of time than what was initially expected. Respondents 
recognised that availability of infrastructures played a significant role in 
recovering interdependent systems; however it was considered that 
preparedness measures were the most critical for faster recovery. Respondents 
explained that alternative solutions for providing resources when infrastructures 
were damaged were put in place by most infrastructure providers before the 
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disaster. Although damages to road infrastructures cascaded to energy and water 
infrastructures, such damages did not escalate to greater failures since the 
recovery of these infrastructures was completed in a timely manner. There were 
strong interdependencies between transport and water infrastructures, as well 
as transport and energy infrastructure systems. Thus, there was rapid 
propagation of failures across these infrastructures, which resulted in cascading 
failures. Road infrastructures were critical enablers via their interdependent 
network with water and energy systems. However, recovery of these 
infrastructures was not entirely affected by roads. Other means of transportation 
were also used for the recovery of these infrastructures. Therefore, few 
interdependencies impacts resulted from reliability and transferability issues, or 
frequency of exchange of resources, since efficient preparedness and mitigation 
measures were implemented before and during recovery respectively.  
 
RQ3- How can the disruptive effects of elements of infrastructures 
interdependencies be minimized or reduced during the recovery effort?  
Respondents revealed that there were no guidelines in recovering 
interdependent infrastructures as well as minimizing their effects during 
recovery. Issues related to infrastructure interdependencies were discussed 
between infrastructure providers informally in the field. Thus, respondents 
recommended considering infrastructures interdependencies during disaster 
preparedness, prevention, response and recovery. Some respondents suggested 
keeping a written record of the various interdependencies that exist across 
critical infrastructures before disasters occur and incorporating this information 
into existing disaster management plans. To most respondents, there is strong 
economical interdependency among critical infrastructures that guides the 
recovery effort. Thus, respondents recommended that providing sufficient 
recovery funding to local government would speed up the recovery effort of 
interdependent infrastructures. Respondents highlighted that funding for 
betterment would enable the rebuilding of stronger infrastructures, thus 
minimising the interdependency issues that might occur after a disaster.  
 
Chapter 6-Within-case analysis  
Erica Mulowayi 205 
6.6 CASE STUDY (4)  
6.6.1 Organisation’s Profile  
Organisation 4 is the seventh largest regional council among the 73 councils 
located in Queensland, Australia. The council was formed in March 2008 after the 
amalgamation of seven local councils. In 2011, Organisation 4 accounted for 3.7% 
of Queensland’s population and its regional boundaries covered a large rural area 
of approximately 12,973 km2. Major creeks including Gowrie Creek and its three 
tributaries; East Creek, West Creek and Black Gully drain Organisation 4’s areas, 
causing a high risk of flooding to the region. December 2010 and January 2011 
were considered to be the wettest months in 68 years. Where North Toowoomba 
recorded 544 millimetres of rainfall; East Toowoomba 517 millimetres; 
Pittsworth 434 millimetres; Yarraman 332 millimetres; Crows Nest 307 
millimetres; Millmerran 325 millimetres and Oakey 304 millimetres rainfall in 
total. Toowoomba receives much of its water from the Cooby, Perseverance and 
Cressbrook dams. The profile of the organisation is provided in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5: Case Study (4)’s profile 
CASE STUDY (4) 
Industry Sector Local Regional Council from rural flood prone areas 
Project Description -The 2010/11 Queensland floods recovery  
-$40 to $50 million cost of devastation repair 
Recovery Approach  Disaster management plan consistent with the Disaster 





-Human and Social Recovery 
-Roads and Transport 
Informant Roles -General Managers (G41, G42),  
-Disaster Recovery Coordinators (D41, D42),  
-Project Managers (P41, and P42) 




-Transport including major road networks of the Warrego, 
New England and the Gore Highways   
-Water (including Sanitation), 
-Energy,  
-Telecommunications (ICT) 
Damaging state of 
CIs 
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Respondents revealed that Organisation 4’s Local Disaster Management 
Plan (LDMP) was implemented in 2009 (G41, G42, D41, D42, P41, and P42). However, 
it was in mid-2010 that the LDMP was eventually distributed to the Local Disaster 
Coordination Centre (LDCC) to be approved by the Local Disaster Management 
Group (LDMG) (G41, G42, D41, D42, P41, and P42). The LDMG comprised a total of 18 
members as shown in Table 6.5. Respondents explained that Organisation 4 was 
well prepared and took the necessary steps to face the 2011 floods (G41, G42). Data 
revealed that regular meetings took place with 9 representatives from 
Organisation 4, along with representatives from Queensland Ambulance Service 
(QAS), Queensland Police Service (QPS), Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, 
Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ), Telstra, etc. During those meetings, 
a number of simulation exercises, software and communication tests were 
conducted with these organisations in preparation for future disasters (G41, G42, 
D41, and D42). Thus when the 2011 floods occurred, Organisation 4 activated its 
LDMG and the coordination centre ensured that the recovery coordination was 
adequately implemented to overcome the impacts from the floods (G41, G42, D41, 
D42, P41, and P42). However, respondents mentioned that the LDMP did not 
directly include recovery of infrastructure interdependencies in the disaster 
management plan (G41, G42). Respondents revealed that to a certain extent, 
interdependency issues were discussed during meetings organised at the 
coordination centre (G41, G42, D41, D42, P41, and P42). Table 6.6 summarises the 
profile of the organisation. 
 
 
Table 6.6: LDMG members and positions 
LDMG Members and Positions 
9 representatives from Organisation 4: 
o Mayor  
o Two Councillors 
o Local Disaster Coordinator (LDC) 
o CEO  
o General Manager Infrastructure Services 
o Manager Environmental Health Services 
o Coordinator Disaster Management  
1 representatives from Queensland State Emergency Service (QSES): 
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o Local Controller 
1 representatives from Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS): 
o Officer in charge  
1 representatives from Queensland Fire Emergency Services (QFES): 
o Area Commander 
1 representatives from Queensland Police Services (QPS): 
o Officer in charge of police division 
2 representatives of Queensland Fire Emergency Services (QFES): 
o Area Inspector 
o Inspector 
1 representative from Ergon Energy: 
o Area Operation Manager  
1 representative from Queensland Health Services: 
o Director Emergency Department  
1 representative from Telstra: 
o Business Development  
1 Representative from ABC Radio: 
o Southern QLD Regional Content Manager 
1 representative from Transport and Main Roads (TMR): 
o Senior Program Officer 
 
 
6.6.2 Recovery Approach for Infrastructure Interdependencies  
Decision making  
The primary decision making body for recovery in Organisation 4 is the 
LDMG (G41, G42, D41, D42, P41, and P42) at local disaster management level. Data 
revealed that the LDMG acted as a single point of coordination to direct 
emergency services after the 2011 floods. Respondents revealed that the LDMG 
established an operational support group chaired by a chief executive officer to 
monitor recovery activities and ensure sufficient resources were deployed to 
disaster affected areas (D41, D42). Due to the unexpectedness of the floods, regular 
meetings were organised daily by the LDMG with the operational group and 
external stakeholders (D41, D42). According to respondents, the coordination 
centre remained opened 24/7 and infrastructure providers as well as state and 
local government lead agencies met twice a day to discuss recovery issues 
encountered at the time (D41, D42, P41, and P42). Some respondents also mentioned 
that Organisation 4 ensured that the community was well informed about road 
closures and other issues related to recovery procedures through media releases 
and radio (D41, D42, and P41). Overall, according to respondents (G41, G42, D41, D42, 
Chapter 6-Within-case analysis  
Erica Mulowayi 208 
P41, and P42), Organisation 4 was well prepared and organised to deal with the 
upcoming floods. There was effective collaboration ongoing within both 
Organisation 4 and with the community, as well as with district and state 
government bodies, which minimized issues related to infrastructure 
interdependencies. Respondents highlighted that most of the challenges and 
issues encountered during the recovery period occurred due to the unexpected 
nature of the 2011 natural disaster (G41, G42, D41, D42, P41, and P42).  
 
Prioritization 
Respondents revealed that the immediate response to the 2011 floods was 
directly handled by the Queensland Police Services (QPS) and Queensland Fire 
and Rescue Service (QFRS) (G41, G42, D41, D42, P41, and P42). It was not until 
September 2011 that Organisation 4 was involved in the recovery effort (G41, G42, 
D41, D42, P41, and P42). The 2011 floods recovery rapidly exceeded Organisation 
4’s capacity, and thus district and state government inputs were needed to 
overcome the many challenges encountered during that time (G41, G42, D41, D42, 
P41, and P42). According to respondents (D41, D42, P41, and P42), prioritization of 
recovery activities was performed under the Natural Disaster Relief and 
Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA) guidelines established by the state 
government. The NDRRA used a value-for-money (VFM) delivery strategy, where 
each infrastructure would be recovered according solely to its individual cost of 
repair (G41, G42). Organisation 4 had to prove that a specific infrastructure needed 
to be recovered based on the NDRRA guidelines. Also, the recovery effort would 
be prioritised to fit the NDRRA guidelines in order for Organisation 4 to be 
approved and receive funding for recovery (D41, D42, P41, and P42). Respondent 
explained:  
“For the recovery of roads systems, we performed a lot tests in different places 
to actually show that they were eligible to be paved under the NDRRA. In some 
places we measured the deflection to prove that the road is damaged. When cars 
and trucks could still use the roads, we had to show that the strength of the road 
was deteriorated and determine how much the road could deflect before we have to 
work on it” (D42).  
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Therefore prioritisation of recovery activities depended entirely on 
funding, not necessarily on the types of interdependencies (G41, G42). In fact, data 
revealed that Organisation 4 could not meet its recovery program if it did not 
outsource funding externally outside of the NDRRA (G41). Organisation 4 had 
limited funding to internally deliver and complete the work on time and some of 
recovery elements such as labour expenses were not refundable by the NDRRA 
(G41).  
 




According to respondents (P41 and P42), the 2011 floods severely affected 
availability of transport infrastructure systems including roads and rail systems 
in Toowoomba. Most of the roads were flooded and severe weather prevented 
helicopters from flying into the region (P41 and P42). According to respondents 
(D41, D42), “Toowoomba’s Emu Creek Road crossing was completely destroyed by 
the 2011 floods after the culverts were severely damaged with the floods. There was 
a need for culverts’ reinstatement and the road causeway to be rebuilt across the 
creek. This kept the road closed for approximately 14 months.” Additionally, the rail 
connection at Spring Bluff and the Western Rail Link were severely damaged by 
the floods (P41, P42). The line transported about 100 trains each week, carrying 
nearly 200,000 tonnes of freight including coal, grain, livestock and general 
freight to towns all the way out to Quilpie and Dirranbandi (P41, P42). Respondents 
mentioned that there were difficulties in accessing flooded areas to provide 
assistance for the recovery of damaged water and wastewater infrastructures 
across the region (P41 and P42). However, respondents (D41, D42) explained that 
although damages of roads and rails significantly impeded the recovery of water 
and wastewater infrastructures, the lack of funding also prevented the recovery 
of these interdependent infrastructures to restart (G41, G42). According to 
respondents (G41, G42), damage to roads and traffic infrastructures were 
estimated at $48 million while water and wastewater infrastructures cost $4.6 
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million of damages. Thus, as much as infrastructure availability has the potential 
to impede the recovery effort of interdependent infrastructures, lack of financial 
resources can also significantly impede the post-disaster recovery (G41, G42).  
Physical disruptions of roads and rail infrastructures seriously impeded the 
recovery effort of interdependent infrastructures such as water and sanitation 
infrastructures. Interdependencies between transport and water infrastructures 
were considered to be loose as failures from these infrastructures propagated 
slowly until they resulted in greater failures across the region. Respondents 
measured the impact of these damages based on a function of the cost of 
recovering each infrastructure. It appears that for Organisation 4, although 
infrastructures availability and reliability, as well as resources transferability 
were critical factors to successful recovery, financial interdependency had a 
much greater impact on the post-disaster recovery effort. Failures that escalated 
from transport infrastructures to other infrastructures had significant impact on 
the economy of the entire region.  
 
 
Figure 6.12: Geographical interdependency between transport systems such as 
roads and rails with water including wastewater systems 
 
Reliability  
Respondents mentioned that ICT systems were the most reliable 
infrastructure in providing resources to other interdependent infrastructures 
Shipping of resources
Access to resources 
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during recovery (D41, P42). According to respondent (D41), “mitigation measures 
implemented by Organisation 4 after the 2011 disasters maintain ICT reliability 
throughout the entire recovery period.” Data revealed that Organisation 4 issued 
a number of media releases and regularly contacted and informed the community 
and other infrastructure providers about issues related to roads and building 
closures, as well as recovery activities (D41, P42). This indicates that effective 
mitigation measures contribute to maintaining reliability between 
interdependent infrastructures after a disaster (D41, P42).  
Respondents also measured reliability based on how long it took to restore 
the damaged infrastructure in order to provide necessary resources to other 
interdependent infrastructures (D41, P 42). According to respondent (D41), the rail 
connections at Spring Bluff and the Western Rail Link, were restored three 
months ahead of schedule (D41, P 42). Although damages to the transport 
infrastructure affected approximately 260 sites, the recovery of interdependent 
infrastructures generally allowed them to re-start and be completed in a timely 
manner (D41, P42). Respondents mentioned that an infrastructure which is unable 
to operate is not necessarily unreliable, as long as interdependencies with other 
infrastructures are restored within a short period of time (D41, P42). Respondents 
revealed that infrastructure reliability can only affect the post-disaster recovery 
when the functioning of other infrastructures is affected by their unavailability 
and unreliability (D41, P42).  
 
Transferability  
Issues related to the transfer of resources after the 2011 floods were mainly 
those related to transport infrastructures (G41, G42). However respondents 
mentioned that during the 2011 post-disaster recovery, Organisation 4 provided 
alternative ways of transferring and accessing resources (G41, G42). For instance, 
immediately after the destruction of Toowoomba’s Emu Creek Road crossing, 
Organisation 4 provided a detour to the New England Highway to access Crow’s 
Nest areas where infrastructure providers and the community could access 
resources and health services (G41, G42). Additionally, even when the detour 
became inaccessible due to heavy rain, Organisation 4 provided a second detour 
Chapter 6-Within-case analysis  
Erica Mulowayi 212 
crossing closer to the original damaged crossing to minimise disruption to 
residents by cutting down transit times (G41, G42). Therefore, effective mitigation 
measures during recovery reduced issues related to resources transferability 
(G41, G42). 
 
6.6.4 Impacts of the degrees of interdependency on post-disaster 
recovery 
Types of Interactions  
From respondents’ perspectives, challenges encountered by Organisation 4 
were primarily those related to restoring physical interactions across roads, rails 
and water including wastewater systems (D41, P42). There were minimal impacts 
from ICT systems that affected cyber interactions across interdependent 
infrastructures (D41, P42). Respondents recognised that the driving force in 
maintaining interactions between interdependent infrastructures was mostly 
due to the policies and regulations implemented by Organisation 4 (D41, P42). 
According to respondents (D41, P42), logical interdependency through human 
decisions and collaborative effort played a significant role in maintaining 
interactions between infrastructures and restoring their interdependencies.  
 
Frequency of Exchange  
Respondents (G41, G42, and D41) mentioned that Organisation 4 ensured that 
constant collaboration between infrastructures providers was maintained 
throughout the recovery effort and this allowed resources to be exchanged 
frequently across critical infrastructures. Organisation 4 was well aware of the 
most critical enabling infrastructures within its interdependent networks before 
disasters occurred and as such preventive actions were quickly implemented to 
maintain the exchange of resources between infrastructures (G41, G42, and D41). 
With efficient preparedness measures, the frequency of exchange of resources 
did not impede the recovery effort (G41, G42, and D41). These preparedness 
measures proved to be essential in minimising issues related to infrastructure 
interdependencies during recovery period (G41, G42, and D41).  
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Critical Enabling Infrastructure  
The critical enabling infrastructure for Organisation 4 was considered to be 
ICT infrastructure systems (G41, G42, and D41). Respondents mentioned that after 
the 2011 floods, there was an urgent need to communicate with infrastructure 
providers and the community in order to keep them informed about the recovery 
processes (G41, G42, and D41). Respondents revealed that “it was very hard to 
actually know what was going on in flooded areas where community were isolated.” 
Thus, ICT systems were needed to begin and guide the recovery effort. This 
indicates that the critical enabling infrastructure plays a significant role in the 
management and coordination of recovery activities (G41, G42, and D41).  
 
6.6.5 Summary 
A summary of data analysis for Organisation 4 is provided in this section. 
Data was analysed to provide insights on how elements of infrastructure 
interdependencies have the potential to impede the recovery effort and how their 
impacts could be minimised during post-disaster recovery. A summary of the 
analysis is depicted in this section.  
 
RQ2 –How do elements of infrastructure interdependencies have the 
potential to affect the post-disaster recovery effort?  
Physical disruptions of roads and rail infrastructures significantly impeded 
the recovery effort of interdependent infrastructures such as water and 
sanitation infrastructures. Interdependencies between transport and water 
infrastructures were considered to be loose, as failures from these 
infrastructures propagated slowly until it resulted in greater failures across the 
region. Respondents measured the impact of these damages based on the cost of 
recovering each infrastructure. It appears that for Organisation 4, infrastructures 
availability and reliability, as well as resources transferability were critical 
factors to successful recovery; but financial interdependency had greater impact 
on the post-disaster recovery effort.  
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The recovery of water including wastewater infrastructures was affected by 
damages to transport infrastructures. This indicates that transport 
infrastructures such as roads were less reliable during the 2011 floods recovery. 
Organisation 4 used alternatives ways to minimise the impacts of transport 
infrastructures on other interdependent infrastructures. Alternative detours 
were used to receive and supply resources to water and wastewater 
infrastructures, thus demonstrating that Organisation 4 was relatively well-
prepared to face the challenges of the 2011 disasters. Organisation 4’s recovery 
effort was entirely guided and coordinated by policies and regulations.  
 
RQ3- How can the disruptive effects of elements of infrastructures 
interdependencies be minimized or reduced during the recovery effort?  
Respondents recognised that issues related to cyber disruptions were 
minimised due to the preparedness measures put in place by Organisation 4 prior 
the occurrence of disasters. To respondents, the success in maintaining 
interactions between interdependent infrastructures was mostly due to 
Organisation 4’s policies and regulatory strategies used to coordinate the 
recovery effort. Hence, most of the respondents recommended incorporating 
infrastructure interdependencies into existing guidelines and standards. 
Respondents also mentioned the need for sufficient betterment funding to guide 
the recovery effort of critical infrastructures. Collaborative efforts among critical 
infrastructure providers, including the community, also contributed to 
implementing effective recovery efforts and as such, respondents suggested 
continuing with such an approach.  
 
6.7 SUMMARY 
The within-case analysis performed in this study allowed the researcher to 
be completely immersed into each case individually and discover how 
organisations dealt with the various impacts of interdependency on post-disaster 
recovery. Data obtained from the interviews were used to reveal how intrinsic 
aspects of the types of interdependencies including physical and cyber 
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disruptions affected the recovery process of critical infrastructures after the 
2010/11 Queensland floods. Data also focused on how the degrees of 
interdependencies including the strong and loose connections between critical 
infrastructures can affect the recovery process of CIs. The qualitative analysis 
performed in this chapter revealed which patterns support, refute or expand on 
the initial propositions made by the conceptual framework in Chapter 3. 
Propositions on how the types of interdependencies have the potential to induce 
cascading or escalating failures across infrastructures were revealed and the 
ways in which failures would propagate across infrastructures according to their 
degrees of interdependencies, were also described.  
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Chapter 7: CROSS-CASE 
ANALYSIS 
7.1 OVERVIEW 
The within-case analysis conducted in the preceding chapter investigated 
how elements of infrastructure interdependencies have the potential to impede 
the recovery effort. The analysis provided the opportunity to become familiar 
with each case individually and to understand how organisations involved in the 
recovery of large infrastructure systems dealt with the various interdependency 
issues encountered during post-disaster recovery. A cross-case analysis was 
performed with the same data that was used in the within-case analysis to find 
common similarities and differences between the four case studies. Data was 
investigated from different perspectives to reveal emerging patterns and ideas 
that enriched research questions (RQ2 and RQ3): 
RQ2: How do elements of infrastructure interdependencies impede the 
post-disaster recovery effort? 
RQ3: How can the disruptive effects of elements of infrastructure 
interdependency be reduced or minimized during recovery period? 
Procedures used to perform the cross-case analysis were explained 
previously in Chapter 4, section 4.6.3 and are reiterated in Section 7.2 of Chapter 
7. Research question (RQ2) is investigated in Sections 7.3 and 7.4. Section 7.3 
focuses on how the types of interdependencies affect the recovery effort, while 
Section 7.4 describes the effects of the degrees of interdependencies on the post-
disaster recovery effort. Section 7.5 provides answers to research question (RQ3) 
and examines how the various impacts of interdependencies can be minimized 
or reduced during the recovery period.  
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7.2 CROSS-CASE PROCEDURES 
Similarities and differences found across the four case studies were used to 
provide more robust and accurate results to the research questions. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the cross-case analysis followed a replication logic or 
pattern matching approach, where data from the four cases was examined 
simultaneously. A comparison was performed between theories that emerged 
from the analysis of data and previous theoretical constructs derived from the 
literature review and the exploratory pilot study. The comparison was performed 
in an iterative way to verify if commonalities and distinctions found among the 
cases confirmed or refuted the initial hypotheses made in the conceptual 
framework provided in Chapter 3. QSR International NVivo 10 software was used 
to compare data and verify that the emergent theories or ideas fit with the 
evidence from each case study. The queries performed in QSR International 
NVivo 10 software involved coding, matrices, text search, numeral counts, as well 
as theoretical annotations and memos. When emerging theories across the cases 
refuted the hypotheses, an explanation building technique was used to justify the 
discordance, avoiding premature or false conclusions from cross-case analysis. 
Key distinctions and commonalities from the case studies led to the development 
of tables, which displayed data related to what was perceived to be the resulting 
impacts of infrastructure interdependencies on the post-disaster recovery.  
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Figure 7.2: Explanation building process 
 
7.3 IMPACTS OF THE TYPES OF INTERDEPENDENCIES  
This section synthesizes the analysis from Case Study (1), (2), (3) and (4) to 
answer RQ2: How do elements of infrastructure interdependencies – such as the 
types of interdependency – impede the post-disaster recovery effort?  
Findings from the literature review performed in Chapter 3 indicated that 
elements of interdependencies such as the types of interdependencies including 
physical, cyber and geographical have the potential to impede the recovery effort 
of critical infrastructures. Physical interdependency is the reciprocal relationship 
that exists through the sharing of physical services across critical infrastructures. 
Cyber interdependency is formed through the mutual exchange of information 
and communication between infrastructure systems. Finally, geographical 
interdependency is due to critical infrastructures being located at close proximity 
to one another.  
The exploratory pilot study performed in Chapter 5 revealed that large 
interdependent infrastructure systems tend to fail mostly due to physical and 
cyber disruptions induced by the lack of resources transferability, as well as by 
the lack of infrastructure's availability and reliability. Availability is viewed as the 
level of functioning to which a critical infrastructure needs to be found in order 
to maintain its interdependency with others infrastructures. Reliability is the 
probability that an infrastructure will still be available to provide resources or 













Step 1 Step 3 Step 2 Step 4 
Repeat the steps in iterative mode 
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Transferability means that the conveyance or delivery of resources or services 
from one infrastructure to another will continue to operate. 
Numerical counts in combination with matrix queries were performed to 
analyse the data generated from the case studies’ interviews in order to identify 
how the lack of infrastructure’s availability and reliability, as well as resources 
transferability have the potential to impede the recovery effort. The process was 
previously depicted in Chapter 4, in section 4.6.7. The cross-case analysis 
revealed that 15 remarks from the interviewees indicate that infrastructure 
availability play a significant role in maintaining interdependencies among 
critical infrastructures such as water (including sanitation), energy, transport 
and ICT. The unavailability of an infrastructure can affect the functioning and 
recovery of others infrastructures and can result in cascading and escalating 
failures across interdependent infrastructures. 10 remarks suggested that 
infrastructure reliability is closely linked to infrastructure availability. Without 
availability, an infrastructure cannot be considered reliable. Thus, in the same 
way that availability can impede the recovery effort by generating cascading and 
escalating failures, reliability will also have the same impacts on the post-disaster 
recovery. Only 5 remarks suggested that access to resources and services was 
essential to begin the recovery effort and recover and rehabilitate damaged 
infrastructures.  
Although data from the interviews indicate that there were distinct views 
on the level of impact to which infrastructure availability, reliability, and 
resources transferability affected the recovery effort of interdependent 
infrastructure systems, overall there was strong evidence that these elements 
have the potential to induce cascading and escalating failures across 
interdependent infrastructures. Data revealed that infrastructure unavailability 
would have a high impact on the recovery effort of interdependent 
infrastructures. Moderate evidence from data reveals that the lack of 
infrastructure reliability and resources transferability would also affect the 
recovery effort of interdependent infrastructures. Some of the remarks stipulated 
by respondents have been provided in Table 7.1. Respondents were represented 
in the table with the codes that were assigned to them in Chapter 6. Table 7.1 
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shows that some respondents expressed two views with regards to 
infrastructure availability, reliability and resources transferability. For instance, 
respondents D31, D32 mentioned that infrastructure availability would have a high 
impact on the recovery effort of interdependent critical infrastructures. However, 
these impacts could be reduced or minimized when effective preparedness and 
preventive measures are put in place before disasters strike.  
 
Table 7.1: Remarks on the impacts of the types of interdependencies elements 
on post-disaster recovery 































 G12, D12, P11, P12, 
G21, G22, S21, S22, 
P21, P22, D31, D32, 
P31, G41, G42  
The unavailability of infrastructures also affects the 
accessibility to resources needed to begin the recovery effort. 
Infrastructure unavailability also has the potential to result 
in cascading failures across other interdependent 












 D31, D32 To a certain extent, the unavailability of an infrastructure 
does not always affect the functioning of other 
infrastructures, particularly when efficient preparedness and 
preventive measures are implemented in advance to operate 









 G41, G42 Although infrastructure availability has the potential to 
impede the recovery effort of interdependent infrastructure, 
lack of financial resources can significantly impede the post-






























 G11, G12, D11, D12, 
P11, P12, S21, S22, 
P21, and P22 
 
Infrastructure reliability is closely linked to infrastructure 
availability during recovery. Availability and reliability affect 
the recovery effort simultaneously; without infrastructure 












 D41, P42 An infrastructure which is unable to operate is not 
necessarily unreliable as long as interdependencies with 
others infrastructures are restored within a short period of 
time. 
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P31, P32, D41, P42: When appropriate preventive and preparedness measures 
are implemented before disasters, this increases reliability of 
interdependent infrastructures and minimize their impacts 
of the recovery efforts of other infrastructures.  
Effective mitigation measures contribute in maintaining 
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Without the supply or transfer of resources from one 
infrastructure to another, recovery would not begin.  
The incapacity to access and transfer resources in a timely 
manner can result in cascading and escalating failures, which 













 D31, D32 Transferability of both physical and virtual resources plays 











 G41, G42 Effective mitigation measures during recovery reduced issues 
related to resources transferability. 
 
Overall, elements of infrastructure interdependencies-including 
infrastructure availability, infrastructure reliability, and resources reliability- were 
found to have great influence on the post-disaster recovery effort of 
interdependent infrastructures.  
Proposition 7: The lack of infrastructure availability, infrastructure 
reliability and resources transferability have the potential to cause cascading and 
escalating failures of interdependent infrastructures, thus impeding their 
recovery efforts. 
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7.3.1 Infrastructure Availability  
Analysis of the interviews data across the four organisations (Organisation 
1, 2, 3 and 4) revealed that infrastructure availability is a critical success factor in 
recovering interdependent infrastructures from both physical and cyber 
disruptions. Four out of six respondents (G12, D12, P11, and P12) from Organisation 
1 reported that failure of an infrastructure system such as a road can cascade and 
escalate across several other infrastructure systems, affecting their recoveries. 
This pattern was found at Organisation 2, where all six respondents (G21, G22, S21, 
S22, P21, and P22) reported that the lack of communication and information can 
impede the coordination of recovery activities and result in cascading and 
escalating failures of others infrastructures. This indicates that for any types of 
interdependencies, whether physical, cyber or geographical, an infrastructure 
has to be available (or in a functioning state) to maintain its interrelationships 
with others infrastructures. Thus from Organisation 1 and 2’s perspectives, there 
is no interdependency if critical infrastructures are not available.  
This pattern was not entirely found in Organisation 3 and 4, which in fact 
mentioned that when efficient preparedness and preventive measures are 
implemented in advance, along with providing sufficient funding, the 
unavailability of one infrastructure will not always affect the recovery process of 
the other infrastructure. Four respondents (D31, D32, P31, and P32) explained that 
the recovery approach of Organisation 3 was successful due to various other 
transport alternatives other than roads systems which were put in place before 
disasters occurred. Two respondents (G41, G42) from Organisation 4 recognised 
that to a large extent, economical inputs have greater influence into the overall 
recovery effort, and with sufficient funding most interdependency issues can be 
minimized before disasters occur, as well as during recovery.  
Organisation 1, 2 and 3 indicated that an essential pre-requisite to begin the 
recovery effort is the presence of resources or services that contribute to the 
functioning and rehabilitation of an infrastructure. In several instances, 
respondents (G12, D12, P11, and P12) from Organisation 1 and respondents (G21, G22, 
S21, S22, P21, and P22) from Organisation 2 provided cases where the unavailability 
of an infrastructure also affected the supply of resources and services needed to 
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begin the recovery effort of others infrastructure systems. This indicates that 
infrastructure availability is measured in function of the infrastructure’s ability 
to fulfil its intended role within the interdependent network. These organisations 
highlighted that the roles of interdependent infrastructures consist of 
transferring or sharing resources that contribute not only to the functioning of 
other infrastructures, but also to their recoveries. This would contribute in to 
preventing failures from cascading and escalating from one infrastructure to 
another.  
 
 To the question of how elements of infrastructure interdependencies – 
such as infrastructure availability – impede the post-disaster recovery 
effort, two propositions have been provided:  
 
Proposition 8a: Infrastructure availability is critical in the recovery of 
infrastructures that are highly dependent on one another; Infrastructure 
availability can prevent failures to cascade and escalate across interdependent 
infrastructures. 
Proposition 8b: Infrastructure availability is likely to influence the transfer 
of resources needed to maintain interdependencies between critical 
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Table 7.2: Major remarks on the impacts of infrastructure availability on post-disaster recovery 
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7.3.2 Infrastructure Reliability  
Data from the within-case analysis indicated that cascading and escalating 
failures begin from the main infrastructure contributor or critical enabler before 
it extends to other critical infrastructures. In most cases, Organisation 1, 2, 3 and 
4 referred to the critical enabling infrastructure as being the most reliable 
infrastructure. Three out of six respondents (D11, D12, and P12) from Organisation 
1 revealed that infrastructure reliability is established before disasters occur 
then continues to increase or decrease after disasters. This pattern was found at 
Organisation 2, where three respondents (S21, S22, and P22) explained that 
infrastructures that were considered reliable before the 2011 Queensland floods, 
were also the ones on which infrastructures relied the most after disasters.  
All six respondents (G11, G12, D11, D12, P11, and P12) from Organisation 1 
associated infrastructure reliability to infrastructure availability during post-
disaster recovery. Three respondents (S21, S22, and P22) of Organisation 2 
explained that the most reliable infrastructure is the one that provides 
uninterrupted resources during recovery. These respondents reported that 
infrastructure availability is measured in function of its ability to provide services 
to others infrastructures during recovery. Hence, reliability is closely linked to 
infrastructures availability. Thus, the lack of infrastructure reliability would also 
affect the recovery in the same way that infrastructure availability affects the 
recovery effort. For both Organisation 1 and 2, an infrastructure which is 
considered unavailable is also unreliable.  
This pattern was not found in Organisation 4, where two respondents (D41, 
P42) indicated that infrastructures that are unable to operate are not necessarily 
unreliable, as long as their interdependencies are restored within a short period of 
time. Organisation 1 reported that after a disaster, reliability depends on the 
types of disasters and the extent of damages experienced by infrastructures. Two 
respondents (G11, P11) from Organisation 1 mentioned that it is only when 
damages of an infrastructure impede the recovery of others infrastructures that 
such infrastructure is considered to be unreliable. Thus, there has to be direct 
impacts on the functioning of others infrastructures to break reliability of an 
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infrastructure. In this regard, both Organisation 3 and 4 recommended to 
institute (or establish) strong reliable interdependencies through preventive and 
preparedness measures before disasters, and to implement effective mitigation 
measures during and after a disaster. Some remarks of respondents on how 
infrastructure reliability impedes the recovery effort are provided below:  
“Infrastructure reliability can only affect the post-disaster recovery when the 
functioning of others infrastructures is affected by its unavailability and its 
unreliability” (D41, P42) 
“The most reliable infrastructure is the one that provides uninterrupted 
resources during recovery. Reliability is closely linked to infrastructures well-
functioning or availability and its ability to provide services to others 
infrastructures” (S21, S22, and P22) 
“Infrastructure systems that are considered to be reliable before a disaster 
occur are also the ones from which most infrastructures relied on after a disaster” 
(S21, S22, and P22)  
 
 
 To the question of how elements of infrastructure interdependencies – 
such as infrastructure reliability – impede the post-disaster recovery 
effort, two propositions have been provided:  
 
Proposition 9a: Reliability is perceived through the extent of impacts that 
an infrastructure has on others infrastructures. 
Proposition 9b: Infrastructure reliability affects the post-disaster recovery 
in the same way that infrastructure availability would affect the recovery effort. 
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Table 7.3: Major remarks on the impacts of infrastructure reliability on post-disaster recovery 
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7.3.3 Resources Transferability  
An infrastructure needs resources to function under normal circumstances, 
however when damaged, it also needs resources that are necessary for its 
rehabilitation and recovery. Two respondents (G11, P11) from Organisation 1 
reported that the lack of resource transfer from one infrastructure to another 
would tremendously affect the recovery effort of damaged infrastructures. 
According to respondents (G11, P11) from Organisation 1, the incapacity to receive 
and to transfer resources in a timely manner can affect the recovery effort of a 
damaged infrastructure, which can in turn affect the recovery of others 
infrastructures and then result in cascading and escalating failures of various 
infrastructures. This pattern was also found in Organisation 2 and 3, where 
respondents (G21) and (D31, D32) indicated that the lack of both physical and cyber 
resources can affect the coordination of recovery activities and also delay the 
recovery effort of infrastructures. Respondents (G21, G22) from Organisation 2 
reported that the unavailability of an infrastructure will impede its resources 
production and without resources; there is no need for transfer, and 
interdependency would eventually fail. Thus, resources transferability is closely 
related to infrastructure availability. Respondents (G21, G22) previously 
mentioned that the most reliable infrastructure is the one that provides 
uninterrupted resources during recovery. Since infrastructure constant 
availability leads to its reliability, this demonstrates that resources 
transferability, infrastructure availability as well as infrastructure reliability take 
place in function of each other. This pattern was not found in Organisation 3, 
where two respondents (G41, G42) indicated that there are always alternative 
means to avoid that issues related to the transfer of resources affect 
infrastructure availability and infrastructure reliability and vice versa. According 
to these respondents, effective mitigation measures can reduce emerging issues 
related to resources transferability and those related to infrastructure 
availability and reliability.  
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 To the question of how elements of infrastructure interdependencies – 
such as infrastructure transferability – impede the post-disaster 
recovery effort, two propositions have been provided:  
 
Proposition 10a: The lack of resource transfer from one infrastructure to 
another would affect the recovery efforts of interdependent infrastructures. 
Proposition 10b: Issues related to resources transferability would also 
affect infrastructure availability and reliability, which in turn will affect the entire 
recovery effort.  
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Table 7.4: Major remarks on the impacts of resources transferability on post-disaster recovery 
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Low Impact High Impact Moderate
Impact








• > 60%: High impact from the lack 
of  infrastructure availability  
• > 40%: High impact should be 
expected from the lack of  
infrastructure reliability  
• >20%: High impact from the lack 
of resources transferability.  
Overall Results 
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7.4 IMPACTS OF THE DEGREES OF INTERDEPENDENCIES  
This section compares and combines the analysis from Organisation 1, 2, 3 
and 4 to answer RQ2: How do elements of infrastructure interdependencies –such 
as the degrees of interdependency – impede the post-disaster recovery effort?  
The degree of interdependency denotes the extent or intensity, to which 
interdependencies between critical infrastructures exist and are manifest 
(Rinaldi, et al., 2001; Ventura, García, & Martí, 2010). The literature review 
preformed in Chapter 3 revealed that the degrees to which infrastructures are 
interdependent, whether loose or tight, have the potential to impede the recovery 
effort of critical infrastructures. Loose interdependency is experienced when 
infrastructures are relatively interdependent of each other and the state of one is 
weakly correlated to the state of the other infrastructure (Rinaldi, et al., 2001; 
Ventura, et al., 2010). Tight interdependency is experienced when infrastructures 
are highly dependent on one another in every level (Rinaldi, et al., 2001; Ventura, et 
al., 2010). In Chapter 5, the exploratory study revealed that loose and tight 
interdependencies are manifest in various forms during recovery, including 
through the types of interactions that exist between critical infrastructures, the 
frequency at which these interactions take place, as well as according to the 
critical enabling infrastructure with which interactions take place.  
Matrix queries along with numerical counts were performed to identify 
how the types of interactions between infrastructures, the frequency at which 
resources or services are exchanged, as well as interactions with the critical 
enabler affect the recovery effort. A similar process to the one described in 
Chapter 4, in section 4.6.7 was followed. A comparison of the four cases revealed 
that 8 remarks from the interviewees indicate that the types of interactions 
dictate the propagation of failures across critical infrastructures. Respondents 
revealed that for infrastructures that are loosely interdependent, failures tend to 
propagate slowly across these infrastructures, whereas for tight or strong 
interdependencies, failures tend to propagate rapidly. 10 remarks from 
interviewees indicate that the frequency or rate at which infrastructures 
exchange resources or services does not directly affect the recovery effort. 12 
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remarks on the other hand, indicate that the inoperability of the critical enabling 
infrastructure can have significant impacts on the recovery process of several 
other interdependent infrastructures. Interviewees revealed that cascading and 
escalating failures tend to originate from the critical enablers of interdependent 
relationships and thus these infrastructures play a significant role in the 
management and coordination of recovery activities. 
Data revealed that the impacts of the degrees of interdependencies on the 
post-disaster recovery effort tend to be experienced once infrastructures are 
damaged. Although the extents of damages are unpredictable, tight and loose 
interdependencies can have high impacts on the recovery effort.  
 
Table 7.5: Remarks on the impacts of the degrees of interdependencies 
elements on post-disaster recovery 




































G12, G12, P11, and 
P12, S21, S22, P21, 
P22 
 
Rapid propagation of failures was experienced between 
energy and ICT systems. The strong interactions between 
energy and ICT infrastructures induced fast propagation of 
electricity outage, which affected communication channels. 
There was a slow propagation of failures from roads to 
sewerage systems across 65 sites in the region when 
damages from roads escalated to sewerage systems. 
Failures tend to propagate slowly for loosely 













 S21, S22, P21, P22 
 
Some of the issues relating to physical disruptions could 
have been reduced if cyber interactions were restored in a 










G31, D31, G32, P31, 
P32, D41, P 42 
 
 
The types of interactions between critical infrastructures 
had minimal impacts on the recovery effort. 
Interdependency issues were minimised due to effective 
preparedness and mitigation measures. Logical 
interdependency through played a significant role in 
maintaining interactions between infrastructures and 
restoring their interdependencies. 
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P21, P22, G21, G22 
 
Even short interruption from power outage can easily 
cascade and escalate to other interdependent 
infrastructures. The frequency, at which certain services 
such as electricity and communication are provided and 
received, is crucial in recovering damaged infrastructures 












 D12, P11, P12 
 
The frequency at which resources were exchanged across 
infrastructures after the floods did not directly affect the 
recovery effort. The real problem did not quite reside in the 










 D31, D32, P31, P32, 
G41, G42, D41 
 
 
The frequency of exchange of services across 
infrastructures had little impact to the recovery process of 
most infrastructures. The focus during recovery was to 
receive the minimum required resources for the recovery 
















































G11, G12, D11, D12, 
P11, P12, G21, G22, 
S21, S22, P21, P22 
 
 
Cascading and escalating failures begin from the critical 
enabling infrastructure and vary in function of the extent of 
damages and the degrees of interdependencies that exist 
across infrastructures.  
Critical enabling infrastructures are the primary enabler of 
accessibility and transferability of resources. Damages on 
the critical enablers can easily trigger cascading and 

















t G41, G42, D41 The critical enabling infrastructure plays a significant role 















t G41, G42, D41 
 
The critical enabling infrastructure plays a significant role 
in the management and coordination of recovery activities 
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 How do the degrees of interdependencies have the potential to impede 
the post-disaster recovery? 
 
Proposition 11a: The degrees of interdependencies inform the different 
types of failures including cascading and escalating failures that would be 
experienced by critical infrastructures.  
Proposition 11b: When infrastructures are tightly independent, failures 
propagate rapidly across them, while for loose interdependencies; failures 
propagate slowly and are distributed over large area or a number of 
infrastructures.  
Proposition 11c: The impacts from the frequency of exchange of services 
on the recovery effort depend on the infrastructure with which these exchanges 
take place. It is only for infrastructures such as electricity and ICT, which operates 
in real time that disruption to the exchange of services, would have a debilitated 
on the recovery effort.  
 
7.4.1 Types of interactions  
The analysis of data from Organisation 1, 2, 3 and 4 revealed that the 
degrees to which critical infrastructures are interdependent are also perceived 
through the types of interactions that exist between them. Four respondents from 
Organisation 1 (G12, G12, P11, and P12) indicated that the types of interactions 
induce a two-way causal effect between interdependent infrastructures; where a 
slow propagation of failures can easily escalate to widespread damages, and 
where a rapid propagation of failure tend to cascade across tightly 
interdependent infrastructures. This pattern was found at Organisation 2, where 
four respondents (S21, S22, P21, and P22) suggested that prioritising recovery 
activities according to the types of interaction could minimise or reduce the 
disruptive effects of a damaged infrastructure to other infrastructures. This 
pattern was not found at Organisation 3 and 4, where seven respondents (G31, 
D31, G32, P31, P32, and D41, P42) indicated that the types of interaction can have 
minimal effects on the recovery effort if effective preparedness and mitigation 
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measures all driven by sufficient funding are implemented well before disasters 
occur.  
 To the question of how elements of infrastructure interdependencies – 
such as the types of interactions – impede the post-disaster recovery 
effort, a proposition has been provided:  
 
Proposition 12: Loose interactions between critical infrastructures tend to 
induce slow propagation of failures across interdependent infrastructures 
whereas strong or tight interactions would result in rapid propagation of failures 
of interdependent infrastructures.  
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Table 7.6: Major remarks on the impacts of the types of interactions on post-disaster recovery 
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7.4.2 Frequency of Interactions  
Three respondents (D12, P11, and P12) from Organisations recognised that 
the real problem during recovery did not quite reside in the frequency of exchange 
of services, rather in the accessibility of resources. According to these respondents, 
organisations are more concerned with recovering critical infrastructures in a 
timely manner with sufficient available resources after disasters. This pattern 
was also found at Organisation 3 where four respondents (D31, D32, P31, and P32) 
indicated that the frequency of exchange of services had little impact on the 2011 
recovery effort. According to these respondents most of the issues revolved 
around having the necessary resources to undertake recovery activities. Two 
respondents (P21, P22) from Organisation 2 revealed that frequency of exchange 
could greatly affect the recovery effort when infrastructures such as energy and 
ICT are involved. According to these respondents, even short interruptions of 
services from these infrastructures could have a great impact on the coordination 
of recovery activities. Organisation 4 followed a different pattern, where 
respondents (G41, G42, and D41) indicated that the frequency of exchange of 
services is a pre-disaster issue which with efficient preparedness measures 
would have very minimal effects on interdependent infrastructures after a 
disaster.  
 
 To the question of how elements of infrastructure interdependencies – 
such as the frequency of exchange of services – impede the post-
disaster recovery effort, a proposition has been provided:  
 
Proposition 13: Frequency of exchange of services between 
interdependent infrastructures in most circumstances would have minimal 
impact on the post-disaster recovery effort.  
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Table 7.8: Major remarks on the impacts of the frequency of exchange on post-disaster recovery 
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7.4.3 Critical Enabling Infrastructure  
All six respondents (G11, G12, D11, D12, P11, and P12) from Organisation 1 
recognised that cascading and escalating failures tend to be triggered by damages 
which originate from the most critical infrastructure within the interdependent 
network. Two of these respondents (D11, D12) revealed that the critical enabling 
infrastructure is usually the primary enabler of accessibility and transferability 
of resources to other infrastructures. This pattern was also found at Organisation 
3, where four respondents (D31, D32, P31, and P32) indicated that a critical enabling 
infrastructure can impede infrastructure availability, but also resources 
accessibility and transferability. The same perspective was observed in 
Organisation 4, where three respondents (G41, G42, and D41) indicated that the 
critical enabling infrastructure plays a significant role in the management and 
coordination of recovery activities. A different pattern was observed in 
Organisation 2, where the six respondents (G21, G22, S21, S22, P21 and P22) indicated 
that there is more than one critical enabling infrastructure within the 
interdependent network and thus it is difficult to identify where failures initially 
originate. To these respondents, if it were to be identified, the critical enabler 
would be the infrastructure that is so critical that failures of such infrastructure 
would undoubtedly result in cascading and escalating failures to other 
infrastructures.  
 To the question of how elements of infrastructure interdependencies – 
such as the relationship with critical enabling infrastructure – impede 
the post-disaster recovery effort, a proposition has been provided:  
 
Proposition 14: If the critical enabling infrastructure is restored in a timely 
manner after disasters, this can reduce the risk of cascading and escalating 
failures across interdependent infrastructures during post-disaster recovery.  
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Table 7.7: Major remarks on the impacts of the critical enabling infrastructure on post-disaster 
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• > 30 %: High impact from the 
type of interaction. 
• > 30%: Low impact from the 
frequency of exchange 
• 50%: Degree of interdependency 
is highly dependent on the critical 
enabling infrastructure.   
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7.5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TYPES AND DEGREES OF 
INTERDEPENDENCIES  
An explanation building analysis was used in this section to describe the 
relationships between the types and the degrees of interdependencies. The body 
of literatures investigated in Chapter 3 depicted the different types of 
infrastructure interdependencies including physical, geographical and cyber 
interdependencies. Chapter 3 also described the degrees of interdependencies 
such as loose and tight interdependencies that exist between critical 
infrastructures. Chapter 5 revealed that physical and cyber interdependencies 
have the potential to directly affect the recovery effort. Within these elements, 
critical factors such as infrastructure availability, infrastructure reliability and 
resources transferability, if maintained after a disaster, can contribute to the 
successful implementation of the recovery effort. Accordingly, factors such as the 
types of interactions, the frequency of exchange of services, as well as the 
relationship with the critical enabling infrastructure are critical success factors 
in minimising issues related to the degrees of interdependencies during post-
disaster recovery. 
The analysis of the four cases (Organisation 1, 2, 3 and 4) indicated that the 
lack of infrastructure availability, infrastructure reliability and resources 
transferability have the potential to cause cascading and escalating failures of 
interdependent infrastructures, thus impeding their recovery efforts. The cross-
case analysis of Organisation 1 and Organisation 2 revealed that the 
unavailability of an infrastructure is likely to influence its reliability and affect the 
transfer of resources needed to maintain interdependency and recover and 
rehabilitate damaged infrastructures. Thus in this case, infrastructure reliability 
affects the post-disaster recovery in the same way that infrastructure availability 
would affect the recovery effort. Issues related to resources transferability would 
also affect availability and reliability of an infrastructure, which in turn will affect 
the entire recovery effort.  
Furthermore, the cross-case analysis of Organisation 1 and 2 revealed that 
loose interactions between critical infrastructures tend to induce slow 
propagation of failures across interdependent infrastructures whereas strong or 
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tight interactions would result in rapid propagation of failures of interdependent 
infrastructures. Organisation 3 and Organisation 4 indicated that the frequency 
of exchange of services between interdependent infrastructures in most 
circumstances would have minimal impact on the post-disaster recovery effort. 
If the critical enabling infrastructure is restored in a timely manner after 
disasters, this can reduce the risk of cascading and escalating failures across 
interdependent infrastructures during post-disaster recovery. 
The relationships between the types and degrees of interdependencies are 
clearly apparent among their critical success factors. Organisation 1 and 
Organisation 2 recognised that infrastructure unavailability would have a greater 
impact on the recovery of critical infrastructures that are tightly connected and 
experience strong interactions. As mentioned previously, Organisation 2 
revealed that tight interactions tend to take place with the critical enabling 
infrastructure. Organisation 3 indicated that damages on one critical enabling 
infrastructure can impede the availability of others interdependent 
infrastructures and the transfer of essential resources to their functioning and 
recoveries. Similarly, the transfer of resources would greatly affect 
infrastructures that are tightly interdependent, but also those who require 
frequent exchange of resources or services in order to operate.  
In the conceptual framework provided in Chapter 3, both the types and the 
degrees of interdependencies were classified as invariant attributes which 
contribute in inducing various types of failures including cascading and 
escalating failures across critical infrastructures. However, to a large extent, the 
influence of the types of interdependencies on the post-disaster recovery 
depends on the extent and intensity, or degrees of interdependencies that exist 
among critical infrastructures. For instance, in the cases of Organisation 3 and 
Organisation 4, the lack of infrastructure unavailability did not affect the recovery 
of others interdependent infrastructures. This was primarily due to the degrees 
of interdependency that existed across these infrastructures.  
 
Proposition 15: Issues related to infrastructure availability, infrastructure 
reliability and resources transferability tend to have great impact on 
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infrastructures that are tightly interdependent and require frequent exchange of 
services to operate.  
Table 7.8: Relationships between the types and degrees of interdependencies  








































7.6 RECOVERY MEASURES TO MINIMIZE INTERDEPENDENCIES ISSUES 
This section combines the analysis of the recovery effort implemented by 
Organisation 1, 2, 3 and 4 to provide answer to RQ3: How can the disruptive 
effects of elements of infrastructure interdependency be reduced or minimized 
during post-disaster recovery period? The section begins with an investigation of 
the current recovery approaches followed by each organisation and then 
compares how interdependencies issues are reduced during recovery. 
 
7.6.1 Recovery Approaches  
According to Alexander (2002), the recovery of damaged infrastructure 
systems needs to be carefully planned and coordinated in order to alleviate the 
impact of natural disasters on local communities. However, the within–case 
analysis revealed that there are no concrete coordination and prioritization 
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activities followed by Organisation 1. This pattern was found in Organisations 2, 
3, and 4. Organisations 1, 3 and 4 reported that their recovery activities are 
guided and prioritised according to funding provided by the state government 
under the Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA) 
guidelines. This suggests that funding greatly affect the recovery process of 
interdependent infrastructures.  
Additionally, Organisation 2 revealed that experts’ judgements are used 
against NDRRA guidelines to decide which infrastructure is critical to the 
community and needs urgent rehabilitation and reconstruction. This pattern was 
also found in Organisation 3 and 4, which reported that eligibility for recovering 
infrastructures was granted by the state government once visual assessments 
(including photos of the damaged infrastructures) along with a series of tests 
were performed and provided by experts to meet the NDRRA guidelines.  
Organisations 1, 2, 3 and 4 possess a local disaster management plan 
(LDMP), which complies with Queensland Disaster Management Act (2003). In 
each of these plans, recovery activities are sub-divided into three phases 
including the short, medium and long-term recoveries. However, Organisation 1 
reported that there is no concrete short, medium and long-terms recovery in the 
field. A cyclic recovery approach rather than a linear recovery approach, where 
activities overlap each other is often adopted during recovery. This pattern was 
found at Organisation 2, 3 and 4, which revealed that their recovery activities did 
not quite comply with Queensland Disaster Management Act (2003) with the 
three phases. Thus their disaster management plans needed to be updated in 
2011 and 2014 to overcome the scale of disasters and the extent of damages.  
Organisation 1 reported that recovery activities are coordinated at the local 
disaster coordination centre (LDCC) through the local disaster management 
group (LDMG) which is the principal decision making body. This pattern was 
found in Organisation 2, which revealed that minimum levels of awareness and 
information on interdependency issues are gained during meetings organised by 
the LDMG at the coordination centre. Organisations 1 and 2 revealed that it is 
during such meetings that infrastructure providers discuss not only issues 
related to the recovery of their infrastructures, but also how damages of other 
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infrastructures affect their own recovery efforts. A slightly different pattern was 
found in Organisation 3 and 4, which revealed that their LDMGs had very little 
awareness of how infrastructure interdependencies issues impeded their 
recovery efforts. Organisation 3 mentioned informal discussions between 
infrastructure providers were the only time interdependencies issues were 
discussed. No evidence was provided by Organisation 4 on how 
interdependencies issues were overcome during recovery. This suggests that 
issues related to infrastructure interdependency were resolved through a 
reactive rather than a proactive approach. There is very little collaboration 
between infrastructure providers during post-disaster recovery.  
 How can the disruptive effects of elements of infrastructure 
interdependency be reduced or minimized during post-disaster 
recovery period?  
 
Proposition 16a: Sufficient available funding promotes faster recovery of 
interdependent infrastructures.  
Proposition 16b: Adopting a proactive approach to recovery, where 
effective collaboration and coordination are implemented among organisations 
has the potential to reduce interdependencies issues during post-disaster.  
 
7.6.2 Approaches to minimise interdependencies issues 
Perrow (1984) suggested that a better way to reduce interdependencies 
issues is to gain a better understanding on the cause and origin of cascading and 
escalating failures of large infrastructure systems. However, most organisations 
are still unaware and unprepared to overcome interdependency issues across 
large infrastructure systems during post-disaster recovery. This pattern was 
found in Organisations 1, 2, 3 and 4, which revealed that their disaster 
management plans did not provide guidelines in restoring critical infrastructures 
according to failures related to their interdependencies. Hence, Organisations 1 
and 4 have suggested that elements of infrastructure interdependencies be 
incorporated into existing disaster management plans to reduce the impacts of 
these interdependencies during post-disaster recovery. Following the same 
perspective, Organisation 2 also suggested to prioritize recovery activities in 
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function of infrastructures interdependencies, while Organisation 3 suggested 
considering infrastructures interdependencies in every aspects of disaster 
management including during disaster preparedness, prevention, response and 
recovery. 
Each case examined provided evidences that the lack of information and 
communication among infrastructure providers impeded to a large extent on the 
recovery efforts of interdependent infrastructures. Organisations 1, 2 and 3 
revealed that meetings at the local disaster coordination centre took place 
irregularly, and as such very little awareness on interdependencies issues was 
found among infrastructure providers during recovery. Thus, Organisations 1, 2 
and 3 recommended having constant effective collaboration between 
organisations involved in the recovery process to minimise interdependencies 
issues during the post-disaster recovery period. 
Data from interviews provided by Organisations 3 and 4 indicated having 
better funding would contribute in building back stronger infrastructures and 
would reduce interdependency issues during recovery. Although no evidence on 
funding betterment was found in Organisations 1 and 2, these organisations 
emphasised on preparedness measures such as intensive trainings as well as 
implementing alternatives measures to maintain interdependencies between 
infrastructures before a disaster occurs.  
 
 How can the disruptive effects of elements of infrastructure 
interdependency be reduced or minimized during post-disaster 
recovery period?  
 
Proposition 18a: Organisational awareness on existing interdependencies 
issues between infrastructures and preparedness measures would greatly 
contribute in reducing the impacts of infrastructure interdependencies during 
post-disaster recovery.  
Proposition 18b: Effective communication and information among 
organisations play a significant role in reducing interdependencies issues during 
post-disaster recovery.  
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Table 7.9: Cross case comparison of post-disaster recovery approaches 
Organisations Organisation 1 Organisation 2 Organisation 3 Organisation 4 
Industry sector Local city council                    
(flood prone areas, located in 
SEQ) 
Local regional council        
(flood prone areas located in 
SEQ) 
Local regional council (flood  
prone areas located in SQ) 
Local regional council 




Local disaster management 
plan (LDMP), which complies 
with the Queensland 
Disaster Management Act 
(2003). 
Local disaster management 
plan (LDMP) established since 
2009. 
 
Local disaster management 
plan (LDMP). 
Local disaster 
management plan (LDMP) 




The Local Disaster 
Management Group (LDMG) 
is the decision making body, 
which is influenced by the 
state and federal 
government entities. 
 
The decision making body for 
disaster management is the 





The decision making body of is 
the Local Disaster 
Management Group (LDMG), 
which coordinates and 
manages the recovery 
activities at the local disaster 
coordination centre (LDCC) 
The primary decision 
making body for recovery 








Funding generated from the 
NDRRA established by the 
state government guide 
prioritization activities. 
 
Prioritization depended on 
experts’ judgements. 
A rule of thumb is used during 
recovery to decide what will 
be the next activity once the 
preceding activity was 
completed. 
Recovery activities were 
prioritised according to the 
funding arrangement 
(NDRRA) established by the 
state government. 
Prioritization of recovery 
activities was performed 
under the Natural 
Disaster Relief and 
Recovery Arrangements 
(NDRRA) guidelines. 
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Moderate awareness of 
interdependencies issues: 
It is during meetings at the 
Local Disaster Coordination 
Centre (LDCC) that issues 
related to infrastructure 
interdependencies are 
discussed. 
Moderate awareness of 
interdependencies issues: 
It is only during meetings 
organised at the Local Disaster 
Coordination Centre (LDCC) 
that infrastructure providers 
met and discussed issues 
related to infrastructure 
interdependencies. 
Very little awareness of 
interdependencies issues: 




informally in the field. 
No evidence 
Collaboration Collaboration took place 
with infrastructure 
providers take place during 
LDCC meetings. 
Collaboration took place with 
infrastructure providers take 
place during LDCC meetings. 
Collaboration took place with 
infrastructure providers take 
place during LDCC meetings. 
No evidence 
Guideline to overcome 
interdependency issues 
during recovery 
The disaster management 




There is no information found 
in the LDMP on restoring 
interdependencies between 
large infrastructure systems. 
The disaster management plan 
currently in place does not 
provide guidelines on how to 




The disaster management 
plan does not directly 
include recovery of 
infrastructure 
interdependencies 
(i) Incorporate elements of 
interdependency into 
(i) Having an effective disaster 
management plan that 
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prioritises recovery activities 
in function of 
interdependency. 
prevention, response and 
recovery. 
existing guidelines and 
standards. 





information during recovery. 
(ii) Effective collaboration 
among infrastructure 
providers through regular 
communication and share of 
information during post-
disaster recovery. 
(ii) Keeping a written record 
of the various 
interdependencies issues that 
occur across critical 
infrastructures. 
(ii) Collaborative effort 
among critical 
infrastructure providers 
including the community. 
 
(iii) Providing intensive 
training sessions using 
simulations and modelling 
techniques which portray 
cascading and escalating 
failures of interdependent 
infrastructures before their 
occurrences. 
(iii) Implement alternatives 
means of providing resources 
to other infrastructures in 
case severe damages are 
experienced by their 
infrastructures. 
(iii) Providing sufficient 
funding for betterment to local 
government 
(iii) Sufficient betterment 
funding to guide the 
recovery effort o critical 
infrastructures. 
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7.7 SUMMARY 
The cross-case analysis performed in this chapter aimed at investigating 
how elements of infrastructure interdependencies impede the post-disaster 
recovery effort; and how their disruptive effects can be reduced or minimized 
during post-disaster recovery. A comparison of four cases examined similarities 
and differences across large organisations involved in flood recovery projects in 
Queensland, Australia. Data from the interviews were investigated from different 
perspectives to reveal emerging patterns from the majority of cases and report 
discrepancies across some of these cases. Further analyses using explanation 
building techniques were performed to clarify the differences across the four 
cases and explain their emerging theories. Overall, it was found that physical and 
cyber interdependencies tend to generate cascading and escalating failures, 
particularly when unavailability and unreliability of infrastructures, including 
the lack of resources transferability, are experienced. Similarly, the degrees of 
interdependencies induce the different types of failures including cascading and 
escalating failures. Explanation building techniques revealed that the levels at 
which the types of interdependencies would affect the recovery effort depend on 
the degrees of interdependencies that exist between infrastructures. Most 
organisations suggested that having sufficient available funding and adopting a 
proactive approach to recovery, where organisational awareness of risks related 
to infrastructure interdependencies would be developed, could reduce the 
impacts of interdependencies on the post-disaster recovery effort. 
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Chapter 8: DISCUSSION AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The literature review and the conceptual framework provided in Chapter 3, 
defined the scope of this research and guided the methods of data collection and 
selection. Four case studies were used to explore the influence of infrastructure 
interdependencies on post-disaster recovery. The cases were mainly associated 
to city councils and regional councils that have experienced and dealt with the 
impacts of interdependencies across critical infrastructure systems such as 
transport (including roads and rails), water (including wastewater), energy 
(particularly electricity), as well as Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) during post-disaster recovery. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the meaning and importance of the 
results of the exploratory pilot study presented in Chapter 5, as well as the results 
of the within-case analysis and cross-case analysis described in Chapters 6 and 7. 
This chapter discusses the results related to the following research questions:  
1. What are the various elements of infrastructure interdependency, 
which affect the post-disaster recovery effort? 
2. How do elements of infrastructure interdependency impede post-
disaster recovery effort? 
3. How can the disruptive effects of the key elements of infrastructure 
interdependency be reduced or minimized during the recovery 
period? 
Plausible conclusions have been drawn from the main findings to 
demonstrate the relevance of this research in addressing the overall research 
problem. The broader implications of the research in scholarly and practical 
contexts have also been highlighted throughout this chapter.  
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8.2 ELEMENTS OF INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCIES  
A global examination of the concept of interdependency in recent literature 
revealed six dimensional characteristics including the types of 
interdependencies, the coupling and response behaviour of infrastructures, 
infrastructure characteristics and environment, as well as the types of failures 
and the states of operation of infrastructures (Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 2009; 
Johansson & Hassel, 2010; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). Two dimensions were excluded 
from the scope of this research; infrastructure characteristics and infrastructure 
environment. Infrastructure characteristics reflect on the conditions that 
infrastructures displayed before disasters occur and as such were found to have 
relatively low significance in revealing the influence of infrastructure 
interdependencies on post-disaster recovery. On the other hand, the sole 
examination of infrastructure environment would constitute in itself a unique 
blend of several other studies, which could each focus on one aspect of 
infrastructure environment and its influence on the post-disaster recovery of 
interdependent infrastructures. However, within a limited timeframe, this 
research has focused on four dimensions of interdependencies including the 
types of interdependency, the degrees of interdependency which refers to the 
coupling and response behaviour of interdependent infrastructures, the types of 
failures and the states of operation of infrastructures. 
While the types of failures were described as variables attributes that 
induce the various states of operation of infrastructures, the exploratory study 
and the case studies supported the assumptions made in the conceptual 
framework, which distinguished the types and degrees of interdependencies as 
being invariable attributes. Six conceptual measures were derived from the types 
of interdependencies (infrastructure availability, infrastructure reliability and 
resources transferability) and the degrees of interdependencies (the types of 
interactions, the frequency of exchange and the relationship with the critical 
enabling infrastructure). This section discussed how these factors are critical to 
elements of interdependencies, particularly in their influence on the post-
disaster recovery. 
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Figure 8.1: Causes and effects of elements of interdependencies 
Energy 
(Electricity) 
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8.2.1 Types of Interdependencies  
Interdependencies across critical infrastructures exist in physical, cyber, 
geographic and logical forms (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; Pitilakis & Kakderi, 2011; 
Rinaldi, et al., 2001). The conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 3 suggests 
that the types of interdependencies have the potential to influence infrastructures 
recoveries after disasters. With the exception of logical interdependency, physical, 
cyber and geographical interdependencies denote the nature and sorts of 
interrelationships that exist among critical infrastructures and as such, they are 
considered to be invariable attributes. These types of interdependencies are formed 
according to the dependencies that critical infrastructures manifest towards one 
another and tend to exist even before disasters occur.  
In this regard, logical interdependency is the only type of interdependency that 
is entirely induced by human behaviour or decisions (Dörner, 1996; Kahneman, 
2003). Although this type of interdependency involves policy or procedural 
interdependency, as well as societal interdependency, logical interdependency tends 
to affect the post-disaster recovery from a broader perspective and thus, has been 
excluded from the conceptual framework. The exploratory pilot study revealed that 
logical interdependency is perceived through the influence of decision makers from 
various organisations, including infrastructure providers, and state and local 
government agencies. During post-disaster recovery, decisions made at higher levels 
(from state and local government) prevail on those that come from infrastructure 
providers. Since decisions vary according to organisations, the influence of logical 
interdependency on the post-disaster recovery effort is considered to be unstable 
and inconsistent (Proposition 4). This finding is consistent with Dörner (1996), 
who mentioned that human decisions have proven to be subject to many errors 
in various circumstances. Thus, relying essentially on decisions to maintain 
infrastructure interdependencies may prove to be insufficient (Dörner, 1996; 
Kahneman, 2003). 
In this research, geographical interdependency has been contextualised and 
examined as part of physical interdependency. Physical interdependency results 
from the exchange of services across critical infrastructures, where the change in 
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condition from one infrastructure could have serious impact on the functioning of 
the other infrastructure (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; Pitilakis & Kakderi, 2011; 
Rinaldi, et al., 2001). Geographical interdependency on the other hand, only exists 
when a disaster causes simultaneous disturbances across several infrastructures. 
Infrastructures that are geographically interdependent satisfy two conditions; 
firstly, they are subject to a common disaster that affects them simultaneously, and 
secondly, these infrastructures are located within close proximity to another. The 
exploratory study revealed that during post-disaster recovery, physical 
interdependencies are restored first, regardless of their geographical 
interdependency issues (Proposition 3).  
The analysis of case study (1) indicated that after the 2011 Queensland floods, 
failures to sewerage systems originating from damaged roads were due to their 
geographical interdependencies. However, even when roads were repaired, 
sewerage systems remained damaged. This was primarily because some utilities 
providers were still out of reach due to damages of their own infrastructures and 
could not supply resources needed to start the recovery of sewerage systems. Thus, 
it was access to services (which are essential attributes of physical interdependency) 
that enabled the recovery of sewerage systems, regardless of their geographical 
interdependency issues with roads. This indicates that for geographically 
interdependent infrastructures, the recovery of one infrastructure does not 
necessarily influence the recovery of the other infrastructure. Physical 
interdependencies which affect the functioning of critical infrastructures tend to be 
the focus of the recovery and rehabilitation process of infrastructures.  
Three critical success factors to physical interdependency were revealed from 
the exploratory study. The study indicated that physical interdependencies across 
critical infrastructures will fail if infrastructure availability, infrastructure 
reliability and resources transferability are not satisfied during post-disaster 
recovery (Proposition 1). From respondents’ perspectives, an infrastructure has 
to be available or in a functioning state in order to maintain its interdependency 
with others infrastructures during recovery. Additionally, infrastructure has to 
be reliable and ready to provide resources or services when needed by others 
infrastructures during post-disaster recovery (Proposition 9a). The exploratory 
study also associated these success factors to cyber interdependency. According 
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to the study, cyber interdependency will fail in the same way that physical 
interdependency would if infrastructure availability, reliability and resources 
transferability are not successfully maintained during recovery (Proposition 
2b). These findings are consistent with the four case studies, which revealed 
instances where most infrastructures were only able perform their intended 
functions when they could operate after disasters. The cases also revealed 
instances where infrastructures needed to receive and provide resources to 
others infrastructures to enable their functioning and recoveries.  
The exploratory study indicated that for physical interdependency, 
infrastructure availability is more critical than infrastructure reliability and 
resources transferability. Respondents revealed that during post-disaster 
recovery, infrastructures have to be available to receive or provide any resources. 
It is the immediate need of finding infrastructures in a functioning state or in an 
available state that drives the recovery and contributes to their physical 
interdependencies (Proposition 7a). Whereas, knowing how long 
infrastructures will be operational, and thus reliable, is a matter that 
infrastructure providers tend to consider before a disaster or after recovery. This 
finding is consistent with Kapur (2014) who mentioned that reliability relates to 
future performance or behaviour of infrastructures.  
A different perspective was provided by respondents when they described 
the importance of critical success factors to cyber interdependency. Data 
revealed that for cyber interdependency, infrastructure reliability is more critical 
than infrastructure availability and transferability. This is primarily due to the 
fact that most critical infrastructures possess a supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) system, which allows them to individually function (P1, P2, 
P3, P4, P5, and P6). The real issue with cyber interdependency is maintaining 
reliability, which is the guarantee of how long an infrastructure would be able to 
sustain services to other infrastructures, enabling them to operate. Organisations 
can remotely control cyber interdependencies as revealed in the analyses of the 
four cases. According to respondents (S21, S22, and P22), “infrastructure systems 
that operate in real-time such as ICT and energy are the most reliable 
infrastructures because their providers make sure that demands are continuously 
satisfied”. Organisations tend to generally focus on preparedness and preventive 
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measures that allow them to easily implement alternative solutions when there 
are no information or communication services during recovery. Nonetheless for 
physical and cyber interdependencies, the cross-case analyses revealed that 
infrastructure availability and reliability is likely to influence the transfer of 
resources needed to maintain interdependencies between critical infrastructures 
(Proposition 7b, Proposition 8b). The lack of transferring resources from one 
infrastructure to another would affect the recovery efforts of interdependent 
infrastructures (Proposition 9a). 
 
8.2.2 Degrees of Interdependencies  
It is essential to know the extent to which critical infrastructures are 
interdependent in order to determine if their dependencies would have a 
debilitating impact on their recoveries. According to Rinaldi et al. (2001), the 
degree (or intensity, strength, and amplitude), to which critical infrastructures 
are interdependent can be loose when infrastructures are relatively independent 
from each other, or tight when infrastructures are highly dependent on one another 
at every level (Rinaldi, et al., 2001; Ventura, et al., 2010). The analysis of data from 
the exploratory study revealed that to a large extent, the degrees of 
interdependencies indicate the degrees of reliance that infrastructures have on 
one another. The cross-case analysis demonstrated that such reliance originates 
from a need or a demand that infrastructures have to satisfy in order to function. 
For instance, ICT systems require constant power for switches and operating 
equipment and energy systems need constant information and communication 
technologies to operate. The degree of reliance between energy and ICT systems 
are strong compared to the degree of reliance between ICT systems and 
sanitation systems.  
Reliance on the other infrastructure in this context depends on the types of 
connections between infrastructures. Data from case studies revealed that the 
degrees of interdependencies are driven by infrastructures’ existing types of 
interdependencies, whether physical, geographical, or cyber. For instance, 
infrastructures such as water systems (including sanitation systems) are loosely 
interdependent with transport systems due to their geographical and physical 
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interdependencies, whereas infrastructures such as energy systems are tightly 
interdependent with ICT systems due to their cyber interdependencies. The types 
of interdependencies however, are driven by critical success factors such as 
infrastructure availability, reliability and resources transferability (Proposition 
1, Proposition 2b). Case study (1) revealed that the interrelationship between 
water and transport systems requires transport to be available for distribution, 
supply, and collection of resources during post-disaster recovery. Transport 
systems on the other hand, need available water for fuel production and slurry 
provision during reconstruction (G11, G12, P11, and P12). Although these three 
critical success factors do not directly determine the degrees to which critical 
infrastructures are interdependent, the cross-case analysis revealed that issues 
related to infrastructure availability, reliability and resources transferability tend 
to have a greater impact on infrastructures that are tightly interdependent and 
require frequent exchange of services to operate (Proposition 15).  
The cross-case analysis indicates that the types of interdependencies are 
related to the connections that interdependent infrastructures have among each 
other, while the degrees denote the strengths of these connections. The types of 
interdependencies exist due to the mutual dependencies across critical 
infrastructures at an operational level, whereas the degrees of interdependencies 
demonstrate the ways in which critical infrastructures are mutually dependent. 
The analyses of the four cases revealed that the consequences and effects of the 
types and degrees of interdependencies on the post-disaster recoveries of critical 
infrastructures are what really vary across interdependent infrastructures. This 
finding is consistent with the assumption made by Perrow’s (1999) in the Normal 
Accident Theory (NAT), who recognized that the consequences resulting from 
damaged interdependent systems cannot be predicted or anticipated as they 
continuously vary (Boin & McConnell, 2007; Perrow, 1984; Perrow, 1999).  
The exploratory study suggested that the degrees of interdependencies of 
critical infrastructures can be known by investigating the ways in which 
infrastructures interact (types of interactions), how often these interactions take 
place (frequency of interactions), and with which infrastructures interactions 
occur the most (relationship with the critical enabling infrastructures) 
(Proposition 5a). Tightly interdependent infrastructures are those that interact 
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constantly, whereas loosely interdependent infrastructures tend to have minimal 
interactions among them (Propositions 5b and 5c). The analysis of case study 
(1) indicates that the frequency of interactions have little impact on the 
immediate recovery of interdependent infrastructures (Proposition 13). 
Availability of infrastructure and accessibility to the services are the most needed 
to restore interactions between infrastructures and complete their recoveries. 
Only 20% of respondents from the exploratory study mentioned the relationship 
with the critical enabling infrastructure as being important to determine the 
degrees of interdependencies. However the case study analyses revealed that the 
primary concern during recovery is the critical enabling infrastructure, which 
needs to be functional in order to provide sufficient resources for the functioning 
and recovery of other infrastructures (Proposition 14). This finding is consistent 
with those of Ventura, et al. (2010), which explained that for effective recovery of 
interdependent infrastructures, it is vital to determine for each infrastructure the 
other infrastructure that it continuously (or nearly continuously) depends on to 
operate normally, and also to investigate the channel by which the services are 
delivered. Jonkman and Dawson (2012) mentioned that the criticality of 
infrastructures during recovery is measured to a large extent according to the 
amount of services they provide to other infrastructures and to the local 
community in order to facilitate their rapid recovery from natural disasters. 
 
8.2.3 The Types of Failures and State of Operation of Infrastructures 
The cross-case analysis revealed that infrastructure interdependencies 
influence the recovery effort once the states of operation of infrastructures have 
been determined. However, the exploratory study also revealed that it is only 
after experiencing a disaster and the different types of failures induced by it that 
the states of operation of infrastructures can be known, assessed and eventually 
decisions made on which recovery measures to adopt (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, and P6). 
From respondents' perspectives, the states of operation of infrastructures are 
perceived as consequences or outcomes of the different types of failures 
experienced by infrastructures. Such consequences exhibit different scales or 
magnitudes, depending on the disaster. Branagan (2012) explained that the 
magnitude of a consequence refers to what the consequence means to the entity 
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from which it results, which in this case is the interdependent infrastructure. In 
this context, Rinaldi et al. (2001) mentioned that the states of operation of 
infrastructures generally vary from peak conditions (when infrastructures 
operate normally) to off-peak conditions (when infrastructures are damaged) 
(Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2007; O'Rourke, 2007; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). Thus, it is the 
magnitude of the consequences of failures, which represents the states at which 
infrastructures are found after a disaster that drives the recovery effort. 
This finding is consistent with assumptions made in the conceptual 
framework which stipulated that cascading and escalating failures induce the 
different states of operations of infrastructures, which will then determine which 
recovery approach needs to be adopted (Proposition 6). These two types of 
failures are particularly of great interest in this research since they are direct 
consequences of interdependencies across critical infrastructures. As mentioned 
in the literature review performed in Chapter 3, types of failures such as common 
causes do not necessarily result from interdependencies across critical 
infrastructures and as such do not always generate interdependencies issues 
during post-disaster recovery (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; Johansson & Hassel, 
2010; Rinaldi, 2004).   
The analysis of case studies (1) and (2) revealed that most organisations do 
not follow a concrete short, medium and long-term recovery phases. The 
recovery effort usually begins with rapid assessment of damaged infrastructures 
after a disaster. This indicates that the state of operation of infrastructures drives 
prioritization, but also dictates decision making on whether or not to rehabilitate 
or fully recover damaged infrastructures. Respondents collectively mentioned 
that both the types of failures and the state of operation of critical infrastructures 
depend on the types of disasters and the extent of damages experienced by 
infrastructures. This finding is consistent with that of Alexander (2002) who 
mentioned that post-disaster recovery varies temporally and spatially according 
to the types, magnitude and extent of damages from disasters (Alexander, 2002; 
Arendt & Alesch, 2014; Smith, 2012). 
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8.2.4 Practical Implications  
Several authors such as Amaratunga and Haigh (2011) have denounced the 
lack of knowledge and proper points of reference to guide the recovery processes. In 
this regard, Rijpma (1997) mentioned that learning may contribute to a deeper 
understanding of complex issues and may reduce potential for surprises with 
regards to issues related to interdependent systems. This research provided an 
understanding of which elements of infrastructure interdependencies have the 
potential to impede the recovery effort of large infrastructure systems such as 
water (including sanitation), transport (including roads and rails systems), 
energy and ICT. The research revealed that elements of infrastructure 
interdependencies such as the types of interdependencies, including physical and 
cyber interdependencies, along with the degrees of interdependencies, whether 
tight or loose, can affect the post-disaster recovery. These elements are invariant 
attributes that exist between infrastructures as soon as their interdependent 
relationships are established. However, although invariants, factors that 
contribute to maintain the types of interdependencies such as infrastructure 
availability and reliability as well as resources transferability are considered 
critical to the recovery effort. Similarly, those that contribute to the degrees of 
interdependencies such as the types of interactions, the frequency of exchange 
and the relation with critical enabling infrastructure are also considered critical 
to effective recovery effort.  
 
8.3 INFUENCE OF ELEMENTS OF INTERDEPENDENCIES ON POST-
DISASTER RECOVERY 
The conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 3 suggested that the types 
and degrees of interdependencies have the potential to induce or generate the 
different types of failures, which will engender the state of operation of 
infrastructures. The post-disaster recovery effort will then be implemented in 
function of the state at which infrastructures are found after a disaster 
(Proposition 6). This finding is consistent with the within and cross-case 
analyses performed in Chapters 6 and 7, which provided strong evidence of how 
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the types and the degrees of interdependencies have the potential to impede the 
recovery effort of interdependent infrastructures.  
 
8.3.1 Physical and Cyber Disruptions  
Data from the exploratory study revealed that critical infrastructures tend 
to fail mostly due to their physical and cyber independencies, which are 
essentially based on the availability and reliability of infrastructures, as well as 
resources transferability (Propositions 1 and 2a). Evidence from the cross-case 
analysis indicates that these factors have the potential to induce cascading and 
escalating failures across interdependent infrastructures, if not maintained 
during the post-disaster recovery (Proposition 7). From respondents’ 
perspectives cascading failures are experienced in the form of contagious 
failures, which propagate from one infrastructure to another through the 
interactions or exchange of resources among interdependent infrastructures. For 
instance, data from Case study (1) revealed that after the 2011 Queensland 
floods, damages on roads systems resulted in damages of drainage systems of 
many roads and highways in 110 locations. This eventually escalated into damage 
of sewerage systems in 65 more locations. This indicates that it is only after 
experiencing these contagious failures multiple times, that damages tend to 
escalate into greater failures across other interdependent infrastructures. This 
finding is consistent with Peters, et al. (2008, p. 1) who mentioned that 
catastrophic events are often generated by cross-scale interactions, which often 
result in “surprises” with severe consequences. Additionally, Dudenhoeffer, 
Permann, and Manic (2006) mentioned that escalating failures occurs when the 
disruption in one infrastructure increases in severity and then generates the 
disruption of a second infrastructure.  
The exploratory study revealed that when infrastructures are physically 
interdependent, infrastructure unavailability would have high impacts on their 
recovery efforts, whereas moderate and low impacts are expected from the lack 
of infrastructure reliability and resources transferability respectively. The study 
also highlighted that when cyber interdependencies are experienced between 
infrastructures, high impacts on the recovery effort are expected from 
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infrastructure reliability while moderate impacts are expected from both 
infrastructure availability and resources transferability. These findings were not 
consistent with the cross-case analysis results, which indicated that the 
propagation of cascading and escalating failures is essentially linked to 
infrastructures behaviours and their interdependencies’ characteristics. In fact, 
Rasmussen (1990, p. 4) mentioned that latent weaknesses that already exist 
within infrastructures in their respective organisations could potentially trigger 
“accidents waiting to happen” when they interact with other infrastructures 
outside of their organisations. Therefore, whether experiencing physical or cyber 
interdependencies, cascading failures occur when infrastructures interact with 
one another and when these failures occur multiple times, there is a possibility 
that cascading failures escalate into greater failures. 
For interactions to take place both physically and virtually, resources need 
to be transferred from one infrastructure to another (Dudenhoeffer, et al., 2006; 
Pitilakis & Kakderi, 2011; Rinaldi, et al., 2001). Findings from the within-case 
analysis of Organisation 1 revealed that the incapacity to receive and transfer 
resources in a timely manner can affect the recovery effort of a damaged 
infrastructure, which can in turn affect the recovery of others infrastructures and 
then result in cascading and escalating failures of various infrastructures 
(Proposition 10a). In the example mentioned earlier in which road damages 
escalated to sewerage systems, respondent (D12) indicated that being unable to 
receive resources from utilities providers contributed to a large extent to 
cascading failures, which later escalated to several other recovery sites across the 
region. This indicates that the lack of resources can contribute to cascading and 
escalating failures across an interdependent network.  
The cross-case analysis revealed that infrastructure needs to be available, 
or at least in a functioning state to provide resources (Proposition 8b). 
Parandehgheibi and Modiano (2013) mentioned that the 2013 Italian blackout 
was generated by a small failure in the power grid, which cascaded to some of the 
switches in the communication system. The lack of power eventually resulted in 
failure of the system and affected approximately 55 million people. This indicates 
that unavailability of an infrastructure will impede its resources production and 
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without resources, no transfer can occur between infrastructures, and 
interdependency would eventually fail (G21, G22). Thus, availability of an 
infrastructure is critical to the recovery of interdependent infrastructures 
(Proposition 8a). Although most respondents in the exploratory study related 
infrastructure reliability to infrastructure availability and resources 
transferability, it appeared evident that infrastructure reliability does not 
directly affect the recovery of interdependent infrastructures. Respondents (D41, 
P42) and (S21, S22, and P22) revealed that the impacts of reliability on post-disaster 
recovery can only be perceived when infrastructures are not available and 
resources cannot be transferred (Propositions 9b and 10b). It is therefore 
through infrastructure availability and resources transferability that 
infrastructure reliability will affect the recovery effort.  
 
8.3.2 Rapid and Slow Propagation of Failures  
Rijpma (1997) mentioned that tight interdependent systems, which 
generally have complex interactions, are likely to experience stochastic 
escalation of failures. According to Rijpma (1997), any small or random incident 
in such infrastructures has the potential to cascade across interdependent 
infrastructures and create greater damages (Boin & McConnell, 2007; Perrow, 
1984; Perrow, 1999, 2011; Rijpma, 1997; Whitney, 2003). However, for loose 
interdependent systems, damages in one system can be minimized or reduced 
before reaching other interdependent infrastructures (Perrow, 1999). As 
previously mentioned, the degrees of interdependencies denote the strengths or 
intensities of the interrelationships that exist across interdependent 
infrastructures. The types of interdependencies such as physical and cyber have 
the potential to induce cascading and escalating failures across infrastructures. 
Therefore, it is the degree or intensity of the existing types of interdependencies 
that would inform whether or not great or minimal failures would occur between 
certain infrastructures (Proposition 11a).  
In this regard, the cross-case analysis performed in Chapter 7 indicated that 
the propagation of failures across infrastructures depends to a large extent on the 
degrees at which infrastructures are interdependent. Data from the four cases 
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revealed that failures tend to propagate slowly across infrastructures that are 
loosely interdependent, whereas failures propagate rapidly for tight or strong 
interdependencies (Proposition 11b). For instance, the analysis of Case Study 
(1) revealed that in the aftermath of the 2011 Queensland floods, the strong 
interactions between energy and ICT systems induced rapid propagation of 
failures from electricity outage to the switches of communication system, 
affecting the entire ICT system (G11, G12). On the other hand, the study also 
revealed that the loose interactions between transport and sewerage systems 
induced slow propagation of failures from damaged roads to sewerage systems 
at more than 65 locations. This finding is consistent with several other studies 
including those performed by Perrow (1984), Rijpma (1997) and Rinaldi et al. 
(2001), which explained that failures across tight interdependent systems are 
inevitable and they tend to escalate rapidly with almost no obstruction across 
infrastructures. Rijpma (1997) explained that this is due to the fact that tight-
coupled systems follow a time-dependent production where their interactions 
cannot be halted under any circumstances, whereas interactions of loose 
interdependent systems can easily be suspended to prevent failures from 
propagating to other infrastructures (Rasmussen, Nixon, & Warner, 1990; 
Rijpma, 1997; Whitney, 2003).  
This significant finding demonstrates that interactions between 
interdependent infrastructures, which contribute to their degrees of 
interdependencies, can also dictate the propagation of failures across 
infrastructures (Proposition 12). As previously mentioned, besides the types of 
interactions, the degrees of interdependencies of infrastructures are also 
manifest through the frequency of interactions, and the ways infrastructures 
interact with their critical enabling infrastructures (Proposition 5a). Although 
these attributes were described as critical success factors to the degrees of 
interdependencies, most respondents admitted that except for infrastructure 
systems such as ICT and energy systems, which need to constantly operate in 
real-time, the frequency of exchange has little influence on how failures would 
propagate across interdependent infrastructures (Proposition 13). The cross-
case analysis of case studies (1) and (3) revealed that the frequency at which 
resources or services were exchanged across infrastructures after the 2011 
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floods did not directly affect the recovery effort. The recovery effort relied 
essentially on the provision of minimum resources or services necessary for the 
fast recovery and rehabilitation of damaged infrastructures.  
This research revealed that the evolution of cascading or escalating failures 
depends on the initial conditions of the critical enabling infrastructure. The 
analysis of the four cases also revealed that the propagation of failures begins 
from the primary contributing or critical enabling infrastructure and varies in 
function of the extent of damages and the degrees of interdependencies that exist 
across infrastructures. If the critical enabling infrastructure is restored in a timely 
manner after disasters, this can reduce the risk of cascading and escalating 
failures across interdependent infrastructures during post-disaster recovery 
(Proposition 14).  
 
8.3.3 Practical Implications  
This research has examined how elements of infrastructure 
interdependencies such as the types and degrees of interdependencies can 
influence the recovery effort. The research has revealed that such 
interdependencies rely essentially on critical success factors such as 
infrastructure availability, reliability and resources transferability (for the types 
of interdependencies); as well as the types of interactions, the frequency of 
exchange and the relationship with the critical enabling infrastructures (for the 
degrees of interdependencies). Some of the practical implications from the cross-
case analysis and previous literature reviews on how to maintain these critical 
factors include:  
Practical implications related to the types of Interdependencies;  
 Since infrastructure damages are difficult to predict, Tamuz and 
Harrison (2006) encouraged organisations to focus on safety 
protections of their infrastructures (Tamuz & Harrison, 2006). 
Infrastructures providers need to make sure that their 
infrastructures continuously produce the intended services 
necessary for the functioning of other interdependent 
infrastructures during recovery. Infrastructure availability needs to 
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be maintained at all times to enable the transfer of resources to be 
performed in a timely manner.  
 Turner and Pidgeon (1997) advised that organisations should 
simply identify and manage threats as they develop, since none of 
them has the predictive ability to recognize well in advance threats 
and factors that lead to failure (Dekker & Pruchnicki, 2014; Pidgeon 
& O'Leary, 2000; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). However, the cross-case 
analysis revealed that implementing efficient preparedness and 
preventive measures can increase infrastructure reliability and 
guarantee its availability after disasters.  
 Effective mitigation measures also contribute to maintaining 
reliability between interdependent infrastructures after disasters. 
According to La Porte (2007), applying mitigation measures such as 
a redundancy approach would enable organisations to maintain 
infrastructure reliability. For instance, if one component of a system 
fails, organisations would make sure that another component is 
available as a backup to replace it (La Porte, 1996; Weick, et al., 
2008). This goal can only be achieved after acquiring greater 
knowledge of the technology and production processes of the 
infrastructure (La Porte, 1996; Weick, et al., 2008). 
 Infrastructure owners should develop criteria for supplying and 
receiving resources from other infrastructures. This will provide a 
succinct and clear evidence of the sort of influence that each 
infrastructure will have on the other according to their types and 
degrees of interdependencies. 
 Policies and regulations that facilitate interdependent relationships 
across infrastructures need to be improved by the organisations 
involved in the exchange of services.  
 
Implications related to the degrees of interdependencies:  
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 Decisions made to minimize the effects of infrastructure 
interdependencies have to be based on the types of 
interdependencies, but most importantly on the degrees at which 
these interdependencies exist. Therefore, organisations need to 
identify the degrees at which their infrastructures are 
interdependent through the types of interactions and the frequency 
at exchange with other infrastructures. 
 For such systems, the majority of failures relate directly to 
organisations where accidents appeared to be “normal” since they 
tend to begin with something that seems ordinary within the 
organisation itself rather than the technology (Whitney, 2003, p. 2).  
 Whitney (2003, p. 2) mentioned that failures tend to originate from 
something that seems ordinary, whether internal or external to 
organisations. This research revealed that cascading and escalating 
failures originate from the critical enabling infrastructure. 
Therefore, infrastructure providers need to identify the critical 
enabling infrastructure to which their infrastructure continuously 
depend on, as well as which infrastructures continuously depend on 
their infrastructure.  
 Timely recovery or rehabilitation of the critical enabling 
infrastructure can minimise or reduce the risk of cascading and 
escalating failures across interdependent infrastructures.  
 
8.4 EFFECTIVE RECOVERY MEASURES TO MINIMIZE 
INTERDEPENDENCIES ISSUES 
Pidgeon and O'Leary (2000) mentioned that good disaster management 
requires good general management. The exploratory study and the cross-case 
analysis revealed that most organisations follow a well-established disaster 
management plan to guide their recovery effort. However, the within-analysis of 
the four cases revealed that there are no concrete coordination and prioritization 
guidelines that explicitly address issues related to infrastructure 
interdependencies during post-disaster recovery. Organisations tend to adopt a 
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reactive rather than a proactive approach to deal with failures related to 
infrastructures interdependencies. In this regard, respondents suggested that 
elements of interdependencies should be incorporated into existing disaster 
management plans in order to manage the risk of cascading and escalating 
failures across interdependent infrastructures after disasters. 
According to Bryson et al. (2002), recovery processes should aim at 
minimizing existing damage to infrastructures by identifying, prioritizing and 
safeguarding critical infrastructures that are more vulnerable than others within the 
interdependent network. Respondents from Case Study (1) suggested that 
infrastructure interdependencies issues should be identified, reported and 
documented in various reports and guidelines to keep organisations informed 
and aware of ways to deal with interdependency issues across infrastructures 
during recovery. Amaratunga and Haigh (2011) mentioned that expertise and 
knowledge from disaster practitioners tends to be lost when they are not recorded 
and documented (Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011; Graebner, Martin, & Roundy, 2012; 
Moe & Pathranarakul, 2006). (Alexander, 2002; Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011, p. 213). 
Thus, keeping a record of past interdependency issues would increase 
organisational awareness on existing interdependency issues between 
infrastructures and contribute greatly in reducing impacts of infrastructure 
interdependencies on post-disaster recovery (Proposition 18a).  
Kajitani and Sagai (2009) mentioned that recovery effort should be performed 
in the form of partnerships that involve multiple organisational sectors such as 
energy, water (including wastewater), transport, and information and 
communication systems (Kajitani & Sagai, 2009; Kröger, 2008; McDaniels, Chang, 
Peterson, Mikawoz, & Reed, 2007). Most respondents from Case Study (2) 
mentioned the need for effective collaboration among infrastructure providers 
and organisations involved in disaster recovery across the region. The cross-case 
analysis revealed that interdependencies issues were only discussed after the 
2011 Queensland floods during meetings with infrastructure providers. From the 
perspectives of respondents, such a collaborative approach would have been 
more effective if it was implemented before disasters occur. The cross-case 
analysis revealed that effective collaboration and coordination among 
organisations involved in recovery effort have the potential to reduce 
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interdependencies issues during post-disaster (Proposition 16b). Therefore, 
rather than adopting a reactive approach respondents suggested that it was best 
to have a proactive insight in recovering interdependent infrastructures.  
Little (2002) mentioned that the high degree of interdependency that exists 
between critical infrastructures requires that entire interconnected networks be 
considered when assessing the impacts of disastrous events or when evaluating 
restoration methods (Little, 2002, 2004). Organisation 2 suggested that 
prioritization of recovery activities should be performed in function of 
infrastructures interdependencies, where the critical enabling infrastructure 
would be repair first to enable the recovery of other interdependent 
infrastructures. However, mot organisations revealed that in most cases, the 
recovery effort and prioritization activities are driven by available funding. 
Sufficient available funding would result in effective recovery effort 
(Proposition 16a). Although most organisations tend to rely on State and 
Federal government to provide for recovery funding, data from interviews 
provided by Organisation 3 and 4 indicated having sufficient betterment funding 
would contribute in building back stronger infrastructures and reduce 
interdependency issues during recovery.  
 
8.5 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF INTEGRATED RESEARCH FINDINGS 
A summary of integrated research findings and their practical implications 
has been provided in Table 8.1. Findings were listed according to research 
questions (RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3) to which they provided responses.
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Table 8.1: Research findings and practical implications 
Research 
Questions  





































































This research revealed that elements of infrastructure 
interdependencies such as the types of 
interdependencies, including physical and cyber 
interdependencies, along with the degrees of 
interdependencies, whether tight or loose, have the 
potential to impede the post-disaster recovery. 
 
 
The types of interdependencies rely essentially on 
critical success factors such as infrastructure availability 
and reliability as well as resources transferability, 
whereas the degrees of interdependencies rely on the 
types of interactions, the frequency of exchange and the 
relation with critical enabling infrastructure 
 The practical implications of research findings suggest that 
organisations be aware of the types of interdependencies that 
exist between infrastructures and identify to what degrees or 
extent these interdependencies are manifest before disasters 
occur.  
 Physical and cyber interdependencies can directly affect the 
recovery effort; as such it is recommended that extensive 
knowledge be built on how these specific types of 
interdependencies affect each infrastructure system.  
 It is recommended that organisations focus on dealing with any 
issues that could hinder infrastructure availability and reliability 
as well as the transfer of resources to maintain physical and 
cyber interdependencies across their infrastructures. Similarly, 
the frequency of interactions and the relationship with the 
critical enabling infrastructure should be strongly established 
between infrastructures before disasters occur.  
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This research suggests that the types of and the degrees 
of interdependencies are invariable attributes that exist 
between infrastructures even before disaster occur. 
 
The types of interdependencies have the potential to 
generate physical or cyber disruptions from their 
physical and cyber interdependencies. These 
disruptions can result in cascading or escalating failures 
across multiple interdependent infrastructures.  
 
The degrees of interdependencies, whether tight or 
loose, would dictate how failures would propagate from 
one infrastructure to another.  
 Recommendations from this research include organisations to 
be focused on ensuring the safety of their own infrastructure in 
order to maintain their availability. Infrastructure availability 
needs to be maintained to enable the transfer of resources to be 
performed in a timely manner during recovery.  
 Organisations are encouraged to apply a redundancy approach, 
where backups of components of their infrastructures are stored 
or kept to be used once the infrastructure is damaged.  
 Better automatic control systems and more data collection and 
processing should be implemented for ICT systems.  
 Adding transmission capacity of energy systems to other 
infrastructures 
 Organisations are urged to identify the critical enabling 
infrastructure with which their infrastructure are 
interdependent in order and manage treats or risks of failures 
from such infrastructure before they occur. 
 Improving policies and regulations that guide the exchange of 
resources or services across infrastructures. Additionally 
decisions made during recovery should be driven by 
infrastructure interdependencies. 
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This research suggested that elements of infrastructure 
interdependencies be incorporated into existing disaster 
recovery plan. 
 
A proactive rather a reactive approach should be used 
for the disaster recovery projects. Such proactive 
approach should be implemented in the form of 
partnerships that involve multiple organisational 
sectors such as energy, water (including wastewater), 
transport, and information and communication systems. 
 
Prioritization of recovery activities should be performed 
in function of interdependencies across infrastructures. 
 Good theory or knowledge of existing interdependencies across 
critical infrastructure systems such as energy, water, transport 
and ICT systems should be gained by organisations and inserted 
into existing guidelines.  
 Better training for human operators should be provided  
 Effective communication and constant information should be 
established between organisations involved in the recovery 
process, including government entities such as state and local 
government as well as infrastructure providers and the 
community.  
 The critical enabling infrastructure should be repaired first to 
enable the recovery of other interdependent infrastructures. 
 Cost-effective changes such as providing available funding for 
betterment can also reduce the risk of interdependencies issues 
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8.6 SUMMARY 
This research investigated how infrastructure interdependencies influence 
the post disaster recovery effort. The principal objective of this undertaking was 
to develop a framework that will support and guide the inclusion of various 
elements of infrastructure interdependencies in a post-disaster strategy 
development. This chapter discussed the two main aspects of the need for 
integrating infrastructure interdependencies into a post-disaster recovery 
strategy. Primarily, elements of infrastructure interdependencies such as the 
types of interdependencies have the potential to generate physical and cyber 
disruptions across infrastructures during post-disaster recovery. Secondly, the 
degrees at which infrastructures are interdependent could induce rapid and slow 
propagation of failures across these infrastructures. Along with identifying the 
disruptive effects of elements of interdependencies on post-disaster recovery, the 
chapter highlighted practical implications of the key findings as well as some of 
the effective measures that could potentially reduce interdependencies effects. 
The next chapter will conclude this research and provide recommendations for 
further research in both the disaster management field and information systems 
field.  
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Chapter 9: CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
A natural disaster can affect infrastructures in a multitude of ways and to a 
large extent, the consequences of a disaster on one infrastructure pose the risk of 
further consequences to other interdependent infrastructures. During post-
disaster recovery, such disturbances can potentially induce a domino effect, 
during which damages to one infrastructure may result in even greater 
disturbances on other infrastructures, thus impeding recovery efforts. This 
research has investigated the influence of infrastructures interdependencies on 
post-disaster recovery. It has explored and identified (1) which elements of 
infrastructures interdependencies have the potential to directly affect the 
recovery effort, (2) how these elements impede the post-disaster recovery effort, 
and (3) how the disruptive effects of these elements can be reduced or minimized 
during post-disaster recovery.  
The literature review performed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this research 
investigated the existing body of knowledge related to the research topic, 
providing an understanding of infrastructure interdependencies on one hand, 
and about post-disaster recovery on the other hand, thus allowing the discovery 
of the gaps across these two fields of studies. Chapter 2 reviewed some the 
contributing and challenging factors in implementing an effective recovery effort. 
Recent studies have demonstrated that management of disaster recovery is best 
approached by possession of good theory and knowledge of previous recoveries. 
This can serve as a point of reference to guide the next recovery effort. Recovery 
of infrastructures is also considered to be successful when it is implemented from 
a community development perspective and when it follows a set of well-
coordinated recovery activities. This is generally achieved when recovery is 
conducted through an inter-organisational collaboration between the 
organisations involved in disaster recovery. The lack of effective coordination 
and collaboration not only compounds the impacts of natural disasters, but also 
affects the rebuilding of resilient infrastructures during post-disaster recovery. 
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As most organisations are more concerned with the challenges mentioned above, 
they often disregard interdependency issues that lead to infrastructure failure 
during recovery. Chapter 3 explored the link between infrastructures 
interdependencies and the post-disaster recovery effort. Chapter 3 has 
demonstrated that critical infrastructures have the tendency to fail not only due 
to their own attributes and complexities, but also due to the interdependent 
relationships that link them to other infrastructure systems. Elements of 
interdependencies such as the types and degrees of interdependencies, 
infrastructure behaviour and environment, as well as the types of failures and 
states of operation of infrastructures contribute to their vulnerabilities and to the 
propagation of failures across interdependent infrastructures. 
The exploratory and interpretive nature of this research led to the selection of 
the qualitative approach depicted in Chapter 4, which adopted an exploratory pilot 
study and a multiple case study method to unveil research questions. The 
exploratory pilot study was used to determine which key elements of infrastructure 
interdependencies have the potential to impede the recovery effort. A series of in-
depth interviews was conducted with general managers; disaster recovery 
coordinators as well as project managers to understand the contextual 
framework of the research subject, to test the practicability of research 
constructs identified in the literature and to discover which elements of 
interdependencies among those identified in the literature can directly affect the 
recovery effort.  
The types of research questions raised, the extent of control that the 
researcher had on the actual course of the research, and the degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events justified the selection of a multiple 
case study methodology. Four cases were selected in this research with the intent 
to produce either similar predictive results (literal replication) or contrasting 
results with a predictive aspect (theoretical replication) of how infrastructure 
interdependencies influence the post-disaster recovery effort. The cases were 
also used to explain how the disruptive effects generated from elements of 
interdependencies can be minimized during the recovery period. Contributing 
results from the four cases led to the generalisation of the theory and, more 
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particularly, to the development of recommendations that could be applied to 
new cases. Pursuing this approach has led to the development of a rich, 
theoretical framework that can be applied to post-disaster recovery projects of 
flood events in the future.  
Chapter 5 reported on the results of the exploratory study and clarified 
which elements of interdependencies directly influence the recovery effort. The 
section revealed six critical success factors when maintaining interdependencies 
across infrastructures. Chapter 6 and 7 presented the results of the within-case 
and cross-case analysis of the four case studies. These analyses captured the 
influence of the types of interdependencies such as physical and cyber 
interdependencies, as well as the degrees of interdependencies including loose 
and tight interdependencies. These two chapters further revealed the influence 
the six critical success factors on the post-disaster recovery, as well as effective 
recovery measures to minimize their overall impacts on the recovery effort.  
This current chapter 9 summarises the main findings on how various 
elements of interdependency influence the recovery process. The chapter 
highlights the overall contributions and limitations of the research and provides 
perspectives for future research directions.  
 
9.2 MAJOR FINDINGS  
The review of literature revealed six elements of infrastructures 
interdependencies including the types and degrees of interdependencies, 
infrastructure behaviour and environment, as well as the types of failures and 
states of operation of infrastructure. The conceptual framework which was 
derived from the literature review in Chapter 3 hypothetically established the 
relationship between elements of interdependency and proposed that only four 
of the six elements, including the types and degrees of interdependency, as well 
as the types of failures and the states of operation of infrastructures can influence 
the recovery effort. 
Findings in Chapter 5 (exploratory study), Chapter 6 (within-case analysis) 
and Chapter 7 (cross-case analysis) including the discussion in Chapter 8 
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revealed that elements of infrastructure interdependencies such as the types and 
degrees of interdependencies have the potential to impede the post-disaster 
recovery effort of critical infrastructures. Infrastructures characteristics and 
environment are confined within a single infrastructure paradigm, and generally 
issues related to these are dealt with by organisations regardless of disasters 
occurring or not. Both of these elements of interdependency were found to have 
relatively low significance in revealing the influence of infrastructure 
interdependencies on post-disaster recovery. Infrastructure characteristics in a 
broader context reflect on the conditions that infrastructures displayed before 
disasters occur. Additionally, the sole examination of infrastructure environment 
alone would constitute in itself a unique blend of several other studies, which could 
each focus on one aspect of infrastructure environment and its influence on the post-
disaster recovery of interdependent infrastructures.  
The cross-case analysis indicated that the types of interdependencies 
denote the nature of the interrelationships across infrastructures, while the 
degrees of interdependencies reveal the strengths of these relationships. The 
types of interdependencies exist due to the mutual dependencies across critical 
infrastructures at the operational level, whereas the degrees of 
interdependencies demonstrate the ways by which infrastructures are mutually 
dependent. The analyses of the four cases revealed that the consequences and 
effects of the types and degrees of interdependencies on the post-disaster 
recovery are what really vary across interdependent infrastructures and they can 
be observed through different types of failures. The types of failures engender the 
various states of operations of infrastructures. The states of operation of 
infrastructures tend to generally vary from optimal design (where the 
infrastructure is damaged but still considered to be functional) to complete 
failure with a total loss of services to all dependent infrastructures. These 
conditions would provide appropriate recovery measures needed to restore 
infrastructures in a timely manner. Hence, the types of failures and states of 
operation of infrastructure are variable attributes, whereas the types of 
interdependencies and the degrees of interdependencies are invariant attributes 
of interdependency. These elements of interdependency are formed according to 
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the dependencies that critical infrastructures manifest towards one another and 
tend to exist independently and regardless of the occurrence of disasters. 
The types of interdependencies are manifest in various forms including 
physical, cyber, geographical and logical. Logical interdependency is entirely a 
reflection of human decisions that guide policies and public opinion of an 
organisation, whether there is a disaster or not. This research revealed that 
during post-disaster recovery, logical interdependency is perceived through the 
influence of decision makers from various organisations, including infrastructure 
providers, as well as federal, state and local government agencies. However, such 
interdependency is considered to be unstable as it only provides a broader 
perspective of what the influence of infrastructure interdependencies would be 
on the post-disaster recovery. The human perspective of logical interdependency 
is unreliable as human decisions have proven to be subject to many errors in 
various circumstances and as such it has been excluded from the conceptual 
framework.  
During post-disaster recovery, physical interdependencies are restored 
first, regardless of the geographical interdependencies found among critical 
infrastructures. Geographical interdependency only exists when a disaster 
causes simultaneous disturbances across several infrastructures, whereas 
physical interdependency exists when there are interactions between 
infrastructures, during which the change in condition of one infrastructure can 
have serious impact on the functioning of another infrastructure. Thus, 
geographical interdependency has been contextualised as part of physical 
interdependency.  
This research revealed that interdependent infrastructures tend to fail 
mostly due to their physical and cyber interdependencies, which are essentially 
based on the availability and reliability of infrastructures, as well as resources 
transferability. An infrastructure has to be available or in a functioning state in 
order to maintain its interdependencies with others infrastructures during 
recovery. The unavailability of an infrastructure will affect the transferability of 
resources from one infrastructure to the next and its reliability to provide such 
resources when needed during post-disaster recovery. This could generate series 
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of failures across infrastructures that are best described as cascading and 
escalating failures. Cyber interdependency will fail in the same way that physical 
interdependency will if infrastructure availability, reliability and resources 
transferability are not successfully maintained during recovery. The lack of these 
critical success factors also results in cascading or escalating failures across 
interdependent infrastructures. 
The propagation of cascading and escalating failures across infrastructures 
depends on the intensity or degrees of interdependencies between critical 
infrastructures. Failures tend to propagate slowly across infrastructures that are 
loosely interdependent, whereas they propagate rapidly with tight or strong 
interdependencies. However, the degrees to which infrastructures are 
interdependent are manifest through the types of interaction between 
infrastructures, the frequency of these interactions and the relationship with the 
most critical infrastructure or the primary contributing infrastructure to 
interdependency. The propagation of failures begins from the critical enabling 
infrastructure and varies in function of the types of the disasters and of the extent 
of damages. If the critical enabling infrastructure is restored in a timely manner 
after a disaster, this can reduce the risk of cascading and escalating failures across 
interdependent infrastructures during post-disaster recovery. 
This research proposed several recommendations that can contribute to the 
reduction of the risks of cascading and escalating failures across interdependent 
infrastructures during post-disaster recovery. Organisational awareness of 
existing interdependencies issues between infrastructures was found to be 
primordial before undertaking a recovery effort of infrastructure. The research 
revealed that learning can contribute to a deeper understanding of complex 
issues and can reduce the potential for surprises with regards to issues related to 
interdependent systems. Adopting a proactive approach to recovery, where 
effective collaboration and coordination are implemented among organisations 
also has the potential to reduce interdependencies issues during post-disaster. 
Effective preparedness and mitigation measures would greatly contribute to the 
reduction of the impacts of infrastructure interdependencies during post-
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disaster recovery. Such measures along with available recovery funding would 
promote faster recovery of interdependent infrastructures. 
Overall, research findings supported and confirmed assumptions made in 
the conceptual framework, which stipulated that the types and degrees of 
interdependencies have the potential to induce or generate the different types of 
failures, which will then engender the state of operation of infrastructures. The 
post-disaster recovery effort will then be implemented in function of the state at 
which infrastructures are found after a disaster. 
 
9.3 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
The following section summarizes the theoretical and practical 
contributions of this research.  
9.3.1 Contributions to theory  
There was no predefined theory from which the veracity of research 
knowledge was able to depend upon. In fact, multiple realities needed to be 
understood both from the perspective of infrastructure interdependencies and 
from the perspective of post-disaster recovery. The post-disaster recovery relies 
essentially on guidelines and standards that guide the recovery effort, as well as 
on decisions from organisations involved in the recovery process. On the other 
hand, as previously mentioned, the concept of interdependency has been 
examined within a broad spectrum of research studies including statistical 
physics, complex adaptive systems (CAS), discrete-event dynamical systems, and 
hybrid, layered network studies. Under these various themes, some researchers 
have identified and explained six dimensional characteristics of interdependency 
including the types and degrees of interdependency; infrastructure 
characteristics and environment; as well as the types of failures and the state of 
operation of infrastructures. As comprehensive as these studies appeared to be, 
most were conducted within a preventive pre-disaster context and had little 
affiliation with the post-disaster recovery effort. None of these previous studies 
have investigated how the emergent behaviours of interdependent 
infrastructures could potentially impede their recovery processes.  
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This research provided an understanding on elements of infrastructures 
interdependencies that have the potential to impede the post-disaster recovery. 
The research revealed how the types of interdependencies have the potential to 
induce cascading and escalating failures across interdependent infrastructures 
and how the degrees of interdependencies can dictate the propagation of failures 
across infrastructures. Additionally, this research identified critical success 
factors that contribute to maintain the types and degrees of interdependencies 
during post-disaster recovery. Finally, this research conclusively provided 
suggestions on how the disruptive effects of elements of infrastructure 
interdependencies can be minimized during post-disaster recovery.  
 
9.3.2 Contributions to methods 
This research used qualitative methods to provide a simple and concise 
understanding of the overall influence of infrastructure interdependencies, at a 
macro-level, on post-disaster recovery. An integrative literature review was 
performed to unveil the concept of interdependency from its original etymology 
and from other research study areas, in order to investigate how 
interdependency can be contemplated within the post-disaster recovery context. 
An exploratory pilot study was first conducted to provide an understanding of 
which elements of infrastructure interdependencies have the potential to impede 
the recovery effort of large infrastructure systems such as water (including 
sanitation), transport (including roads and rails systems), energy and ICT. The 
exploratory study used an exploration for discovery and an investigative 
exploration to obtain a firsthand understanding of elements of interdependency 
and to discover when during post-disaster recovery, infrastructure 
interdependencies, could potentially impede the recovery effort.  
An inductive theory building approach implemented with multiple case 
studies was used to investigate the multifaceted problems related to how 
infrastructure interdependencies affect the post-disaster recovery effort. These 
methods were used to develop a theoretical framework, which explains the 
fundamental roles that infrastructures interdependencies play in generating 
cascading and escalating failures. The framework reveals how the influence of 
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infrastructures interdependencies is perceived through the resulting states of 
operation of infrastructures after experiencing cascading and escalating failures. 
Additionally, the research reveals how the disruptive effects of these elements 
can be minimized or reduced during post-disaster recovery. 
 
9.3.3 Practical contributions to the post-disaster recovery field 
The examination of the influence of infrastructure interdependencies on 
post-disaster recovery efforts remains poorly investigated, particularly in the 
fields of disaster management, project management, and construction 
management. Most organisations are still unaware of how to overcome 
interdependency issues across large infrastructure systems during post-disaster 
recovery. The real challenge during recovery has been to incorporate and 
implement the various elements of interdependencies into existing recovery 
strategies, guidelines or standards.  
This research proposed a theoretical framework that can serve as practical 
policy-based tool for organisations involved in the post-disaster recovery of 
critical infrastructure systems such as water (including sanitation), energy, 
transport and ICTs. The exploratory aspect of the developed framework provides 
a better understanding of the risks that infrastructures interdependencies pose 
to the post-disaster recovery of critical infrastructures. The predictive aspect of 
this research provides a clear depiction of ways to minimise the risks of failures 
from interdependent infrastructures from escalating to a disaster of a disaster 
scenario during recovery. The theoretical framework also provides better 
understanding on how to maintain interdependencies across infrastructures 
through their critical success factors during recovery. 
The framework helps to identify for each infrastructure: 
o The types of interdependencies and the level of availability, the level of 
reliability and the channels of transferability of resources. 
o The critical enabling infrastructure, the frequency of exchange of services, 
and the types of interaction with others infrastructures, to define the 
degree of interdependency.  
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o The potential sources of failure and the threshold between peak and off-
peak conditions.  
The knowledge and understanding gained from the adoption and extended 
use of the theoretical framework provides practical guidance in prioritizing the 
recovery of interdependent infrastructures during post-disaster recovery. The 
theoretical framework allows policy makers and disaster recovery managers to 
take informed actions that could result in positive recovery scenarios for disaster 
prone regions. For instance, investigating the types of failures engendered by 
interdependency provides an indication of the level of criticality of each 
infrastructure located within the interdependent network which encompasses 
them. Such knowledge will contribute to better recovery and rehabilitation 
processes and will provide a balance of theory-based and practical guidelines for 
policymakers and practitioners in order to implement effective post-disaster 
recovery planning for interdependent infrastructures. 
 
9.4 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS  
There were a number of limitations related to both the research scope and 
the design. The research was limited to flooding disasters, which are considered 
to be the costliest type of natural disasters in Australia. Thus, the data was 
primarily collected in Australia and most of the participants were essentially 
from city councils and regional councils from Queensland, Australia. Although the 
research claimed to be purposeful, the selection of participants also took into 
consideration the availability and proximity of respondents. Only General 
Managers, Disaster Recovery Coordinators, as well as Project Managers were 
invited to partake in the research. These participants were considered to be 
relevant and a good fit, with their many years of extensive experience in dealing 
with large infrastructure systems. They were able to provide a wide variety of 
rich and profound ideas on the topics of interest.  
The critical infrastructure systems examined in this research were limited 
to organisational systems such as energy (including thermoelectricity), transport 
(including roads and rails systems), water supply (including sanitation), and 
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Information and Communication Technology (ICT) systems. These critical 
infrastructure systems are considered to form the resource pillars on which the 
global security and prosperity of a country such as Australia stand. Elements of 
interdependencies across those systems were limited to those that are perceived 
at a macro-level, without considering the multiple types of interdependencies 
that exist at a micro-level or within each infrastructure.  
However, although context-specific to Australia, this study provides lessons 
for other countries where similar hydro-meteorological natural disasters and 
post-disaster recovery issues occur and where addressing the impacts of 
infrastructures interdependencies are of great necessity. Regardless of the 
locations or the infrastructure, management of infrastructures during post-
disaster recovery can be affected by the interdependencies that exist between 
different systems. A fundamental characteristic of these interdependencies is 
that often the failure of an infrastructure can result in the failure of other 
interdependent infrastructures, which can in turn result in the knock-on failures 
of other infrastructures. 
 
9.5 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research provides the possibility for the development of new research 
along similar lines in a wide variety of disaster-prone countries where post-
disaster recovery practices can take into consideration interdependencies issues 
across critical infrastructures. The theoretical framework developed in this 
research could be applied in a closed environment, while looking at 
interdependencies of a single pair of infrastructures in details rather than several 
infrastructures. Additionally, detailed understanding of interdependencies from 
a different type of disaster will provide organisations with a platform to have a 
better picture of the potential impacts of interdependency on post-disaster 
recovery. 
The framework developed in this research provides standardized 
knowledge and awareness of existing elements of infrastructures 
interdependencies. Further research could focus on identifying where 
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interdependencies’ issues originate. Identifying the critical enabling 
infrastructures and proposing ways of improving its safety would contribute to 
new knowledge and to the current body of knowledge proposed by this research. 
The proposed framework could be refined to focus on the influence of each 
element of interdependencies in order to discover additional critical success 
factors. Elements of interdependencies such as the types of failures, whether 
cascading or escalating can further be studied using quantitative methods. 
Quantitative analytical tools such as the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) can be used to identify critical components of a system, whose failures 
can lead to cascading and escalating failures. FMEA can also be used to determine 
the effects of these critical components on the overall performance of the 
infrastructure systems to improve their safety. 
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APPENDIX B-Exploratory Pilot Study  
Semi-structured Interview questions 
 
1. How long have you been involved in post-disaster recovery projects? 
2. How are recovery activities organised during the short-and the long-
term recovery phases in the recovery guideline followed by your 
organisation? 
3. In what level does your organisation require collaboration with 
government lead agencies such as Federal and State government as well 
as (water/energy/ transport/ and ICT) infrastructure providers to 
achieve effective recovery? 
4. How does the lack of services or information from other infrastructures 
[such as Water/Transport/ Energy and ICT] affect the recovery process 
of your infrastructure?  
5. Could you describe some alternatives put in place by your organisation 
in order for infrastructures to be functional without the services from 
other partnering infrastructures during the post-disaster recovery?  
6. Which infrastructure would you consider to be the most critical 
infrastructure within the interdependent network that links water, 
transport, energy and ICT infrastructure systems?  
7. In the interdependent network existing between critical infrastructures, 
which infrastructure would you consider being the trigger element that 
can lead to a cascading or escalating failure? 
8. Could you please describe the conditions under which your 
infrastructure is still considered functional and serving its intended 
purpose after a disaster? 
9. How would you go about assessing the functionality of infrastructures 
after a disaster?  
10. Can you describe some of other challenges induce by infrastructure 





APPENDIX C-The Case Study Protocol  
Prior undertaking the main case study investigation, a pilot study was conducted 
with six  
 
The protocol defines the instruments and procedures to follow in conducting 
the case study and guides the investigator in data collection process. 
Part 1: Introduction to the research (5 min.) 
 Introduce myself and the research  
 Thank interviewees for consenting to the interview and taking time off to 
do it. 
 Introduce following concepts: Post-disaster recovery, Short-term 
disaster recovery, Resilience, Critical Infrastructures, Infrastructure 
Interdependency, Types of Interdependencies, Degrees of 
Interdependencies, Types of Failures, State of operation  
 Ensure confidentiality and provide ethics consent form for signature  
 
QUT has strict policy on ethics, and in order for this research to be carried, ethics 
had to be approved. That’s why before we start the interview I would like to ensure 
you that this interview is absolutely confidential, and in no way it could be 
apparent that responses came from you. Could you please read and sign this 
consent form to confirm your agreement to participate in this study.  
 
 Ask for permission to record the interview  
 
Part 2: Case Study Questions (40 min.) 
Demographic questions
 
11. Can you briefly describe yourself? 
a) How long have you been working for [company name]?  




c) Have you been involved in a post-disaster reconstruction of 
infrastructure project in Queensland in the past years for 
[company name]? If yes, how long were you involved and what 
were your role and responsibilities in post-disaster 
reconstruction?  
d) In what ways were you involved in the post-disaster recovery of 
infrastructure after the 2010 and 2011 Flood events, which 
affected Queensland regions such as Brisbane centre, Toowoomba 
centre and regions near Toowoomba including Lockyer Valley, 
and Grantham?  
e) Do you know anything about your company and its involvement 
in the post-disaster reconstruction of infrastructure after the 
1974 Flood event in Queensland?  If yes, Please briefly describe 
the role and responsibilities of your company in the post-disaster 
reconstruction of infrastructure after the 1974 Queensland 
Floods.  
12. What is the organisational structure of [company name], responsible of 
the post-disaster recovery of infrastructure system? 
a) How many team members are involved in a post-disaster 
reconstruction for [company name]? 
b) What are their roles and responsibilities? 
c) What is their respective expertise? 
d) Who are your main contacts in the team or other units? 
e) What makes them significant to your work? 
f) Is it possible for me to contact them? 
 
Post-disaster recovery investigation questions 
 
13. How is the post-disaster recovery program implemented in [company 
name]? 
a) Does your company follow a well-established process of 
reconstruction for Flood events? If yes, how are recovery 
activities subdivided between the long-term and the short-term 
recovery phases? If not, do you know why?  
b) What is the approximate time period adopted in your company’s 
recovery plan to indicate the end of short-term recovery and the 
beginning of long-term recovery phase? 
c) In the recovery management plan of your company, what are the 
activities that mark the transition from the short-term recovery 
phase in order to start the long-term recovery phase? 
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d) In what level do [company name] require collaboration with 
government lead agencies such as Federal and State government 
during the post-disaster recovery period? 
e) In what level do [company name] require collaboration with other 
lead agencies such as local councils and (water/energy/ 
transport/ and ICT) infrastructure providers during the post-
disaster recovery period? 
14. In the post-disaster recovery plan of the 2010 and 2011 Flood events 
scenario, what was the order of priorities for the short-term recovery 
process of [infrastructure name]?  
a) How long did the short-term recovery last?  
b) Would you classify the 2010 and 2011 post-disaster recovery as 
successful or unsuccessful? Please provide reasons for your 
answer. 
15. In the post-disaster recovery plan of the 1974 Flood event scenario, what 
was the order of priorities for the short-term recovery process of 
[infrastructure name]? 
a) How long did the short-term recovery last?  
b) Would you classify the 1974 post-disaster recovery as successful 
or unsuccessful? Please provide reasons for your answer.  
16. How would you compare the 1974 post-disaster recovery and the 2010 
and 2011 post-disaster recovery in terms of reconstruction period, 
activities and costs? Which recovery period do you consider to be the 





17. In [company name], how is the critical infrastructure network 
subdivided in term of infrastructure system/ subsystems/ 
structure/unit?  
 
Questions to determine how the types of interdependencies such as 
physical interdependency and cyber interdependency impede post-
disaster recovery effort 
Availability= Availability corresponds to the amount of shared services between 
critical infrastructures that need to be available in order for them to operate.  
18. Does [Infrastructure name] require services or information from 
external infrastructures to enable it to function? If so, to what extent do 
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[Infrastructure name] depends on input from other infrastructure to 
operate during post-disaster recovery?  
19. Does [infrastructure name] provide resources or services to other 
partnering infrastructures, allowing them to operate? If so, what are the 
services provided?  
20. How does your organisation measure interdependency with other 
partnering infrastructures? 
21. In which component of the critical infrastructure network, the 
interdependent relationship with collaborative infrastructures takes 
place? 
22. Does interdependency through the sharing of services or information 
with the partnering infrastructure facilitate post-disaster recovery 
effort? If so, how? 
23. Does the lack of sharing services or information with the partnering 
infrastructure affect the post-disaster recovery effort? If so, how? 
 
Reliability =the probability that resources or services will still be available to 
facilitate the sharing process between CIs during post-disaster recovery 
24. What makes your infrastructure's services beneficial to other dependent 
infrastructures during post-disaster recovery? 
25. How does your organisation establish reliability in the interdependent 
relationship with other partnering infrastructures? 
a) What are some alternatives put in place by your organisation in 
order for [infrastructure name] to continue sharing services with 
partnering infrastructure during post-disaster recovery? (For 
example during electricity breakdown or lack of communication 
or information).  
b) Could your infrastructure be considered to be the most reliable 
infrastructure within the interdependent network that links 
water, transport, energy and ICT infrastructure system? If so, 
why? 
26. To what extent does your infrastructure rely on services provided by 
partnering infrastructure during post-disaster recovery?  
27. To which infrastructure does [infrastructure name] rely the most during 
post-disaster recovery? 
28. To which infrastructure does [infrastructure name] rely the less during 
post-disaster recovery? 
Operability= conditions under which an infrastructure is still considered to be 
functional after a disaster in order to serve its intended purpose well and produce 
the minimum required resources for the supported infrastructure to function. 
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29. Under which conditions your infrastructure is still considered to be 
functional in order to serve its intended purpose after a disaster? 
30. What are the minimum resources or information needed by your 
infrastructure from partnering infrastructure in order to remain 
operational during short-term disaster recovery? 
31. What is the rate of production of resources or services shared by your 
infrastructure to partnering infrastructures to enable them to operate 
during short-term recovery phase?  
 
Transferability= the probability that an infrastructure will be able to convey or 
deliver resources to another infrastructure during post-disaster recovery. 
32. How does [Infrastructure name] provide services to partnering 
infrastructure, allowing them to function? 
33. How does [Infrastructure name] receive services from partnering 
infrastructure in order to operate? 
34. How long does it take for your infrastructure to produce services or 
resources requested by partnering infrastructure? 
35. How long does it take for your infrastructure to receive services or 
resources requested by partnering infrastructure? 
36. How does the interdependent relationship impact access on distribution 
channels during post-disaster recovery?  
 
Questions to determine how the degrees of interdependencies impede the 
post-disaster recovery effort? 
Tight interdependency= Tight interdependency means that infrastructures are 
highly dependent on one another in every level. 
37. Is your infrastructure highly dependent on resources or services 
provided by one of the partnering infrastructure? If so, to which 
partnering infrastructure your infrastructure is highly dependent on?  
38.  Does the tight relationship that exists with the partnering infrastructure 
affect the recovery process of your infrastructure? If so, how? 
Loose interdependency= Loose interdependency implies that the infrastructures 
are relatively interdependent of one other, and the state of one infrastructure is 
weakly correlated to the state of the other infrastructure. 
39. Is your infrastructure weakly dependent on resources or services 
provided by one of the partnering infrastructure? If so, to which 
partnering infrastructure your infrastructure is weakly dependent on?  
40.  Does the loose relationship that exists with the partnering infrastructure 




Linear Interaction= Linearity generally means that effects are proportional to 
causes. For example if an infrastructure shares a large amount of resources or 
services, it expects to receive as much as it has shared. Another way of expressing 
linearity is additivity; the total effect is the sum of the effects of the individual 
causes. For example if an industry provider wants its infrastructure to produce a 
certain amount of services, then it might either share the equivalent amount of 
resources or find an alternate infrastructure to provide the resources needed. The 
effect or result would be approximately the same.  
41. Do you consider the services shared by your infrastructure to be 
proportional to the services received? If so, explain how this affects the 
post-disaster recovery of your infrastructure?  
42. Does your infrastructure require services from two or more partnering 
infrastructures in order to operate? If so, describe the sharing sequence 
including direct and indirect interactions.  
 
Complex Interaction= Complex interactions are those in which one component of 
the system can interact with one or more other components outside of the normal 
production sequence, either by design or not by design.  
43. Do any of the interdependent relationships with the partnering 
infrastructure exist outside of the normal sharing sequence? If so, explain 
how this affects the post-disaster recovery of your infrastructure?  
 
Questions to determine how the types of failures impede the post-disaster 
recovery effort? 
Common cause failure= a common cause failure occurs when two or more 
infrastructure networks are disrupted at the same time because of some common 
cause, particularly natural disasters. 
Cascading failure= a cascading failure occurs when a disruption in one 
infrastructure causes the failure of a second infrastructure, which subsequently 
propagates on the rest of infrastructures. 
Escalating failure = an escalating failure on the other hand, occurs when the 
disruption in one infrastructure increase in severity and then generates the 
disruption of a second infrastructure, delaying the time for recovery or restoration 
of the second failure.  
44. Based on the description provided above, would you classify the types of 
failures that your infrastructure encountered in the aftermath of the 
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2010 and 2011 Flood events, as being common cause, cascading or 
escalating failure? 
45. How did the type of failure encountered by your infrastructure impeded 
on the post-disaster recovery process in the aftermath of the 2010 and 
2011 Flood events?  
46. Would you classify the types of failures that your infrastructure 
encountered in the aftermath of the 1974 Flood events, as being common 
cause, cascading or escalating failure? 
47. How did the type of failure encountered by your infrastructure impeded 
on the post-disaster recovery process in the aftermath of the 1974 Flood 
events?  
48. In the interdependent network that exist between your infrastructure 
and partnering infrastructures, which infrastructure would you consider 
to be the trigger element to provoke a cascading  or escalating failure? 
Questions to determine how do the states of operation of CIs after a 
disaster impede the post-disaster recovery effort? 
State of operation= varies from peak to off-peak conditions when infrastructures 
are at their normal state, and damaged or repaired states during the restoration 
period 
49. In trying to assess the state of operation of infrastructures, what are the 
criteria based on which your infrastructure is considered to be at normal 
state after a disaster? 
50. What are the criteria based on which your infrastructure is considered to 
be disrupted after a disaster? 
51. What are the criteria based on which your infrastructure is still 
considered being functional even after being disrupted?  
52. What is the partnering infrastructure, from which your infrastructure 
depends on continuously or nearly continuously during its normal state?  
53. What is the partnering infrastructure, from which your infrastructure 
depends on continuously or nearly continuously during its disrupted?  
54. During the short-term recovery period an infrastructure can function at 
well below its normal design state, but as long as it still provide what the 
engineer or project manager perceives as full service, then it will be 
considered as functional. 
55. What are the different milestones involved in restoring your damaged 
infrastructure to its normal functional state or optimal design state 
during the short-term recovery period? 
56. Are there any political, economical, social, technological, legal and 
environmental factors that can affect the operations and decision making 
during post-disaster recovery? If so, how?   
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APPENDIX D-Correspondence with Study 
Participants  
Sample approach email 
Subject Title: Participation in a research study on post-disaster recovery of infrastructure 
 
Dear [Name of the interviewee] 
 
My name is Erica Mulowayi and I am undertaking a PhD degree in the School of Civil Engineering and 
Built Environment at Queensland University of Technology (QUT) under the supervision of Dr 
Vaughan Coffey and Associate Professor Jonathan Bunker. 
 
I am currently trying to establish a “Framework that will support and guide the inclusion of various 
elements of infrastructure interdependencies in a post-disaster strategy development”, in 
Australia. An integral part of this research is to identify how the Types of Interdependencies, the 
Degrees of Interdependency, the Types of Failures due to interdependencies and the State of 
Operation of Critical Infrastructures, will affect post-disaster recovery efforts, particularly during the 
short-term recovery period. The framework will provide practical guidelines for policymakers and 
practitioners that will contribute to better reconstruction and rehabilitation processes for post 
disaster recovery projects, in order to achieve shorter recovery period while maintaining resilient 
infrastructure systems. 
 
In trying to achieve this, I have been investigating the 2010 and 2011 Queensland floods and seeking 
for additional case studies to explore the networked conditions that exist/existed between critical 
infrastructures such as transport (including roads and rails), water, energy and information and 
communication technology (ICT). 
 
Because of your expertise and knowledge post-disaster recovery of infrastructure projects, Dr 
Vaughan Coffey has suggested that I contact you directly to seek an interview with you at your 
convenience. The interview will only take up to 60 minutes and confidentiality and nondisclosure of 
any information on [Company name] is strictly guaranteed. In no way your name or the name of your 
company and any other participants of this study will be revealed and I am the sole researcher 
analysing the data. 
 
I have attached a flyer which describes the major aim and objective of this research for your perusal. 
A copy of the findings of this study will be available to you. 
 
Many thanks in advance for your support and for an opportunity to learn from your experiences. 
I look forward to hearing of your availability and to organising a time that best suits you for us to 
meet. 
Could you please contact me either by telephone or email (below) to organise a time and venue for 






APPENDIX E-Information Consent Form 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT RESEARCH PROJECT 
– Interview – 
 
The Influence of Infrastructure Interdependency on Post-Disaster 
Recovery 
 
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1500000140 
 
RESEARCH TEAM  
Principal Researcher: 
Erica Mulowayi PhD Candidate, Queensland University of 
Technology (QUT) 
Associate Researchers: Vaughan Coffey Principal Supervisor  
 Jonathan Bunker Associate Supervisor 
 
School of Civil Engineering & Built Environment, Science & Engineering 
Faculty, QUT 
 
Bambang Trigunarsyah External Supervisor, King Fahd University of 
Petroleum and Minerals 
 
DESCRIPTION 
This project is being undertaken as part of PhD Study for PhD Candidate Erica Mulowayi.   
 
The purpose of this research is to investigate how various elements of infrastructure 
interdependencies affect post-disaster recovery efforts, particularly during the short-term recovery. 
The proposed theory stipulates that the types and degrees of interdependencies between Critical 
Infrastructures (CIs) such as water (including wastewater), transport, energy and telecommunication 
generate different types of failures once being subjected to natural disasters. These failures indicate 
the states of operation of CIs, which influence the recovery process. While several well-defined 
research attempts have focused on the functioning of individual infrastructure sectors such as energy 
systems, transport infrastructure systems, ICT networks, and water and wastewater systems, very few 
have been seeking to link these infrastructures together in a form representative of the actual 
implementation of their interdependencies during the post-disaster recovery phase, including the 
short term recovery. The objective of this research is to develop a framework that will support and 
guide the inclusion of these various elements of infrastructure interdependencies in a post-disaster 
strategy development, focusing specifically on the short-term recovery phase in Australia. 
 
You are invited to participate in this project because of your expertise as a project manager with post-
disaster recovery of infrastructure projects. 
 
PARTICIPATION 
Your participation will involve an audio-recorded interview at your work premises, QUT, or other 
agreed location. The interview will take approximately one hour of your time. 
 
Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. If you do agree to participate you can withdraw 
from the project without comment or penalty. If you withdraw, on request any identifiable 
information already obtained from you will be destroyed. Your decision to participate or not 
participate will in no way impact upon your current or future relationship with QUT or with associated 
external organisations that are participating in this research. 
 
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
It is expected that this project will not benefit you directly. However, there is a likelihood that your 
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understanding of the impacts of infrastructure interdependencies on post-disaster recovery processes 
may improve as a result of your involvement in the research. The wider benefits of this study is the 
development of a practical framework that will contribute to better reconstruction and rehabilitation 
processes of interdependent critical infrastructures.  
 
This understanding, while not comprehensive, may result in recommendations for improvements of 
post-disaster recovery planning of critical infrastructures, in order to achieve shorter recovery period 
while maintaining resilient infrastructure systems. 
 
RISKS 
There are no risks beyond normal day-to-day living associated with your participation in this project. 
 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
All comments and responses will be treated confidentially unless required by law. 
 
The data from this study that is kept will not contain names or be identifiable after the completion of 
the project. Once all data are collected, names and means of identifying participants will be removed 
from the data and stored separately. The interview audio recordings will be transcribed and, if needed 
for my thesis or academic publication, visual images will be altered to remove any means of identifying 
participants. 
Please note that non-identifiable data collected in this project may be used as comparative data in 
future projects or stored on an open access database for secondary analysis. 
 
We would like to ask you to sign a written consent form (enclosed) to confirm your agreement to 
participate. 
 
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT 
If have any questions or require further information please contact one of the research team members 
below. 
 
Erica Mulowayi  +61 423 045 931   erica.mulowayi@hdr.qut.edu.au 
Vaughan Coffey +61 7 3138 1002    v.coffey@qut.edu.au 
Jonathan Bunker              +61 7 3138 5086              j.bunker@qut.edu.au 
 
 
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT 
QUT is committed to research integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  However, if you 
do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project you may contact the QUT 
Research Ethics Unit on 07 3138 5123 or email ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The QUT Research Ethics 
Unit is not connected with the research project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an 
impartial manner. 
 
Thank you for helping with this research project.  Please keep this sheet for your information. 
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